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Summary
This thesis consists of four self-contained essays at the nexus of applied microe-
conomics, behavioural economics, and environmental economics. In the essays of the
thesis, I use field experiments and econometric tools to examine the impact of mon-
etary and non monetary incentives for behavioural change during resource scarcity.
I use methods of eliciting intrinsic motivations and then empirically test theories on
the interaction of intrinsic motivation and extrinsic incentives. Specifically I analyse
whether and which incentives undermine, support, or are independent of existing
preferences, and whether incentives change behaviour.
The first two essays analyse two distinct types of conservation policy in Brazil:
i) direct payments from the state of Sa˜o Paulo to small landholders living in vulner-
able ecosystems conditional on the landholders conserving their land; and, ii) federal
policy to regulate, monitor and enforce land use in the Brazilian Amazon through
conservation zoning and creation of a public list of municipalities with high rates of
deforestation (“priority municipalities”) to increase visibility and thus accountabil-
ity.
The first essay1 uses a field experiment in Brazil to test if monetary incent-
ives to conserve land on private property in vulnerable ecosystems - “Payments for
Environmental Services” (PES) - crowd out demand for a conservation program.
Landholders are less likely to accept the higher monetary offers to conserve com-
pared to the lowest offers. Given that the rational choice model does not explain
the role of incentives in shaping demand for PES, we then look at the interaction
of the randomised incentive offers and individuals’ initial intrinsic motivations. We
construct methods to elicit social preferences in order to analyse this interaction. We
find that, while high monetary incentives crowd in demand of progovernment land-
holders, they crowd out demand of pro-environment (henceforth “proenvironment”)
and prosocial landholders.
The second essay2 combines satellite data on deforestation with data on the
location and timing of the conservation zones in Brazil to estimate the effect of
conservation zoning on deforestation in the period 2004-2010. We provide spatial
regression discontinuity estimates and difference-in-difference estimates to show that
1Co-authors: Florence Kondylis, Development Research Group, World Bank; Astrid Zwager,
Development Research Group, World Bank.
2Co-authors: Liana O. Anderson, National Center for Monitoring and Early Warning of Natural
Disasters (CEMADEN); Torfinn Harding, Department of Economics, NHH Norwegian School of
Economics, and University of Stavanger; Karlygash Kuralbayeva, Grantham Research Institute,
LSE; Andre Lima, Department of Geographical Sciences, University of Maryland.
5the policy does not explain the large reduction in deforestation rates during this
period. We provide evidence that zones reduce deforestation in municipalities put
on a federal government “shame” list for high deforestation rates.
The last two essays3 test behavioural interventions to decrease residential water
consumption across the City of Cape Town in South Africa as complements to tariff
increases and water restrictions during a severe water crisis. Using inserts in monthly
municipal bills, we test multiple behavioural messages in a randomised control trial
on the full population of free standing domestic households (400 000+). The treat-
ments are classified into five groups: information provision and increased salience on
the tariff structure, financial savings, appeals to the public good, social comparison,
and social recognition. By using a number of different framings, the third essay
focuses on identifying which incentives best motivate individuals of different income
levels to reduce their consumption. We find that lower income households respond
only to financial incentives, whereas the higher income households respond only to
social incentives and appeals to their intrinsic motivation.
In the final essay, we further explore the drivers behind the effect of social recog-
nition on pro-environmental behaviour (henceforth “proenvironment behaviour”).
According to Be´nabou and Tirole (2006), the visibility of doing-good may create
doubt to others as to the true motive of the individual and result in a crowding
out of prosocial behaviour. We use three treatments within the larger randomised
control trial to disentangle intrinsic motivation, extrinsic incentives, and image mo-
tivation. We exogenously vary the visibility of the social recognition treatments to
test whether i) social recognition incentives crowd out intrinsic motivation and, ii)
whether social recognition increases the noise of the prosocial signal and ultimately
crowds out cooperation. We find, on average, using image motivation as an extrinsic
incentive crowds in cooperation. Social recognition with an explicit opt-out has, on
average, no effect on consumption. Thus, in our setting, the signal of social recogni-
tion for prosocial behaviour is strong enough to elicit cooperation. In application to
public policy, our findings suggest public recognition can be used as an adjunct to
more traditional demand side management tools, such as water restrictions and tariff
increases to achieve additional conservation in the higher income households. To our
knowledge, this empirical analysis has not been executed elsewhere and contributes
both to the academic literature as well as policy recommendations for alternatives
to traditional demand side management tools during times of resource scarcity.
3Co-authors: Kerri Brick, Environmental Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Cape
Town; Martine Visser, School of Economics, University of Cape Town.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Conservation of natural resources is imperative for the sustainability of human de-
velopment on this planet. Recognised by the United Nations in its 2030 agenda
for sustainable development, which formulates 17 Sustainable Development Goals
(SDGs)1, conservation is one of the goals necessary to achieve “sustainable develop-
ment in its three dimensions - economic, social and environmental - in a balanced
and integrated manner.” (United Nations, 2015)
Yet conservation often yields greater benefits to society than to the individual,
driving a wedge between private marginal benefits and collective societal benefit.
While it is recognised that conservation is needed on an aggregate level, conserva-
tion in practice suffers from the public goods dilemma: independent of each indi-
vidual’s contribution, all share the benefits equally. Thus, the incentive is to free
ride (Hardin, 1968; Hasson et al., 2010; Brekke and Johansson-Stenman; Brick et al.,
2016b). Consequently, incentives are needed to promote conservation in the pres-
ence of these externalities. Against this background, it is crucial that incentives
which facilitate the adoption of conservation practices at the individual and house-
hold level be identified and validated via rigorous impact evaluations. And while
most interventions have high costs both in overhead and implementation, low cost
1See Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 14 (“conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas
and marine resources for sustainable development”) and 15 (“protect, restore and promote sus-
tainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, sustainably manage forests, combat desertification, and halt
and reverse land degradation and halt biodiversity loss”)(United Nations, 2015).
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and non punitive interventions to promote conservation have not been fully designed
and tested.
The overarching question of this thesis is “what are the incentives for individuals
to conserve the environment?”. In economics, rational choice explains behaviour
(Friedman, 1953); individuals maximise personal advantage given their constraints.
To incentivise behavioural change, rewards and sanctions can be used to change these
trade-offs (Olson, 1965; Ostrom, 1997). Prosocial behaviour, such as conservation of
natural resources, may be encouraged through rewards such as monetary (Chapter
2) and non monetary incentives (Chapter 4 and 5). Antisocial behaviour may be
discouraged through sanctions such as regulation and enforcement (Chapter 3).
For some, extrinsic incentives may not be necessary to achieve a socially optimal
outcome. Cognitive psychologists found that an activity can be rewarding of its own,
independent of any external reward or sanction; this is called intrinsic motivation
(Deci, 1971) or the “warm glow” effect (Andreoni, 1990). Solow (1971) assumed
monetary incentives were synergetic to behaving altruistically. However, this is
not always the case: extrinsic incentives - and monetary incentives in particular -
may reduce intrinsic motivation (Deci and Ryan, 1985; Lane, 1991; Andreoni, 1990;
Be´nabou and Tirole, 2003; Be´nabou and Tirole, 2006).
Thus, for those who are intrinsically motivated, the effect of an extrinsic in-
centive to behave prosocially - i.e. conserving natural resources - is an empirical
question. Frey (1992) introduced the possibility of an external incentive crowding
out intrinsic motivation into a simple rational choice model. An individual may
perceive that the external instrument is used to control or regulate the individual’s
intrinsic motivation; it diminishes self determination and therefore welfare. Altern-
atively, the external instrument may be interpreted as a recognition by the principal
that the agent is behaving well, raising their self evaluation and thus welfare. Frey
and Oberholzer-Gee (1997) argue that in the case of environmental policy in par-
ticular, monetary incentives need to be reconsidered as they may crowd in or out
“civic duty”.
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The channel through which incentives affect behaviour are largely determined by
how the individual perceives the incentive supporting or undermining their intrinsic
motivation (Frey, 1992). Throughout the thesis, I explore whether monetary and non
monetary incentives support, undermine, or are independent of intrinsic motivations.
In particular, I analyse the effect of various incentives on conservation behaviour:
monetary incentives, social norms, public recognition, appeals to contribute to the
public good, and information provision.
The first two essays analyse two distinct types of conservation policy in Brazil: i)
direct payments from the State of Sa˜o Paulo to small landholders living in vulnerable
ecosystems conditional on the landholders conserving their land; and, ii) federal
policy to regulate, monitor and enforce land use in the Brazilian Amazon through
the creation of conservation areas. In addition we look at the impact of a Federal
“shame” list of municipalities with high deforestation rates.
If individuals are self-interested profit maximizing rational individuals, then in-
creasing the private financial gains from conservation should incentivise behavioural
change. To analyse the effects of monetary incentives to promote prosocial beha-
viour, I look at demand for Payments for Environmental Services (PES) in Chapter
2. Recently, payments to landholders, conditional on them preserving forest on
their private land (PES), are being used in critical ecological areas to incentivise
the landowner to change current land use. PES programs resulting in low rates of
change in deforestation are hypothesised to be due to either a) spillage, or b) high
enrolment of those who are already motivated to conserve their land resulting in
low or no additionality of land conserved (Sierra and Russman, 2006; Pfaff et al.,
2008). Inefficient targeting of PES projects may altogether jeopardise the impact
of PES projects (Sa´nchez-Azofeifa et al., 2007; Pfaff et al., 2008) and compromise
taxpayer dollars. Using a field experiment in the state of Sa˜o Paulo, Brazil, we
find demand for a PES incentives program is non monotonic in price. Given the
rational choice model does not fully explain demand, we explore the interaction of
incentives and preexisting intrinsic motivations. We find that while high monetary
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incentives crowd in demand for progovernment landholders, they crowd out demand
of proenvironment and prosocial landholders.
A vastly different conservation policy in Brazil is land use regulation and enforce-
ment. In Chapter 3, we estimate the effect of conservation zoning and enforcement
in the Brazilian Amazon to explain the large decrease in deforestation in the 2000s.
By combining satellite data on deforestation with data on the location and timing
of the conservation zones in Brazil, we estimate the effect of conservation zoning on
deforestation in the period 2004-2010. We provide spatial regression discontinuity
estimates and difference-in-difference estimates to show that the land regulation does
not explain the large reduction in deforestation rates during this period. Rather,
we find evidence that zones reduce deforestation if located in a municipality put
on a “shame” list by the federal government for having high rates of deforestation.
The visibility increases accountability; these municipalities were subject to more rig-
orous environmental monitoring and law enforcement from Brazil’s environmental
protection agency (IBAMA) as well as possible sanctions.
As an alternative to providing monetary incentives or sanctions and regulations,
insights from behavioural economics suggest that individuals can be motivated to
change behaviour by non monetary extrinsic incentives. In the provision of public
utilities, municipalities resort to pecuniary approaches (i.e. tariff hikes) or struc-
tural approaches (i.e. water restrictions) during time of resource scarcity to correct
for market failures. Experiencing severe drought, local municipalities throughout
South Africa have been implementing both types of instruments to reduce water
consumption. Assuming individuals are profit maximizing rational individuals, price
mechanisms or structural adjustments should incentivise resource efficiency through
the cost benefit tradeoff. However, tariff structures are often not salient nor easily
understood. Thus shifting behaviour through tariff changes is rendered less effective
by the complex tariff which dilutes the price signal (Brick et al., 2016a). Shifting
behaviour through structural adjustments is often regressive as lower income house-
holds are less able to adjust their behaviour through uptake of resource efficient
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technology.
Non monetary behavioural interventions can be low cost and scalable and are
appropriate across the income spectrum. However the exact mechanisms underlying
behavioural change in water or energy conservation due to non monetary behavi-
oural interventions are not fully understood in the literature to-date due to multiple
channels coalescing into the treatment effect (Allcott, 2011; Ferraro et al., 2011;
Ayres, 2010). In Chapters 4 and 5, we investigate the role of framing in addition to
existing pecuniary measures as determinants for proenvironmental behaviour change
in South Africa (specifically, household water conservation).
In Chapter 4, we empirically test hypotheses postulated in behavioural economics
theory to identify the causal chain underlying the incentives driving behavioural
change to conserve. We aim to measure if households respond most strongly to
salience on the tariff pricing structure, financial incentives, appeals to their intrinsic
motivation, social norms, social recognition, or appeals to contribute to the public
good.
Using inserts in monthly household utility bills, we test seven behavioural mes-
sages in a randomised control trial on the entire population of free standing house-
holds in the Western Cape, South Africa (412 489 households) to disentangle the
channels through which households are motivated to reduce water consumption. We
find that lower income households respond only to information provision on the tar-
iff structure and how to save money, whereas the higher income households respond
only to intrinsic motivation and social incentives.
In Chapter 5, we tease out the social recognition treatments in more detail.
Revealing identity to reward prosocial behaviour has been used in to increase vot-
ing, charity contributions and blood donations (Gerber et al. (2008); Lacetera et al.
(2011), qtd. in Samek and Sheremeta (2015)). Yet the causal mechanisms through
which social recognition promotes prosocial behaviour is noisy- especially if indi-
viduals behave prosocially exclusively for the reward. Be´nabou and Tirole (2006)
hypothesise that the signal of doing-good may cast doubt on the true motive of
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the behaviour: heterogeneity in the individual’s image motivation can increase the
noise-to-signal ratio and dampen the overall net effect.
We empirically test Be´nabou and Tirole’s (2006) hypotheses by disentangling
intrinsic motivation, extrinsic incentives, and image motivation. More specifically,
we test whether i) extrinsic incentives crowd out intrinsic motivation and, ii) whether
social recognition obscures the signal of prosocial behaviour and ultimately crowds-
out cooperation. The social recognition incentive is publishing the name and suburb
of all households who met a reduction target during our treatment period on the
City of Cape Town’s website. We test (ii) by exogenously varying the visibility of
the social recognition: we allow an explicit opt-out for one treatment arm. Applying
the results to theory (Be´nabou and Tirole, 2006; Frey, 1992), we find, on average,
using image motivation as an extrinsic incentive crowds in cooperation. However,
in our income quintile analysis, we discover that this effect is only picked up in the
middle to high income households. In our setting, we find the signal of compulsory
social recognition for prosocial behaviour is strong enough to elicit cooperation in
wealthy households. Yet, because the social recognition with an explicit opt-out
has no effect on consumption, we hypothesise that the effect we pick up in the
compulsory social recognition treatment (“image motivation” treatment) might be
due to the avoidance of shame. As we did not conduct a “shaming” treatment due
to ethical concerns, we leave this area for future research. In application to public
policy, our findings suggest that, for the higher income population, image motivation
can be used as an adjunct to more traditional demand side management tools,
such as water restrictions and tariff increases to achieve additional conservation.
Importantly, the effect is only observed in the middle to high income quintiles which
are the households who use the most water and are least responsive to price signals
(Brick et al., 2016a).
Contributions of this thesis are multi-fold. It provides a critical evaluation of
both bottom-up (Chapter 2) and top-down (Chapter 3) carrot and stick policy levers
to promote conservation of scarce resources. With the collaboration of co-authors,
26
the thesis creates new data using high resolution satellite imagery (Chapter 3) and
city-wide administrative data on utilities (Chapter 4 and Chapter 5) as public goods.
The thesis also utilises advanced econometric techniques including factor analysis
and separately, geospatial analysis combined with regression discontinuity methods
and difference-in-differences to critically evaluate policy interventions.
Crucially, it contributes to the behavioural economics literature by separating
and empirically testing multiple behavioural science theories through a city-wide
randomised control trial (Chapter 4 and Chapter 5). The behavioural theories
which have been empirically tested to-date in the literature are situated in developed
countries. Furthermore, many of the studies focus on the impact of social norms
on behaviour change, and often the interventions include other potential channels
which have not yet been causally evaluated, such as information provision and finan-
cial savings (Allcott, 2011; Ferraro et al., 2011; Ayres, 2010). We contribute to this
literature by finding that social norms do impact behaviour, however, other factors
are at play. Specifically, financial incentives and social recognition are stronger
drivers of behavioural change. Importantly, we find vastly different mechanisms af-
fect behavioural change across income groups in a highly unequal country. This is a
key finding as budget constrained governments are often seeking effective, low-cost,
demand-side and non-punitive conservation policies. Thus a significant contribu-
tion of this thesis is empirical evidence on the cost-effectiveness of government using
behavioural incentives for conservation of scarce resources in a developing country
context suffering from environmental crises and egregious inequality.
The rest of the thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 2 uses a field experiment
to test the interaction of a monetary incentive and pre existing intrinsic motivations
on demand for a PES program in Brazil. Chapter 3 empirically tests the effect
of land use regulation and enforcement on deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon.
Chapter 4 uses a randomised field experiment in the City of Cape Town to caus-
ally determine which incentives work best to promote water conservation across all
domestic households. Chapter 5 teases out one of the channels - social recognition
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- to determine if the extrinsic incentive crowds out intrinsic motivation. Chapter
6 summarises the overall findings, discusses their limitations, and provides avenues
for further research.
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Chapter 2
Protecting the Environment: For
Love or Money?The Role of
Motivation and Incentives in
Shaping Demand for Payments
for Environmental Services
Programs1
2.1 Introduction
In neoclassical economics, rational choices based on the benefits and costs of al-
ternative actions explain behaviour. Carrots (rewards) and sticks (sanctions) can
alter behaviour by affecting these trade-offs. Offering monetary rewards to perform
a certain action will increase the benefits relative to its costs and thus make the
action more likely. In the context of environmental issues, policies have recently
1Co-authors: Florence Kondylis, Development Research Group, World Bank; Astrid Zwager,
Development Research Group, World Bank. This research was funded by the Spanish Fund for
Latin America and the World Bank Brazil Country Management Unit. A version has been pub-
lished in Public Finance Review in 2015 (see De Martino et al. (2015)
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been designed to nudge agents to internalise the societal cost of degradation and
adopt environmentally desirable behaviour through subsidy programs, commonly
known as payment for environmental services (PES). The underlying assumption of
PES programs is that monetary rewards provide extrinsic motivation to conserve
the environment by influencing the cost-benefit analysis that determines behaviour.
However, the pure rational choice paradigm has increasingly been called into
question by behavioural economics, which allows for alternative motivations for in-
dividual action. In particular, individuals’ actions may respond to intrinsic motiva-
tions independently of external (or extrinsic) incentives (Deci and Ryan, 1985). In
the realm of environmental policies, individuals may have varying levels of intrinsic
motivation to protect the environment. Critically, the effect of extrinsic monetary
incentives can depend on individuals’ intrinsic motivations. For example, a number
of studies in the economics and psychology literature suggest a crowding out effect
whereby monetary incentives may actually reduce intrinsic motivation to behave a
certain way (Frey, 1992; Be´nabou and Tirole, 2003). Frey (1992) shows that, as
individuals perceive a policy as an external instrument to control or regulate in-
trinsic motivation, it may diminish their self determination and, therefore, welfare
associated with ecological behaviour. On the other hand, intrinsic and extrinsic mo-
tivations may act as complements, and offering higher levels of subsidy may leverage
preinstalled conservation behaviour (crowding-in). Agents may interpret the sub-
sidy payments as recognition of “good” behaviour, raising their self-evaluation and
welfare derived from conservation Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (1997).
Another mechanism through which monetary incentives may undermine con-
servation is framing. Evidence from the lab suggests that external incentives may
shift an individual’s decision from a social frame to a monetary frame (Heyman and
Ariely, 2004); once the framing on the activity changes, the level of the monetary
incentive matters above and beyond the intrinsic motivations, suggesting that levels
of conservation may in fact decrease after the phasing out of a PES program (Gneezy
and Rustichini, 2000; Lepper and Greene, 2015).
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The literature thus suggests that the impact of a monetary incentive on conser-
vation behaviour is a priori ambiguous and may be conditioned by preexisting levels
of intrinsic motivations. Monetary incentives to increase conservation of private land
may not have the effect expected under rational choice accounts.
We contribute to this literature by shedding light on the interplay of extrinsic and
intrinsic motivations in the context of a payments for environmental services (PES)
program. In the PES literature, many studies have analyzed land and demographic
characteristics of participants in the programs (Sierra and Russman, 2006; Rios and
Pagiola, 2010; Pagiola et al., 2010; Arriagada et al., 2009; Pfaff et al., 2008; Robalino
et al., 2008), yet the role of intrinsic motivation in the context of demand for PES
has not been thoroughly studied. One exception is a recent paper by Zanella et al.
(2014) who use ex post data to show that information, environmental concern, and
participation positively affect take up of PES programs in Brazil. We are not aware
of any studies that analyze the interaction of extrinsic and intrinsic incentives in the
context of demand for PES programs.
Using an experiment in Brazil, we vary extrinsic incentives by randomising hy-
pothetical offers to landholders in vulnerable watersheds to conserve and/or restore
trees surrounding springs on their land2. We capture intrinsic motivations through a
detailed survey instrument on individual preferences regarding the environment and
society. In an earlier working paper (see Appendix B for full paper), we used factor
analysis to construct latent indices which allowed us to develop a taxonomy of in-
trinsic motivations to conserve. We use the constructed indices of latent motivations
in this essay. Our findings suggest that, contrary to rational-actor expectations,
demand for conservation and restoration programs does not increase with higher
subsidies. Landholders who took part in our experiment were randomly assigned to
four offer levels and asked a double-bounded contingent valuation question to elicit
a hypothetical willingness to accept (WTA) value. We find that landholders are
less likely to accept the payment if they were randomly assigned to the high offer
2The CV data used in this thesis is secondary data.
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treatments than if they were randomly assigned to the low offer treatments.
Our analysis of the interaction of extrinsic and intrinsic motivations suggests that
monetary incentives can undermine intrinsic motivation in certain cases, making in-
dividuals less likely to accept a PES program. Specifically, we found that while
high monetary incentives elicit higher demand for conservation behaviour among
prolegal and progovernment landholders, they crowd-out demand of proenviron-
ment and prosocial landholders. This crowding-out effect explains why progressively
higher monetary offers did not increase landowners’ likelihood to accept. From a
policy perspective, this result suggests that program administrators should, to the
extent possible, take individual motivation into consideration when designing PES
programs. This is particularly important for ensuring that such policies have ad-
ditionality, since we find those who are compliant to existing conservation laws are
those accepting the payments.
Our study builds on a new strand of field experiments that seek to analyze the
interaction of motivation and incentives in relation to environment protection (Vol-
lan, 2008; Kerr et al., 2012). Using trust and common pool resource games in South
Africa and Namibia, Vollan (2008) finds that a monetary incentive’s crowding-out
effect on prosocial behaviour is dependent on three conditions: strong existing norms
of trust and reciprocity; a low degree of self-determination in the individual; and
perceptions of the external regulation as controlling rather than supportive. Kerr
et al. (2012) run lab-in-the-field experiments to isolate the impact of incentives on
weekend volunteerism in Mexico and Tanzania. In Mexico, group payments made
through village authorities resulted in lower participation where people distrust lead-
ers (Kerr et al., 2012). Payments did not undermine participation in Tanzania, but
they reduced satisfaction from the task.
However, our results must be taken lightly as the monetary incentive- while
correctly randomized - may not have captured the true valuation of the landholder
due to instrument design issues. Specifically, the monetary offers were too narrow
in value. For example, while we know that landholders were less likely to accept
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the incentive if in the highest bid treatment, we cannot know if they might have
accepted the bid if the bound was set much higher. We only have qualitative data3 to
understand if the bid was rejected because it was too low. If we incorrectly captured
the landholder’s willingness to accept a monetary incentive, then our results are
biased (please refer to Section 2.4.1 for further discussion). With the assumption
that the second bid was not well designed, we conducted an analysis on the first bid
alone and find that the results are robust to model specification.
The remainder of this article is as follows: we introduce payments for environ-
mental services and its relevance in Brazil; we then describe the experimental design
conducted in Brazil, followed by descriptive statistics and our empirical strategy; and
we then present the results and conclude.
2.2 A Brief Introduction to Payments for Envir-
onmental Services Programs and the Brazilian
Context
Payments for Environmental Services (PES) seek to correct externalities by using
monetary subsidies to incentivise individuals to preserve or restore public goods
(such as forests) or common goods (such as water). A variety of market failures
impede individuals from allocating socially optimal levels of conservation effort. So-
cial benefits of conservation may disproportionally accrue to certain groups. For
instance, land-degrading activities upstream may have large adverse effects on those
living downstream, with little direct impact on upstream users. While tree planting
is socially optimal, upstream individuals will not internalise the benefits and, there-
fore, risk not investing in conservation activities. In this setting, a direct subsidy to
upstream landholders will reduce the wedge between private and public marginal be-
nefits. This is the idea behind PES programs. Typically, landowners will be offered
3Low response rate due to truncation as the question was only asked to those households who
rejected the monetary incentive.
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a payment conditional on changing or maintaining environmentally desirable land
and resource management practices.
Understanding the benefits and pitfalls of this approach is crucial, as the num-
ber of PES programs has steadily increased over the last decade, especially in Latin
America. In Brazil, several states have launched PES pilots4, mainly with a focus
on preventing deforestation and its side effects, such as erosion. While the monet-
ary incentives are expected to help landowners overcome barriers to invest in inputs
needed to transition from their current land use, it is unclear that they would be
sufficient to trigger behavioural change in the absence of other incentives, inform-
ation campaigns, and additional trainings. The present study adds to the current
state of evidence on determinants of demand in the context of a government-led
PES program in the state of Sa˜o Paulo (SP), Brazil. Around 40 percent of the state
is at risk of erosion, which is a major contributor to the state’s worst water crisis
to date affecting 20 million people. Against this background, the state policy on
climate change was adopted in 2009 to promote large-scale restoration. The pro-
gram we study (Mina d’ A’gua) was one of the policy instruments piloted under this
initiative.
It is the first PES project implemented directly by the SP state government and
was developed in partnership with twenty-one municipalities.
2.3 Analytical Framework
2.3.1 Determinants of Demand
From the landholder’s perspective, there are many potential drivers for investment in
a PES program. We group these motivations in two categories: extrinsic motivations
and intrinsic motivations. According to the rational choice model, the landholder
responds only to extrinsic incentives: he will conserve if the monetary benefits exceed
the costs. Conservation beyond the expected level of a strict profit-maximizing
4See Pagiola (2013) for results from these programs
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landholder suggests the individual may hold intrinsic motivations that lead him or
her to conserve some portion of land irrespective of costs and benefits.
We consider three extrinsic drivers of demand for investment in a conservation
or restoration program, which are not mutually exclusive, along with their expected
effect on behaviour:
1. Level of monetary incentive (the “carrot”): the higher the incentive offered,
the more likely a landholder will accept the payment and conserve his property.
2. Opportunity cost of land: the higher the opportunity cost embodied in altern-
ative income generating activities, the less likely a landholder will conserve his
land.
3. Prolegal motivation (the “stick”): the landholder will conserve all land required
under the conservation law in order to avoid fines. Under the Brazil Forest
Code, a landholder is responsible for the full preservation of “permanent forest
preservation areas” (APP), which includes areas adjacent to rivers and ponds,
steep hillsides, and springs.5
We consider four main intrinsic drivers of demand for investment in a PES
program:
1. Proenvironment motivation: the landholder values the existence and import-
ance of the environment.
2. Prosocial motivation: the landholder values protection of the environment for
his community members and society as a whole, current, and/or future (Eckel
and Grossman, 1996; Meier, 2007).
3. Progovernment motivation: the landholder believes the government is respons-
ible for paying to protect water sources on private, and separately, public
property.
5In the case of springs, the permanent forest preservation areas (APP) consists of a fifty meter
radius from the center of the spring.
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4. Social norms: the landholder incorporates the perceptions of their neighbour
with regards to PES into their own decision-making.
As discussed, we are especially interested in the interaction of extrinsic incentives
on intrinsic motivations. While the expected effect on conservation behaviour of each
driver in isolation is straightforward, the effect of the interaction between extrinsic
and intrinsic motivations is a priori ambiguous given the possibility of the monetary
incentive supporting or undermining the landholder’s intrinsic motivation.
2.4 Data and Experimental Setup
2.4.1 Data Collection
The survey designers ran a randomised experiment within the baseline survey for
a pilot PES program in the state of SP. The baseline survey was carried out in
2013 in two municipalities, Ibiu´na and Guapiara, both located in the southeast
region of SP state. Each municipality established priority areas for conservation
and restoration, which typically consist of water basins exploited by local water
companies that distribute domestic water to the surrounding communities. In the
study area, the survey designers listed all landowners in the catchment of these
priority water basins and their adjacent areas. Within that group, they sampled
all agricultural landowners with at least one spring on their parcel. In total, they
surveyed 350 landowners. The survey captures patterns of land and water use,
agricultural production, and income. The survey designers also elicited WTA for
PES programs using randomly assigned offer levels and conducted an exhaustive
survey of landholders’ attitudes toward environmental issues. The descriptives in
Section 2.5 discuss the characteristics of the surveyed landholders.
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2.4.2 Data Generation for Extrinsic and Intrinsic Motiva-
tions
We now detail the data generation strategy we employ to measure extrinsic and
intrinsic motivations in our survey.
1. Eliciting responses to extrinsic incentives
To understand how landholders respond to extrinsic motivations, we introduce
a monetary incentive: the survey presented landowners with two hypothetical
PES projects, one for conservation and one for restoration. A key question
in any PES program is the amount that should be paid to the landholder.
In principle, the amount should be set based on the value of the services be-
ing provided. In practice, this is very difficult to do. Contingent valuation
(CV) has increasingly been used in the PES context (Whittington and Pagi-
ola, 2012). If the landholder is motivated only by extrinsic motivations, the
expectation is that he would not accept a payment for conservation that is
less than his opportunity cost and would not accept a payment for restora-
tion that is less than the sum of his opportunity and restoration costs. Any
finding contradicting these assumptions would prompt us to consider altern-
ative motivations for the landholder’s behaviour. According to Whittington
and Pagiola (2012) the objective of a CV in this context is to determine the
minimum compensation that sellers would accept to change their behaviour
and/or undertake a new set of land use activities, or both.
The vast majority of applications of CV in a PES context to date has been
estimating the Willingness to Pay (WTP) of water users for the improved water
services that PES can provide. Whittington and Pagiola (2012) identified
25 such studies, and more have been undertaken since. In contrast, they
found only one CV study that examined service providers’ WTA payments
to undertake specific activities (Southgate et al., 2010); in addition, there
was one application of conjoint analysis (Porras and Hope, 2005). Southgate
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et al. (2010) estimate landholder WTA for conservation in Guatemala and
Ecuador. They find that WTA differs substantially among landholders at
their sites. However their sample is a small group of subsistence-oriented
farmers in Guatemala and Ecuador. The context is very different from that
of southern Brazil, where commercial activities play a much greater role in
farming, and where both the implementation and the opportunity costs of
conservation are much higher. Ma et al. (2012) examine WTA in the context
of farmer willingness to participate in a conservation program. They argue
that there are two hurdles to participation: farmers first decide whether to
consider enrolling (which depends on farm and farmer characteristics), and
then whether to participate (which depends on the payment offered).
The CV in this study was developed in light of best practice guidelines (Bate-
man et al., 2002; Whittington, 2010; Whittington and Pagiola, 2012) with the
assistance of Dale Whittington (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill),
one of the leading experts in the field. The instrument was pre-tested in the
field in 2012.
The conservation project offered a yearly payment per hectare of conserved
APP in compliance with the law. The payments were proportional to the
size of the forest cover in APP areas. The first offer ranged from R$150
to R$300 per year per hectare. The upper bound of R$300 per year per
hectare is equivalent to the average annual return of keeping livestock on
degraded pasture, according to informal discussions with SP state secretariat
of environment.
The restoration project offered a one-time payment to restore any uncovered
degraded APP area. As opposed to the annual conservation payments, this
was a one-off, nonrenewable payment to the household. Given the large costs
of restoration, payments were higher than in the conservation program. Sim-
ilar to the conservation offer, payments were proportional to the size of the
uncovered APP areas. The first offer ranged from R$2,000 to R$5,000 per hec-
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tare and was determined using the costs borne to the government for similar
restoration activities (R$4,000 per hectare).
In the survey, the enumerator first described the concept of PES, then the
specific MdA project and its requirements. The enumerator asked if the land-
holder had ever heard of such a program (PES), if the landholder would like to
participate in such a program, and if they understood what APPs are. Then
two scenarios (conservation and restoration PES programs) were presented se-
quentially to each landholder. First, the landholder was asked “Would you be
interested in participating by receiving $ X per year to conserve one hectare?”.
If the landholder declined, then they were offered another yet final higher offer
(see more details below on the double-bounded CV method). Then the land-
holder was asked if they were sure of their answer, and the reason for why (or
why not) they would be willing to (or not) receive the amount to conserve the
forest in the APP areas. See Table 2.1 for bid levels.
The landholder was then presented with a scenario in which the government
pays to restore APPs, and asked if they would be interested in participating by
receiving a one-time payment of R $ X per hectare and if not, the landholder
was offered another yet final higher offer. Again the enumerator asked the
landholder if they were sure of their answer, and the reason for why (or why
not) they would be willing (or not) to receive the amount to restore the APPs.
The full instrument can be found in Appendix A.1.
The researchers who designed the CV method (Whittington and Pagiola) use
a double-bounded dichotomous contingent valuation model to elicit individual
willingness-to-accept compensation for a PES program. Double bounded eli-
citation methods are common practice in environmental valuations (see for
example Bateman et al. (2002)).
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Table 2.1: Offers per Hectare (in R$)
Conservation Restoration
Payment Bid 1 Bid 2 Bid 1 Bid 2
Level 1 150 225 2,000 3,000
Level 2 200 300 3,000 4,500
Level 3 250 375 4,000 6,000
Level 4 300 450 5,000 7,500
If the landholder accepted the first offer, then no second offer was made. If
the first offer was turned down, a second and final offer was made, which
was 50 percent greater than the first bid (Table 2.1). It is important to note
that the use of this particular double-bounded format by the research team
is non-standard. Specifically, respondents were not offered a lower bid if they
accepted the first compensation amount offered. See caveats below.
Crucial for our analysis, the incentive offer was randomised across four differ-
ent levels among the surveyed landholders. The randomization was stratified
across the two municipalities and in the priority and adjacent areas. Please
refer to the descriptives section for information on balance tests.
As mentioned, the field experiment was carried out within a baseline survey for
a pilot PES program in the state of SP. We use data from the survey on land
and water use, agricultural production, and income as proxies for opportunity
costs in the regression analysis.
To measure legal compliance, we consider landholders to be “prolegal” if they
conserve land where it is required by law in order to avoid fines. To verify
if the landholder is in full compliance with the law, we documented existing
levels of conservation on each hectare of the landholder’s property when the
survey was administered, including hectares under APP and outside of APP.
We devise an indicator taking the value of 1 if the landholder is currently in
full compliance with the APP law6 and 0 if not.
6Full compliance requires conserving 100 percent of land under APP and at least 20 percent of
land not under APP.
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Caveats to the CV instrument
There is a large literature on CV methods and documentation of its develop-
ment (for example, see Bateman et al. (2002)). According to nine principles
for designing a CV study outlined in Whittington and Pagiola (2012), the sur-
vey designers followed best practices by asking debriefing questions, such as
follow-up questions eliciting the reasons why the respondents agreed to accept
or did not agree to accept the offer. The instrument collected data on the
constraints that landholders might face in undertaking restoration, even if a
payment makes it profitable (such as lack of knowledge on how to do so, lack of
access to needed inputs, lack of financing for the necessary investments, etc.).
Please refer to Appendix A.1 for the full instrument.
However, the application of CV to this study has limitations and may not have
adequately captured the true WTA value. In particular, the bid levels used
were too narrow and thus may not have spanned the true range of respondents’
preferences. Additionally, we do not know if the respondents who replied ‘yes’
to the first bid would have accepted a lower amount.
One of the inefficiencies with the CV method in general is the sample size
requirements (Foster and Mourato, 2003). While 350 respondents is a sufficient
sample size to elicit the WTA value, we are unable to analyze the follow-up
responses due to power issues to understand why landholders chose not to
accept the offer in order to rule out issues with the instrument.
As the responses to the second bid is conditional on the first bid response, we do
not measure purely independent responses to calculate the average WTA. The
largest concern with using the data from this CV method is that it captures
the monetary incentive used in the behavioural analysis. If the method has
shortcomings, then the data may be inaccurate and thus the results in this
paper must be taken with great caution. To test if the conditionality had an
impact on the results, we include a robustness check by conducting an analysis
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on the first bid alone. We find the results are robust to model specification
(see Table 2.8 and Table 2.9 in the Results section).
Another natural concern is that the valuations were hypothetical. The sur-
vey designers put great effort into developing an introduction on PES and a
list of comprehensive questions after the CV to encourage the respondent to
critically consider the reasons for or against accepting the incentive. As an-
other robustness check, Appendix B tests the effect of motivations on program
take-up. The correlations between motivations and take-up are robust to the
correlations between motivations and accepting the hypothetical incentives in
this paper. In other words, the same type of landholders who accepted (or not)
the hypothetical offer then later indeed enrolled (or not) in the PES program.
2. Eliciting intrinsic motivations: survey responses
To elicit intrinsic motivations, we use data from the detailed survey questions
on perceptions of conservation and society. The survey responses allow us
to identify landholders as motivated by proenvironment, prosocial, progov-
ernment, or social norms attitudes as described in the analytical framework.
Using factor analysis, we construct indices to reduce the dimensionality of the
proxies for motivations in an earlier working paper (see Appendix A.1 for the
list of indices and Appendix B for the full paper on construction of the in-
dices). We then test if stated preferences as captured in the indices determine
revealed preferences, as measured by existing levels of conservation at the time
of the survey. This step is crucial to establish that the indices provide a valid
measure of latent intrinsic motivations.
Our results, reported in an earlier working paper (Appendix B), show that
stated preferences are in fact consistent with revealed preferences once we
control for opportunity costs, and we refer readers to this working paper for
further discussion.
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2.5 Descriptive Statistics
2.5.1 Extrinsic Drivers: Monetary Incentives
The percentage of households who accepted the first and second bid, respectively,
is reported in Table 2.2. Independent of the treatment level, half of the sample
accepted the first bid for the conservation program, and one-third of the sample
accepted the first bid for the restoration program. We observe monotonic responses
from those who rejected the first offer but then accepted the second, higher, offer.
20 to 30 percent accepted the second and final bid for the conservation program
whereas only 11 to 17 percent of this sample accepted the second and final bid for
the restoration program (Table 2.2).
Balance tests on the four randomised treatments were carried out on observable
characteristics. Small yet significant differences across treatments arise from the
age of the head of household, credit use, area of property, amount of erosion on
property and conservation within APP zones (Table 2.3)7, and are controlled for in
all estimation models. Take-up of the conservation bid was 60 percent of the sample,
whereas take-up of the restoration bid was 43 percent of the sample.
Table 2.2: Bids Accepted
Percentage accepted first bid (%) Percentage accepted second bid of
those who rejected first bid (%)
Conservation offer (in R$)
150; 225 50 21
200; 300 45 31
250; 375 45 26
300; 450 48 18
Restoration offer (in R$)
2,000; 3,000 37 11
3,000; 4,500 33 13
4,000; 6,000 33 12
5,000; 7,500 36 17
7Full balance tests are available in Appendix B.
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Table 2.3: Property Characteristics
Property characteristics Total Guapiara Ibiu´na Difference
Size of the property (Ha) 12.2 12.2 12.3
Household lives on the property (%) 81 91 72 ***
Has no area designated to
agriculture (%) 20 7 30 ***
Agriculture is used for own
consumption (%) 75 81 69 **
Agriculture is only used for own
consumption (%) 32 29 34
Area of property covered with forest
(%) 43 31 53
Has erosion on part of the property
(%) 11 17 6 ***
Has livestock (%) 61 74 50 ***
Number of springs 1.9 1.7 2.1 **
Observations 350 188 162
Note: “Difference” denotes t-tests of means (Guapiara vs. Ibiuna).
**p <.05. ***p <.01.
2.5.2 Extrinsic Drivers: Opportunity Costs and Legal Com-
pliance
Our average landholder holds a little over twelve hectares of land - a small-scale
producer by Brazilian standards (Table 2.2). About 15 percent of the sample uses
credit. For those who do not use credit, 76 percent of the sample stated it was
because they did not need credit. Thus, we are analyzing a sample that is not
credit constrained or not undertaking investments. Thirty percent of the sample
experienced a bad agricultural yield in the previous year. We find that Guapiara
experiences higher levels of erosion than Ibiuna. Although over 80 percent of our
sample uses at least part of their land for agriculture (Ibiuna 70 percent and Guapi-
ara 93 percent), properties in our sample have high forest cover (Ibiuna 53 percent
and Guapiara 31 percent). At the time of the survey, 52 percent of landholders were
in full compliance with the APP law (Ibiuna 56 percent and Guapiara 48 percent).
Ibiuna landholders mostly engage in horticulture, while Guapiara producers mainly
produce annual crops and use significantly more livestock. In our estimation, we
account for these differences using municipality fixed effects.
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2.5.3 Intrinsic Drivers: Motivations
Table 2.4 presents the breakdown of the sample by intrinsic drivers: proenvironment,
prosocial, progovernment, and social norms. The average respondent answered pos-
itive to 52 percent of the proenvironment questions, whereas the average respond-
ent answered positive to only 8 percent of the prosocial questions. When looking
at the descriptives of those who accepted the restoration bid, the average respond-
ent answered positive to 56 percent of the proenvironment questions and to only 4
percent of the prosocial questions.
The average landholder responded positively to 61 percent of the progovernment
questions and 87 percent of the questions on social norms influence. On average,
the landholder responded positively to 52 percent of the questions on knowledge of
PES and the MdA program in particular. Those who accepted the restoration bid
responded positively to 71 percent of the progovernment questions, 95 percent of
the questions on social norms influence, and 54 percent of the questions on access
to information.
Table 2.4: Indices
Intrinsic motivation
index
Number of
questions in
additive
index
(standard-
ized in
regressions)
Mean
number of
“Yes”
replies
(n=351)
Standard
deviation
Mean
number of
“Yes”
replies for
those who
accepted
conservation
bid (n=210)
Mean
number of
“Yes”
replies for
those who
accepted
restoration
bid (n=151)
Proenviron-
ment 7 4.72 2.35 4.79 5.07
Prosocial 1 0.08 0.27 0.06 0.04
Progovern-
ment 3 1.84 1.22 1.98 2.12
Social
norms 2 0.87 0.38 0.95 0.96
Access to
information 3 1.04 .80 1.06 1.07
The descriptives are consistent with the regression results later: landholders with
prosocial motivations are unequivocally less likely to accept the monetary incentive,
while proenvironment landholders are less likely to accept the monetary incentive
only at high offer levels. Landholders with progovernment motivations, social norms
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influence, and access to information, on the other hand, are categorically more likely
to accept the monetary incentive.
2.6 Experimental Results
This section presents our regression results. First, we determine the average WTA
value of the extrinsic (monetary) incentive. Second, in order to gain a richer under-
standing of the effect of opportunity costs, intrinsic motivations, and the interaction
of intrinsic motivations and the extrinsic randomised incentive offer, we use a probit
model to determine the main drivers of demand for investment in PES.
2.6.1 Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) of WTA Model
The average WTA value is analyzed using a double-bounded dichotomous model.
We construct a likelihood function and use MLE to obtain the coefficients. We
estimate the average monetary amount required to comply with the requirements of
the conservation and, separately, the restoration program as observed in the sample
independent of the randomised offer level. We represent the first bid amount by
t1 and the second bid by t2. Thus, the landholder will belong to one of the following
three categories:
1. The landholder answers yes to the 1st bid: the probability is Pr(WTA≤t).
2. The landholder answers no to the 1st but yes to the 2nd bid: the probability
is Pr(t1<WTA≤t2).
3. The landholder answers no to the 1st bid and the 2nd bid: the probability is
Pr(t2<WTA<∞).
Employing a WTA model, we calculate the average using a double-bounded
model (Lopez-Feldman, 2012) with dichotomous choices under the assumption that
there is a single valuation function behind both answers. y1i and y2i are the dichotom-
ous variables that capture the response to the first and second questions. To obtain
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estimates for the average WTA (represented as b and s), we construct a likelihood
function and use MLE programming to obtain the coefficients8:
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where dnni , dsi , dnsi are variables that take the value of one or zero depending
on the response to y1i and y2i . First we estimate the WTA without covariates
and then we control for opportunity costs as defined by the Demographicsi and
Landcharacteristicsi vectors (see Table 2.5).
Result 1: Average WTA value is low for the conservation program but
high for the restoration program.
Table 2.5: Willingness to Accept (WTA) Estimates
Program Direct WTA WTA with covariates
Conservation R$244 R$233
Restoration R$7,030 R$6,853
The average WTA for the conservation program lies between the first and second
offer level, whereas the average WTA for the restoration program is much higher
and lies between the third and fourth (highest) offer level. The higher average WTA
for the restoration program is indicative of the program’s requirement to reallocate
time, labor, and money to reforest the property and affect potential farming land.
By contrast, the conservation program requires less effort.
The complementary model below further explores the characteristics of house-
holds who accepted an incentive for the conservation, and separately, the restoration
program to understand the determinants of a relatively low WTA, and highlights
8“Doubleb” is an existing STATA 13 command created by Alejandro Lopez Feldmen from Centro
de Investigacio´n y Docencia Econo´micas. However, it will only calculate willingness to pay and
does not allow for discontinuities from a WTA model. Thus, we expanded the Doubleb command
to include a maximum likelihood function for WTA models. Without controls, the function can be
estimated by .doubleb2 bid1 bid2 answer1 answer2. The doubleb2 command directly estimates b.
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results that corroborate the main finding that there exists large heterogeneity in
response to incentive payments.
2.6.2 Interacting Intrinsic Motivations and Extrinsic Incent-
ives
We estimate landholder-level probit regressions where the dependent variableAccepti
is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if landholder i accepted the theoretical incentive
to participate in the conservation program and, separately, the restoration program,
and zero otherwise. We assume that the probability of acceptance is a function
of opportunity costs, indices of intrinsic motivations, the incentive offer, and the
interaction of indices and incentives, or:
Accepti = α + β1Demographics′i + β2 Land characteristics′i
+ β3 Prolegali + β4 Proenvi + β5 Prosociali
+ β6 Progovti + β7 Socialnormsi
+ β8Access infoi + β9 i.incentivei
+ β10 i.incentiveleveli × indicesi + 
(2.1)
Demographicsi is a vector of covariates including household size, education, age,
gender of the household head, income, and credit access and use. Landcharacteristicsi
is a vector of covariates conventionally used in analyses of PES demand (Sierra and
Russman, 2006; Rios and Pagiola, 2010; Pagiola et al., 2010; Arriagada et al., 2009;
Pfaff et al., 2008; Robalino et al., 2008) and are comprised of property size in hec-
tares, number of people working on the land, possession of legal documents for
ownership or renting of the property, soil characteristics (sand, clay, mix, and red
soil), steepness of land, evidence of erosion on property, number of springs on prop-
erty, if the landholder experienced a bad yield in the previous year, (log) profits
from agriculture, and a binary variable indicating whether the property is used for
agriculture. Although it is an empirical question, if the landholder has more land,
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and more workers on the land, we may expect them to be more willing diversify land
use and to enroll part of their property in a PES program compared to a smaller
landholder who may not have the ability to diversify their land use. As this de-
pends on the motivations of the landholder, we will observe the effects of including
motivations as independent variables (see below). Those with property rights that
are well defined may be more likely to invest and take care of their land. Especially
if the land is suffering from high erosion, the landholder may be more willing to
participate in a restoration program. Furthermore, flatter land is expected to be
more productive and thus conserving it would entail higher opportunity costs.
Prolegali is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the landholder is in full com-
pliance of the APP law at the time of the survey and 0 otherwise.
To go beyond the strict homo economicus landholder, we are interested in em-
pirically documenting the role of intrinsic motivations in determining demand for
PES. As outlined earlier, we consider four main intrinsic drivers of investment in
the program: Proenvironmenti, Prosociali, Progovti, and Socialnormsi.
We also consider AccesstoInformationi an important and final covariate to
determine if those who have access to and understand information on PES and the
MdA program of interest have higher demand for PES programs.
i.incentive is a vector of dummy variables for the four randomised levels of pay-
ments, using the lowest offer as the base. The variable i.incentive × i.indices cap-
tures the effect of interacting the randomised monetary incentive with the various
motivations. The motivations of interest in the heterogeneity analysis are prolegal,
proenvironment, prosocial, progovernment, social norms, and access to information.
Finally, i is an independently distributed error term assumed to be normally
distributed with zero mean and a constant variance.
Marginal effects are computed for continuous and dichotomous explanatory vari-
ables. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.9 Estimation results
are reported in Table 2.6. As we are measuring elasticities of demand, the interpret-
9We tested equality constraints of all parameters and rejected the hypothesis that the paramet-
ers are equal.
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ation of coefficients is in percentage change, except when analyzing the standardised
indices, which are interpreted as increases in standard deviations above the mean.
Result 2: Demand for conservation and restoration is nonmonotonic with
respect to extrinsic monetary incentives.
If landholders are profit-maximizing agents, the prediction is that a higher subsidy
offer will yield higher demand for the PES program. Our first result contradicts
this monotonicity assumption (Tables 2.6 and 2.7). We pool the four randomised
treatment offer levels into two groups, high offer and low offer. Landholders are 5
percent less likely to accept the conservation offer if assigned to the high payment
treatment compared to those who received the low payment treatment. This is
consistent across all specifications. For the restoration program, the likelihood to
accept a payment also decreases with a high monetary offer, and the magnitude is
even greater: landholders are 26 percent less likely to accept the payment if assigned
to the high offer versus the low offer.
Result 3: Landholders with high opportunity costs are less likely to accept
the extrinsic incentive.
In our third specification, we regress demographics and land characteristics on ac-
cepting a conservation payment, controlling for the high offer level, which is highly
significant and negative.10 The results consistently show that various measures of
high opportunity cost are associated with lower demand for the programs. As an
example, landholders who use most of their land for agriculture are 14 percent less
likely to accept the incentive for the conservation program and 10 percent less likely
to accept the incentive for the restoration program (Tables 2.6 and 2.7). As the num-
ber of members that participate in agricultural activity increases by one worker, the
landholder is 3.8 percent less likely to accept the conservation incentive. However,
having experienced a bad agricultural yield in the previous year is associated with
10The high offer treatment is highly significant and negative for the restoration payment in the
fully specified model.
50
a 10 percent greater likelihood to accept the incentive for the restoration program.
If the property suffers from any erosion problems,11 the landholder is 5 percent less
likely to accept the offer for restoration. Restoration of these properties may be
too expensive for the landholder and the payments may not fully compensate the
costs. In general, the income elasticity of demand was significant and negative for
restoration program. As income from agriculture increases,12 the landholder is 20
percent less likely to accept the payment for the restoration program.
Result 4: Policies may be redundant.
In our context, a purely profit-maximizing landholder would include the expected
legal cost of noncompliance with the APP zoning laws in the utility-maximization
function. We find that being prolegal is associated with an 8 percent increase in
landholders’ probability of accepting the conservation offer. When interacted with
the randomised offer levels, prolegal landholders are 12 percent more likely to accept
the offer if in the high offer treatment relative to the low offer treatment. When
analyzing the results from the restoration program, we find that prolegal landholders
are 5 percent more likely to accept the offer. In the fully interacted model, the pro-
legal landholders are 20 percent more likely to accept the offer if they are assigned
to the high offer treatment relative to the low offer treatment. According to Frey’s
model, prolegal landholders may perceive the incentive, and especially higher levels
of the incentive, as supporting their self-evaluation of legal compliance. An altern-
ative explanation is that the program’s administration costs are perceived to be too
high to make it worth it for these landholders to accept the subsidy at low levels of
subsidy. It may not be immediately clear that increasing the level of the subsidy
to elicit prolegal landholders to take up the program makes any fiscal sense if these
11This is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the landholder answered yes to the question “is
there any erosion on your property?”
12Farm costs were determined from self-reported survey data on fertiliser and seeds; fuel; packing
material; animal feeding; storage; rent for machines, pasture, and land; and temporary labor, fixed
labor, electricity, utilities, taxes, repayments of credit, maintenance of machines, transportation,
technical assistance, and other activities and inputs. Farm revenue similarly was determined
from cultivation of annual crops, perennials, and vegetables; cultivation of pinus, eucalyptus, and
sugarcane; and from animals and animal products as reported by the household in the survey.
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Table 2.6: Estimation results
I II III IV V VI VII
Accept conservation program incentive Means Offer level Opp costs Offer level &
Opp costs
Opp costs &
indices
Offer level, opp
costs & indices
Fully interacted
model
High offer treatment (level 3 and 4) 0.49 -0.048*** -0.053** -0.061
0.027 0.018 0.027 0.042
Second payment offer level 0.006
0.095
Third payment offer level -0.02
0.015
Fourth payment offer level -0.04
0.153
No. of HH members 3.915 0.008 0.008 0.005 0.006 0
0.145 0.013 0.012 0.007 0.006 0.004
Gender HH head 0.853 -0.163 -0.162 -0.111 -0.107 -0.12
0.019 0.146 0.143 0.175 0.169 0.168
Age of HH head 55.425 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
0.753 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002
Education of HH head13 2.469 0.019 0.019 0.026*** 0.025*** 0.025***
0.063 0.016 0.016 0.004 0.005 0.008
Income from agriculture-units of minimum wage14 1.326 0.008 0.008 0.002 0.002 0.001
0.087 0.015 0.016 0.009 0.01 0.01
HH uses credit (y/n) 0.147 -0.022 -0.015 -0.045 -0.037 -0.047
0.019 0.092 0.088 0.091 0.088 0.102
ln(profit) 12.126 -0.097 -0.108 -0.055 -0.067 -0.045
0.008 0.12 0.112 0.073 0.063 0.049
Ibiuna 0.54 0.080*** 0.057 0.058 0.057 0.057 0.057
0.027 0 0.055 0.055 0.055 0.055 0.049
Experienced bad agricultural yield in previous year 0.29 0.111 0.111 0.084 0.083 0.091
0.025 0.162 0.165 0.157 0.161 0.135
Total area of property (Ha) 12.506 0.003* 0.003* 0.003** 0.003** 0.003**
0.713 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001
Number of members that participate in agriculture
activity 1.962 -0.038*** -0.039** -0.028* -0.029* -0.023
0.117 0.014 0.016 0.016 0.017 0.022
Has legal documents for property (y/n) 0.883 0.050*** 0.052*** 0.039 0.043 0.044
0.017 0.011 0.008 0.042 0.037 0.027
13Average of five response options: never attended (1), elementary-incomplete (2), elementary - complete (3), high school(4), higher education (5)
14The minimum wage is used to define the national poverty line and in the agricultural context farmers do not have a monthly wage which is either above or below the minimum wage but
instead they express the average farming income in relation to units of minimum wage.
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Sand 0.267 0.059 0.06 0.093 0.094 0.092
0.024 0.131 0.138 0.101 0.109 0.103
Clay 0.258 0.007 0.009 0.054*** 0.059*** 0.042***
0.024 0.016 0.02 0.014 0.009 0.007
Sand-clay 0.226 0.014 0.011 0.031 0.03 0.014
0.023 0.041 0.039 0.024 0.021 0.028
Terra Roxa 0.437 0.054*** 0.058*** 0.107*** 0.112*** 0.106***
0.027 0.006 0.003 0.02 0.016 0.015
Proportion of total steepness over total property 0.754 -0.024 -0.019 -0.027 -0.02 -0.033
0.015 0.061 0.054 0.11 0.099 0.08
# of properties eroded 0.15 0.013 0.007 0.056*** 0.050*** 0.052***
0.027 0.015 0.014 0.005 0.004 0.002
Land used for agriculture (ha) 0.804 -0.146*** -0.144*** -0.131*** -0.128*** -0.122***
0.022 0.047 0.048 0.049 0.049 0.043
Chance of deforesting around APP spring (y/n) 0.044 0.111*** 0.102*** 0.172* 0.168* 0.145
0.011 0.028 0.024 0.104 0.098 0.102
% of non-APP land conserved 0.381 -0.127*** -0.131*** -0.100*** -0.106*** -0.122**
0.018 0.013 0.014 0.026 0.024 0.051
Prolegal 0.525 0.078** 0.078** 0.110*** 0.108*** 0.104***
0.027 0.033 0.032 0.034 0.032 0.021
Access to information on PES (std) 0.009 0.018 0.016 0.050***
0.054 0.042 0.04 0.016
Social norms (std) -0.01 0.122*** 0.123*** 0.088***
0.054 0.011 0.008 0.019
Proenvironment (std) 0.003 -0.016*** -0.014*** 0.001
0.054 0.004 0.004 0.052
Prosocial (std) 0.008 -0.016*** -0.019** -0.013
0.055 0.006 0.009 0.01
Progovernment (std) -0.009 0.071*** 0.069*** 0.030***
0.054 0.015 0.014 0.005
Interaction high offer and proenvironment (std) -0.04
0.108
Interaction high offer and prosocial (std) -0.039
0.062
Interaction high offer and progovernment (std) 0.073***
0.01
Interaction high offer and prolegal 0.019***
0.006
Interaction high offer and access to information (std) -0.068
0.052
Interaction high offer and Social Norms influence (std) 0.088
0.083
Observations 348 351 348 348 348 348 348
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Note: APP 14 permanent forest preservation areas; HH
1
4 household.
*p <.10. **p <.05. ***p <.01.
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Table 2.7: Estimation results
I II III IV V VI VII
Accept restoration program incentive Means Offer level Opp costs Offer level &
Opp costs
Opp costs &
indices
Offer level, opp
costs & indices
Fully interacted
model
I II III IV V VI VII
High offer treatment (level 3 and 4) 0.49 -0.02 -0.017 -0.256***
0.027 0.018 0.017 0.007
Second payment offer level -0.031
0.085
Third payment offer level -0.041**
0.019
Fourth payment offer level 0.017
No. of HH members 3.915 0.003 0.004 -0.001 -0.001 -0.005
0.145 0.009 0.01 0.014 0.014 0.012
Gender HH head 0.853 -0.171* -0.170* -0.118 -0.117 -0.116
0.019 0.09 0.09 0.117 0.117 0.098
Age of HH head 55.425 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
0.753 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.003
Education of HH head15 0.042*** 0.042*** 0.042*** 0.042*** 0.038***
0.063 0.015 0.015 0.003 0.003 0.004
Income from agriculture-units of minimum wage16 1.326 -0.002 -0.002 -0.009*** -0.010*** -0.012***
0.087 0.001 0.002 0.001 0 0
HH uses credit (y/n) 0.147 -0.004 -0.001 0.003 0.005 -0.006
0.019 0.125 0.119 0.114 0.109 0.123
ln(profit) 12.126 -0.199* -0.204* -0.184*** -0.188*** -0.187**
0.008 0.107 0.11 0.07 0.072 0.083
Ibiuna 0.54 0.211*** 0.103*** 0.103*** 0.110*** 0.110*** 0.122***
0.027 0.003 0.021 0.021 0.012 0.013 0.001
Experienced bad agricultural yield in previous year 0.29 0.119 0.119 0.094** 0.094** 0.100***
0.025 0.078 0.079 0.044 0.046 0.03
Total area of property (Ha) 12.506 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002** 0.002** 0.002*
0.713 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
Number of members that participate in agriculture
activity 1.962 -0.035 -0.036 -0.018 -0.019 -0.014
0.117 0.026 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.023
Has legal documents for property (y/n) 0.883 -0.112*** -0.111*** -0.116*** -0.115*** -0.121***
0.017 0.003 0.003 0.028 0.028 0.022
15Average of five response options: never attended (1), elementary-incomplete (2), elementary - complete (3), high school(4), higher education (5)
16The minimum wage is used to define the national poverty line and in the agricultural context farmers do not have a monthly wage which is either above or below the minimum wage but
instead they express the average farming income in relation to units of minimum wage.
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Sand 0.267 0.094 0.095 0.120*** 0.121*** 0.110***
0.024 0.074 0.076 0.017 0.02 0.002
Clay 0.258 0.085 0.087 0.115*** 0.116*** 0.099***
0.024 0.055 0.056 0.025 0.025 0.004
Sand-clay 0.226 0.015 0.014 0.027 0.027 0.022
0.023 0.012 0.012 0.025 0.025 0.042
Terra Roxa 0.437 -0.063 -0.061 -0.019 -0.017 -0.001
0.027 0.064 0.064 0.037 0.036 0.015
Proportion of total steepness over total property 0.754 0.029 0.03 0.041 0.043 0.033
0.015 0.061 0.06 0.11 0.11 0.085
# of properties eroded 0.15 -0.046*** -0.048*** -0.020*** -0.022*** -0.016**
0.027 0.002 0.005 0.002 0.005 0.006
Land used for agriculture (ha) 0.804 -0.095*** -0.095*** -0.089*** -0.089*** -0.100***
0.022 0.012 0.011 0.008 0.007 0.011
Chance of deforesting around APP spring(y/n) 0.044 -0.133 -0.136 -0.11 -0.111 -0.132
0.011 0.141 0.146 0.112 0.114 0.118
% of non-APP land conserved 0.381 -0.119*** -0.122*** -0.077** -0.079** -0.079***
0.018 0.027 0.029 0.038 0.04 0.026
Prolegal 0.525 0.049*** 0.049*** 0.064*** 0.063*** -0.069*
0.027 0.015 0.015 0.004 0.003 0.04
Access to information on PES (std) 0.009 0.032** 0.031* 0.052***
0.054 0.015 0.016 0.004
Social norms (std) -0.01 0.101*** 0.102*** 0.093*
0.054 0.029 0.029 0.049
Proenvironment (std) 0.003 0.024 0.024 0.040*
0.054 0.023 0.024 0.022
Prosocial (std) 0.008 -0.029 -0.03 0.006
0.055 0.032 0.033 0.047
Progovernment (std) -0.009 0.083*** 0.082*** 0.092***
0.054 0.014 0.015 0.025
0.165
Interaction high offer and proenvironment (std) -0.030***
0.005
Interaction high offer and prosocial (std) -0.424***
0.019
Interaction high offer and progovernment (std) -0.024
0.1
Interaction high offer and prolegal 0.264***
0.053
Interaction high offer and access to information (std) -0.037
0.041
Interaction high offer and social norms influence (std) 0.038
0.069
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Observations 348 351 348 348 348 348 348
Note: APP 14 permanent forest preservation areas; HH
1
4 household; PES
1
4 payments for environmental services.
*p <.10. **p <.05. ***p <.01.
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Table 2.8: Estimation results: Robustness check
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
Accept 1st Conservation Bid Means Offer level
(disaggregated)
Offer level (binary) Demographics and
Offer Level
(disaggregated)
Demographics and
Offer level (binary)
Demographics, Offer
level (disaggregated)
and motivations
High offer treatment (level 3 and 4) 0.49 -0.01 -0.031**
0.027 0.067 0.014
Value offer 224.34
2.992
Second payment offer level -0.059 -0.048 -0.031
0.139 0.088 0.064
Third payment offer level -0.052 -0.067*** -0.045**
0.056 0.003 0.02
Fourth payment offer level -0.029 -0.044 -0.05
0.22 0.128 0.101
No. of HH members 3.915 0.026 0.026 0.023
0.145 0.031 0.035 0.026
Gender HH head 0.853 -0.173 -0.177 -0.141
0.019 0.164 0.166 0.178
Age of HH head 55.425 -0.003 -0.004* -0.003
0.753 0.002 0.002 0.002
Education of HH head17 2.469 0.005 0.005 0.01
0.063 0.027 0.029 0.021
Income from agriculture-units of
minimum wage18 1.326 -0.013 -0.012 -0.013
0.087 0.037 0.035 0.031
HH uses credit (y/n) 0.147 0.075** 0.068*** 0.063**
0.019 0.035 0.022 0.028
ln(profit) 12.126 -0.19 -0.186 -0.155
0.008 0.144 0.148 0.099
Ibiuna 0.54 0.134** 0.133* 0.128*
0.027 0.064 0.069 0.066
Experienced bad agricultural yield in
previous year 0.29 0.138* 0.138* 0.123
0.025 0.083 0.076 0.087
Total area of property (Ha) 12.506 0.002** 0.002* 0.002**
0.713 0.001 0.001 0.001
17Average of five response options: never attended (1), elementary-incomplete (2), elementary - complete (3), high school(4), higher education (5)
18The minimum wage is used to define the national poverty line and in the agricultural context farmers do not have a monthly wage which is either above or below the minimum wage but
instead they express the average farming income in relation to units of minimum wage
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Number of members that participate
in agriculture activity 1.962 -0.070*** -0.070*** -0.061***
0.117 0.015 0.015 0.012
Has legal documents for property
(y/n) 0.883 -0.066*** -0.061*** -0.062*
0.017 0.016 0.014 0.033
Sand 0.267 0.151 0.151 0.177*
0.024 0.129 0.141 0.095
Clay 0.258 0.045 0.05 0.077
0.024 0.036 0.045 0.069
Sand-clay 0.226 0.053 0.054 0.067
0.023 0.072 0.073 0.092
Terra Roxa 0.437 0.144*** 0.145*** 0.183***
0.027 0.052 0.047 0.069
Proportion of total steepness over
total property 0.754 -0.007 -0.005 -0.02
0.015 0.025 0.017 0.054
# of properties eroded 0.15 0.068* 0.072 0.090**
0.027 0.04 0.047 0.042
Land used for agriculture (ha) 0.804 -0.101*** -0.100*** -0.096***
0.022 0.001 0.018 0.01
Chance of deforesting around APP
spring (y/n) 0.044 0.124 0.118 0.151
0.011 0.109 0.084 0.112
% of non-APP land conserved 0.381 -0.04 -0.041 -0.023
0.018 0.141 0.121 0.101
Prolegal 0.525 0.086
0.027 0.056
Access to information on PES (std) 0.009 0.015
0.054 0.012
Social norms (std) -0.01 0.063***
0.054 0.004
Proenvironment (std) 0.003 -0.008
0.054 0.018
Prosocial (std) 0.008 -0.025***
0.055 0.006
Progovernment (std) -0.009 0.068***
0.054 0.003
Observations 341 351 351 341 341 341
Note: APP 14 permanent forest preservation areas; HH
1
4 household; PES
1
4 payments for environmental services.
*p <.10. **p <.05. ***p <.01.
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Table 2.9: Estimation results: Robustness check
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
Accept 1st Restoration Bid Means Offer level
(disaggregated)
Offer level (binary) Demographics and
Offer Level
(disaggregated)
Demographics and
Offer level (binary)
Demographics, Offer
level (binary), and
motivations
High offer (level 3 and 4) 0.49 -0.007 -0.041* -0.035**
0.027 0.053 0.021 0.015
Value offer 224.34
2.992
Second payment offer level -0.038 -0.03
0.109 0.109
Third payment offer level -0.042 -0.071***
0.034 0.016
Fourth payment offer level -0.01 -0.04
0.183 0.137
No. of HH members 3.915 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.021***
0.145 0.004 0.008 0.003
Gender HH head 0.853 -0.193* -0.196* -0.157
0.019 0.1 0.101 0.12
Age of HH head 55.425 0 0 0.001
0.753 0.002 0.002 0.002
Education of HH head19 2.469 0.029** 0.028** 0.029***
0.063 0.011 0.013 0.003
Income from agriculture-units of
minimum wage20 1.326 -0.017 -0.016 -0.018
0.087 0.02 0.018 0.015
HH uses credit (y/n) 0.147 0.019 0.015 0.011
0.019 0.067 0.048 0.057
ln(profit) 12.126 -0.202 -0.202 -0.174
0.008 0.187 0.181 0.132
Ibiuna 0.54 0.148*** 0.149*** 0.154***
0.027 0.018 0.026 0.018
Experienced bad agricultural yield in
previous year 0.29 0.091*** 0.091*** 0.078***
0.025 0.009 0.003 0.005
Total area of property (ha) 12.506 0 0 -0.001
0.713 0.001 0.001 0.001
19Average of five response options: never attended (1), elementary-incomplete (2), elementary - complete (3), high school(4), higher education (5)
20The minimum wage is used to define the national poverty line and in the agricultural context farmers do not have a monthly wage which is either above or below the minimum wage but
instead they express the average farming income in relation to units of minimum wage
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Number of members that participate
in agriculture activity 1.962 -0.063*** -0.063*** -0.047***
0.117 0.003 0.002 0.002
Has legal documents for property
(y/n) 0.883 -0.112*** -0.107*** -0.099***
0.017 0.032 0.034 0.007
Sand 0.267 0.146** 0.147** 0.170***
0.024 0.061 0.074 0.012
Clay 0.258 0.064*** 0.067*** 0.092***
0.024 0.02 0.01 0.033
Sand-clay 0.226 0.100*** 0.101*** 0.113**
0.023 0.008 0.01 0.051
Terra Roxa 0.437 -0.003 -0.002 0.038***
0.027 0.035 0.043 0.008
Proportion of total steepness over
total property 0.754 0.058 0.062** 0.05
0.015 0.036 0.026 0.061
# of properties eroded 0.15 0.007 0.009*** 0.026***
0.027 0.011 0.002 0.006
Land used for agriculture (ha) 0.804 -0.04 -0.038** -0.035***
0.022 0.031 0.016 0.011
Chance of deforesting around APP
spring (y/n) 0.044 -0.021 -0.022 -0.008
0.011 0.118 0.138 0.112
% of non-APP land conserved 0.381 -0.091* -0.090*** -0.052***
0.018 0.05 0.032 0.018
Prolegal 0.525 0.076***
0.027 0.028
Access to information on PES (std) 0.009 0.027***
0.054 0.003
Social norms (std) -0.01 0.066*
0.054 0.036
Proenvironment (std) 0.003 0.013***
0.054 0.001
Prosocial (std) 0.008 -0.032
0.055 0.053
Progovernment (std) -0.009 0.073***
0.054 0.003
Observations 341 351 351 341 341 341
Note: APP 14 permanent forest preservation areas; HH
1
4 household; PES
1
4 payments for environmental services.
*p <.10. **p <.05. ***p <.01.
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landholders are already incentivised by the law; nevertheless, excluding participants
on the basis of their ex ante compliance may be even more problematic if exclu-
sion changes their behaviour ex post of the intervention. However, this question is
outside the scope of this analysis.
2.6.3 Results from Analysis of Intrinsic Motivations
We now explore the possibility that the demand response to the randomised offer
levels may vary across levels of intrinsic motivations.
Result 5: For proenvironment and prosocial motivated landholders, de-
mand for conservation and restoration programs is undermined by higher
monetary incentive levels.
We find evidence that higher monetary incentives crowd-out demand for proenvir-
onment and prosocial landholders. In the fully interacted model for the restoration
program, a one-unit increase in standard deviation above the mean in the proen-
vironment index leads to a 4 percent greater likelihood of accepting the incentive;
however, this effect is dampened by 3 percent if the landholder is assigned to the
high offer treatment. Thus, interaction with the higher offer treatment crowds-out
demand for the restoration program. Following Frey’s (1992) model, the high in-
centive may be undermining the self-determination of proenvironment landholders,
as it disengages their interest in the program.
This finding is consistent with evidence from landholders’ existing levels of con-
servation prior to the experiment. Using the percentage of non-APP land conserved
as another proxy for proenvironment behaviour, we also find a negative and highly
significant association, when controlling for opportunity costs, between the percent-
age of non-APP land conserved and the likelihood that the landholder accepts the
payment for either program. We find similar but even stronger dynamics in the case
of prosocial landholders. A one-unit increase in standard deviation above the mean
in the prosocial index leads to a 42 percent lower probability of accepting the higher
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offer for the restoration program (significant at the 1 percent level). The higher offers
are significantly disengaging prosocial motivated landholders. In an earlier analysis,
we found a positive association between the prosocial index and existing levels of
land conservation under APP and outside of APP jurisdiction prior to introduction
of the monetary incentive (Appendix B). Thus, the introduction of a monetary in-
centive and especially the interaction with the higher offer disengages demand from
those with prosocial motivation. According to Frey’s model, the incentive may be
seen as undermining their self-determination.
Result 6: The principal matters.
Perception of the government is a significant determinant of accepting the payment.
When controlling for opportunity costs and the offer level, an increase in one stand-
ard deviation above the mean in the progovernment index is associated with a 7
percent higher probability of accepting the payment for the conservation program
(see Table 2.6). If the landholder is assigned to the high offer treatment, a one-unit
increase in standard deviation above the mean increases the probability of accept-
ing the payment to 10 percent. For the restoration program, a one-unit increase in
standard deviation above the mean in the progovernment index is associated with
8 to 9 percent higher probability of accepting the payment (see Table 2.7).
In our sample, landholders who believe it is the government’s responsibility to
pay to protect public resources on private and public property have greater demand
for PES programs. Higher subsidies further increase demand for PES programs.
On the other hand, in more qualitative analysis of the landholders who refused the
monetary incentive, we found that 24 percent and 36 percent of the sample offered
the conservation incentive and restoration incentive, respectively, stated they were
not confident the government program would be implemented, they did not want
the government to control their property, or they did not want to be burdened with
the bureaucracy. Thus, we learned that the principal matters and eliciting support
for, and confidence in, government programs is crucial for increasing demand of PES
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programs.
Result 7: Monetary incentives can override social norm concerns.
Support for Result 7 comes from Tables 2.6 and 2.7. The payment offer for con-
servation and restoration incentivises the landholders who are influenced by social
norms. Social norms is an index derived from factor analysis and captures those
landholders who plan to discuss the project with their neighbour and will enroll in
the program if their neighbour enrolls.
However, since the monetary instrument incentivised them to accept before their
ability to discuss the project with their neighbour, and without them having know-
ledge of the decision of their neighbour, the extrinsic incentive may have overridden
their social norm concerns. An increase in one standard deviation above the mean
in the social norms index leads to a 12 percent higher probability the landholder
will accept the incentive for the conservation program, and a 10 percent higher
probability the landholder will accept the offer for the restoration program.
Result 8: Information matters.
Support for Result 8 comes from 2.6 and 2.7. Those who have access to general
information on PES, information on the specific Mina d’A´gua PES scheme, and
understand the APP law are 5 percent more likely to accept the offer for both
the conservation and the restoration program. The results are in line with the
findings of Zanella et al. (2014); however, Zanella et al. (2014) conclude that access to
information is the most significant determinate of participation over environmental
concern. We find otherwise; various motivations and the interaction of motivations
with varying levels of incentives are more significant determinants of demand for
PES than access to information.
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Robustness checks
If we are concerned about the CV design, and in particular if the conditional second
bid was not well designed, then an analysis of the first bid alone is needed. We
conduct a probit analysis of the first bid for both the conservation and restoration
programs. We look at the first bid level alone, then a separate specification adding
demographics, and a final specification including the intrinsic motivations. We find
the results are robust to model specification. The variables of interest retain their
significance.
When controlling for demographics (Column V in Table 2.8 and Column V in
Table 2.9) and separately demographics and motivations (Column VI in Table 2.8
and Column VI in Table 2.9), the average landholder is less likely to accept the
payment when assigned the high offer treatment. When looking at the disaggregated
offers, we observe the landholder is less likely to accept when assigned to the third
highest bid compared to the lowest bid.
Progovernment (Column VI in Table 2.8 and Table 2.9) and prolegal landholders
are more likely to accept the monetary offer (Column VI in Table 2.9). As in the
main model, proenvironment landholders are more likely to accept the Restoration
bid (Table 2.9) but we do not have enough power to observe the interaction effects
when the proenvironment landholder is provided the higher bid treatments. Proso-
cial landholders, also as in the main model, are less likely to accept the conservation
bid (Column VI in Table 2.8). However we cannot observe if refusal increases with
higher levels as we do in the main model due again to lack of power.
2.7 Conclusion
In this study, we employ a field experiment to shed light on the determinants of de-
mand for a PES program in the state of SP, Brazil. Our results cast some doubt on
a pure rational choice model. We find that demand for PES does not always mono-
tonically increase with the level of subsidy provided. As the offer level increases, the
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average landholder becomes less likely to accept the payment. Other factors than
pure monetary increases are likely at play.
Next, we consider the role of intrinsic motivation in determining demand for
PES. Specifically, we use a taxonomy to separate multiple sources of intrinsic mo-
tivation: proenvironment, prosocial, progovernment, and social norms. We find
evidence of important differences in how types of intrinsic motivation interact with
experimental changes in monetary incentives. Landholders who believe the govern-
ment is responsible for paying to protect water sources (progovernment) are more
likely to accept the monetary offer, and their demand increases with the size of the
subsidy. In contrast, landholders with prosocial motivations are categorically less
likely to accept the monetary incentive, and refusal increases with higher levels of
subsidy. Landholders with proenvironment motivations are less likely to accept the
monetary incentive at high offer levels.
While the present study provides credible evidence on the interplay of intrinsic
and extrinsic motivations in determining demand for a PES program, additional
work is needed to understand the dynamic impact of a PES program on conservation
behaviour and on preferences and perception over time.
Our findings also indicate that higher levels of knowledge on conservation techno-
logies are associated with higher take up of the PES offer. Financial constraints and
undermining the importance of intrinsic motivations may not be the sole sources of
inefficiencies in understanding conservation behaviour, and program administrators
may consider supplementing their outreach with education campaigns.
However, our results must be taken with caution. While the incentive was ran-
domised which allows us to measure the interplay of incentives and motivations, the
CV instrument has shortcomings. In particular, the bid levels are too narrow, and
the conditional second bid may not have been able to span the range of respondents’
preferences. As responses to the monetary incentive form the basis of the analysis
in this chapter, the results need to be interpreted with discretion. However, this
would be a larger concern if our results showed that landholders did not accept the
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incentive at any level, or if there was weak significance of acceptance at high offer
levels but not low offer levels. Instead, our results show that landholders are less
likely to accept the incentive if in the high offer treatments in comparison to the low
offer treatments. Arguably, there could exist a much higher amount that would be
accepted more likely than the lowest offer. However the offer amounts were based on
bounds determined by costs borne by the government; thus the payment offers are
congruent with what the government is able and willing to provide to landholders
to conserve. As a robustness check, we conducted an analysis on the first bid alone
with the assumption that the second bid was not well designed. The results are
stable to model specification.
Overall, we show that considerable heterogeneity underlies demand for PES pro-
grams. Some of our results suggest that, at certain levels of subsidization and among
certain subgroups, payments may not have additionality. This implies that in order
to achieve fiscal efficiency, such programs may consider running randomised con-
trolled trial pilots, varying the subsidy levels and eliciting motivations, to establish
the price elasticity of demand in their target population. Such studies, comple-
mented with education campaigns, can be powerful ex ante instruments to improve
the design of the subsidy at the pilot stage and ultimately, to improve take-up of
well-targeted recipients for the program.
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Chapter 3
The Effects of Land Use
Regulation on Deforestation:
Evidence from the Brazilian
Amazon1
3.1 Introduction
Tropical deforestation is a major contributor to greenhouse gases in the atmosphere,
accounting for about 32% of the world’s total CO2 emissions during the 1990-2005
period (World Bank, 2010). The importance of reducing deforestation received
much recognition in the climate agreement reached in Paris 2015, with 60 countries
including REDD (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation)
in their commitments and a separate REDD-clause in the final agreement (The
Economist, 2015). From 2000 to 2012, Hansen et al. (2013) found increasing forest
loss in the tropics, driven by countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia and others. In
1Co-authors: Liana O. Anderson, National Center for Monitoring and Early Warning of Natural
Disasters (CEMADEN); Torfinn Harding, Department of Economics, NHH Norwegian School of
Economics, and University of Stavanger; Karlygash Kuralbayeva, Grantham Research Institute,
LSE; Andre Lima, Department of Geographical Sciences, University of Maryland. The project is
funded by the Research Council of Norway (project number 230860).
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contrast, Brazil stood out with the largest decline of all countries globally, with
more than halving its annual loss of forest cover from 2003/2004 to 2010/2011. An
understanding of the factors behind the Brazilian success could guide the efforts of
other countries in reducing their deforestation rates. However, academics are still
debating the importance of the different policies and corporate actions that have
been implemented since 2004.2
In this paper we examine the contribution of forest conservation to the reduction
in deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon. As shown in the left panel of figure 3.1,
forest under strict regulation (conservation zones) increased from 12% to 22% of
the entire legal Amazon area in the period 2003-2010. Many observers assign an
important role to this aggressive policy effort in the remarkable drop in deforestation
rates over the same period, which can be seen in the right hand side panel of the
figure. However, it is clear that most of the drop took place outside of the zones
rather than inside of the zones, as the level inside was low also before 2004.
Figure 3.1: Total area covered by conservation zones and deforestation rates
Notes: Conservation zones (left panel) and deforestation rates inside and outside zones (right
panel). Zones established in the years 1959-2012. Figure C.1 presents the same graphs including
only zones established in 2004-2010. Source: Authors own calculations based on data from INPE.
High resolution spatial data (we use 1 km2 grid cells) allow us to zoom in and
compare areas just inside with areas just outside the conservation zones, i.e. we
implement a spatial regression discontinuity design, like Turner et al. (2014). We
follow Turner et al. (2014) in focusing on straight parts of the zone boundaries,
2See for example the Editorial of Nature April 2nd 2015 and the two Science articles (Gibbs
et al., 2015; Nepstad et al., 2014).
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to deal with potentially endogenous zone location due to micro variations in the
natural geography. The assumption is that nothing in nature is straight, in contrast
to policy lines. We focus on zones established from 2004 to 2010, and annual data
on deforestation (2002-2013) allow us then to investigate the discontinuities at zone
boundaries before and after the zones were established.
Our first empirical finding is that zones in general have not reduced deforesta-
tion. Although the areas inside the zones do have lower deforestation rates, with a
discontinuity at the boundaries, we find that the discontinuity in deforestation was
present also before the zones were established. This observation suggests that the
zones did not reduce deforestation. Difference-in-difference estimates, based on the
difference between inside and outside cells, before and after zones were established,
confirm that zones did not reduce deforestation.
Our second empirical finding is that zones were placed where agricultural pro-
duction is likely to have low profitability. A linear probability model reveals that
the conservation zones established from 2004 to 2010 were likely to be placed away
from areas where agricultural production is expected to be profitable. In the same
vain, high past deforestation rates also correlate negatively with the likelihood of
the area being put under regulation. These results suggest that the location of zones
were dominated by minimizing the efficiency loss of the policy, at the expense of the
effectiveness of the policy in terms of reducing deforestation rates. In turn, this can
explain our second empirical finding.
Our third empirical finding points to the importance of enforcement. It is obvi-
ous that enforcement issues matter in designing and assessing any regulatory regime.
We exploit a policy implemented by the federal government in 2008, in which muni-
cipalities with particularly high deforestation rates were put on a “shame list” and
faced the risk of losing federal monetary transfers over the state budget. We find
that zones located in municipalities on the list were more effective than other zones.
Our finding that the conservation zones established from 2004 to 2010 play a
little, if any, role for the large reduction in deforestation rates observed in the
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Brazilian Amazon since 2004, stands in stark contrast to the going conventional
wisdom. For instance, Assunc¸a˜o et al. (2015) argue that approximately half of the
deforestation that was avoided in the Brazilian Amazon during 2005-2009 was the
result of government conservation policies. Soares-Filho et al. (2010) came to a sim-
ilar conclusion, asserting that the expansion of the protected areas account for 37%
reduction in deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon between 2004 and 2006, without
facilitating leakage. Nolte et al. (2013) found that protected areas have contributed
to reducing deforestation rates. Furthermore, as they compare different types of
protected areas, they conclude that strictly protected (SP) areas have avoided more
deforestation than sustainable use (SU) areas, with the former being effective under
conditions of limited government enforcement. In contrast, our estimates do not
reveal any qualitative differences between SU and SP zones.
For countries like Indonesia, Malaysia and Congo, that are in need for policies
that can reduce deforestation, this paper contributes by pointing out that conser-
vation zone policies can reduce current deforestation rates if incentives to enforce
the regulation are high for the local authorities, and only if they are placed where
agricultural profitability is positive.
The first contribution of the paper lies in the empirical identification strategy.
The current empirical literature3 has used matching on observables to deal with the
potential non-random selection of zone location. Our empirical design is an improve-
ment over this, as it allows us to take into account selection also on unobservables.
Such unobservables are found to be crucial for the location of the zones. For the
Brazilian zones established in 2004-2010 that we study, the endogenous selection of
zone locations introduces a bias such that zones appear more effective than they
are in reality. The spatial regression discontinuity (RD) design in combination with
straight borders that we borrow from Turner et al. (2014) aims to account for unob-
servables in that, close to the border, the factors relevant for deforestation are plaus-
ibly the same on both sides of the border. In our context, however, this may not be
3e.g., Assunc¸a˜o et al. (2015), Blackman et al. (2015), Bruner et al. (2001), Nolte et al. (2013),
Soares-Filho et al. (2010) and Pfaff et al. (2014)
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sufficient to deal with unobservables as there is a discontinuity in deforestation also
before the zones were established. The difference-in-differences estimation allows
us to control for time-invariant unobservables as wells as differential trends inside
and outside of the zones. In the absence of randomly placed zones, these strategies
give the best hope of achieving unbiased estimates of the effect of the zones. The
set of results presented in this paper gives a remarkably consistent picture. Note,
however, that had we relied on RD alone, i.e. not brought in the time-variation, we
could easily have concluded that the zones did reduce deforestation.
The second contribution of the paper is that we empirically explain the location
of the zones. Nolte et al. (2013) also discusses the importance of “deforestation
pressure”, and our paper complements their paper by adding empirical estimates of
key determinants of zone location.
A final contribution is that we take advantage of a program of the federal gov-
ernment that raised the stakes of reducing deforestation for certain municipalities,
and show that conservation zones reduced deforestation in incentivised municipal-
ities. This is consistent with Assunc¸a˜o and Rocha (2014), who study the effects of
the listing in a municipality-time panel analysis. They find that the listing reduced
deforestation primarily through monitoring and law enforcement. Our contribution
is to investigate the effect of the listing in the context of zones, zooming in precisely
on where the deforestation happened within municipalities.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 3.2 we describe the
empirical approach and the data. Empirical findings on the effects of zones on de-
forestation rates are in Section 3.3. Section 3.4 investigates the factors that affect
the location of the zones. Section 3.5 examines the role of incentives in reducing de-
forestation rates in the context of the zones. Section 3.6 concludes with a discussion
on the role of conservation zones in reducing deforestation rates in Brazil.
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3.2 Empirical strategy and data
3.2.1 Empirical strategy
1. Effective conservation zones generates a discontinuity in deforesta-
tion at zone boundaries
First we investigate graphically if there is a discontinuity in deforestation at
the borders of the conservation zones. This follows a standard spatial regression-
discontinuity design, like Turner et al. (2014) and Cust and Harding (2014). For
each zone, we know the year of establishment and we look for discontinuities in the
period the zone was active, as well as in the years before the zone was active.
To formally estimate the effect of conservation zones, we use a standard difference-
in-difference regression (like, e.g., Greenstone et al. (2010)):
DFpzt = α + β1Everz + β2EverzxPostzt + β3Postzt
+ f(distpz) + Everz ∗ f(distpz) + Z ′pztθ + pzt (3.1)
where p indicates cell, z zone and t year, i.e. grid-cells observed annually are our
units of observation and we know whether they are located in an active conservation
zone or not. DF measures deforestation in fraction of the area of the cell, Ever is a
dummy that takes 1 if the cell will be or is in a conservation zone, Post is a dummy
taking 1 for the years the conservation zone is active. β2, the coefficient on the
interaction between Ever and Post picks up the difference-in-difference estimate and
is our coefficient of interest. dist is the distance from the cell p to the conservation
border. f is a polynomial and we allow for it to have separate effect on each side of
the border. We use a polynomial of order 2 in our baseline specification.4
Z is a vector of controls for the land rent curve5. We interpret agricultural
4In an earlier version of this paper, we included separate time-trends inside and outside of the
zones, and it did not change the conclusion that zones in general do not reduce deforestation. Given
our conclusion of no-effect, we view it as more prudent to not saturate the model with controls,
and therefore use a more parsimonious formulation as our baseline model.
5Please refer to the full working paper (Anderson et al., 2016) which includes a theoretical
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production widely (anything that requires deforestation), and the distance z as the
distance to the relevant markets. z also represents anything that is correlated with
agricultural productivity. The appropriate measures would in principle vary across
agricultural products. We focus on distance to city and soil quality. We also control
for the fraction of the cell that is coded as non-forest (water, cities etc.) as well as
for lagged forest cover.6
β2 in equation 3.1 is identified to the extent the error term is uncorrelated with
the variable Everz x Postzt. Non-random allocation of zones represents a consider-
able identification challenge. We control for observables as explained above, whereas
unobservables are controlled for by the following. The RD-set up, with the flexible
polynomials in the distance to the conservation zone border controls in principle for
unobservables in terms of natural geography. The idea is that very close to the bor-
der, the natural geography is the same. Furthermore, we follow Turner et al. (2014)
and use only straight parts of the borders.7 The idea is that nothing in nature
is straight, in contrast to policy lines. A discontinuity across a straight border is
therefore more likely to be related to the policy than a discontinuity across a non-
straight border, whose location is more likely to be partly determined by omitted
factors in terms of local natural geography. Finally, by bringing in the timing, we
can control for municipality-year fixed effects that pick up anything that affects the
average level of deforestation in a given municipality in a given year, i.e. we identify
β2 from within municipality variation.8 In robustness checks, we also present results
with cell fixed effects in addition to the municipality year fixed effects. We cluster
the standard errors on the level of treatment, i.e. on zone-time, to take into account
section, written by Karlygash Kuralbayeva and Torfinn Harding, which forms the basis for the
controls in the empirical analysis.
6We have also investigated the role of alternative measures of market access and agricultural
productivity, such as the distance to nearest river, distance to nearest soy field, the fertility of the
soil and past deforestation rates. The choice of variables to be included in Z does not seem to
affect the results. Distance to city is found to be the most robust one.
7Borders are defined as straight by the rule used by Turner et al. (2014), see their graph on p.
1374 for an illustration. More details are available from the authors.
8Using instead year fixed effects, municipality fixed effects, zone fixed effects, or combinations
of the above does not seem to alter the results.
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potential Moulton bias and spatial correlation.9
The second assumption we test is the location of the zones. Concerns for min-
imizing leakage of deforestation into previously unprofitable areas push the location
beyond the agricultural frontier. The government may also plan “buffers” to future
potential deforestation. If, however, the government faces an additional incentive
and is forced to reduce historical rates of deforestation to some reference point, then
the government has to locate the zones inside of the agricultural frontier. In this
case, the agricultural frontier is to be located inside the conservation zone.
2. Economic efficiency concerns push the zone location out of areas
with high rents in agriculture, whereas concerns about reducing con-
temporary deforestation rates push the zones to be located (at least
partly) inside the agricultural frontier
To test this hypothesis, we estimate the following linear probability model:
EverpzxPostpz = α + Z ′pzγ1 + pz (3.2)
Importantly, here we estimate where the zones are located in the cross section,
i.e. we limit the sample so all cells are only represented once. We compare in prin-
ciple all cells across space, and the dependent variable is simply the ever-treated
dummy. The first set of determinants are variables correlated with transportation
costs and land productivity, representing economic efficiency concerns. The second
set is past deforestation rates. A negative effect of past deforestation rates would in-
dicate that economic efficiency concerns are working also through past deforestation
(unobserved land rent determinants are captured by past deforestation), whereas a
positive effect of past deforestation would indicate that the zones were placed where
there had been high deforestation in the past and hence they would be an attempt
to curb those rates in the future. We also condition on the initial level of forest
cover. The linear probability model reveals how the location of the zones correlates
9One could argue that we should implement two-way clustering to take into account serial
correlation. However, given our conclusion of no effect, we regard it as more prudent to run with
less conservative clustering.
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with characteristics such as distances to city, river, nearest soy field, soil quality
and past deforestation. The variables are either predetermined or related to nat-
ural geography. In the linear probability model, we cluster standard errors on the
municipality level to take into account spatial correlation.
The third hypothesis we empirically test is that higher enforcement costs or lower
enforcement budgets result in higher deforestation rates within conservation zones.
This implies that policy interventions that increase enforcement efforts can result in
lower deforestation rates.
3. The drop in deforestation at the border varies with enforcement
We take advantage of an initiative from the federal government introduced in
2008, which put a set of municipalities with particularly high deforestation rates
on a “shame list” (or “priority list”) with the threat of reduction in federal funds
for the municipalities’ general budgets if deforestation rates did not come down.
These municipalities therefore faced higher incentives than others to reduce defor-
estation and hence may have increased the enforcement of the zones. We expand
the difference-in-difference model of equation 3.1 with an interaction term between
the treatment dummy and a time varying dummy taking one if the municipality
where a given cell is located was on the list in a given year:
DFpzt = α + β1Everz + β2EverzxPostzt + β3Postzt
+ β4EverzxPostztxListpt + β5EverzxListpt + β6PostztxListpt + Listpt
+ f(distpz) + Everz ∗ f(distpz) + Z ′pztθ + pzt (3.3)
A negative β4 suggests that the zones reduced deforestation more in the mu-
nicipalities on the list. To avoid complicated interpretation, we exclude for these
estimates zones established after 2008, i.e. in 2009 and 2010. The rest of the set up
is identical as for the difference-in-difference estimation described around equation
3.1.
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3.2.2 Institutional setting
Brazil was for long the leader in tropical deforestation worldwide, estimated to have
cleared an average of 19,500 km2 per year from 1996 to 2005. In 2008, the Brazilian
government committed to reduce deforestation by 80% of the historical baseline by
2020 (Government et al. (2007)). However, efforts started before 2008.
Brazil’s law regulating deforestation on private land is the Forest Code (FC),
which was created in 1965, and through various presidential decrees in the 1990s
it was transformed into de facto environmental law (Soares-Filho et al. (2014)).10
Even though the FC severely restricted deforestation on private land, it was hardly
enforced until Marina Silva became the minister of environment from 2003-2008.
In 2003 she launched a National Plan for the Prevention and Control of Amazon
Deforestation that ramped up law enforcement and established 600,000 km2 (roughly
the size of France) of new protected areas, with the area in conservation zones adding
up to 22% of the Amazon in 2010 (Alarcon-Diaz, 2012). A key component was also
to fight illegal deforestation activities.11
The Amazon protected areas (PAs) are broadly defined as all public areas under
land-use restrictions that contribute to the conservation of the natural resources. In
addition to the conservation zones we study in this paper, PAs include indigenous
lands and military areas.12 The conservation zones are managed by the federal,
state, or municipal governments, and they are classified into two groups: strictly
protected areas (SP) and sustainable-use units (SU). Each group can be further
sub-classified into diverse categories, according to the degree of conservation and
use(Verissimo et al., 2011). In SP areas, harvesting of forest products or minerals as
10The FC establishes a percentage of rural properties to be maintained as a permanent forest
reserve. The FC originally dictated that at least 50% of private properties in the country’s northern
region should be maintained as reserves (Alarcon-Diaz, 2012). Following a major increase in forest
clearing rates in the middle 1990s, the fraction of person’s property held in reserve has changed.
As of 2001, the FC stipulates that 80 percent of Amazon rain forest on private property must be
held in reserve, meaning that landowners can clear 20 percent (Soares-Filho et al. (2014).)
11See interview with Silva in the Financial Times, October 5, 2009
12PAs covered a total area of about 2.2 million km2 by December 2010, encompassing 43.9% of
the territory of the Brazilian Amazon (Verissimo et al. (2011)), with conservation zones accounting
for 22.2% and indigenous land covering the remaining 21.7%. From 2004 to 2013, deforestation
declined to 35.9% of its historical levels.
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well as settlements of traditional and non-traditional populations are not allowed.
SU areas are designed for both biodiversity conservation and sustainable extrac-
tion of natural resources. In those areas the extraction of timber and other forest
products are permitted to some extent under a sustainable management standard.
Traditional populations may remain within the area as long as they undertake activ-
ities in a sustainable way (Verissimo et al. (2011)). In the late 1980s, the SP areas
accounted for the majority of the areas under conservation (92%). Over time, and
in particularly after year 2000, the share occupied by SU zones has increased.
The Forest Code also requires that property owners register their land; the sys-
tem called the Rural Environmental Registry System (Portuguese acronym SICAR),
which should improve transparency and compliance. However, as Gibbs et al. (2015)
argue property registration does not protect forests. They note that only few re-
gistered properties in states such as Mato Grosso (9%) and Para (4%) had the forest
cover at least 80% as dictated by the FC. This may be about to change, with recent
efforts of implementing comprehensive land registration.
Also the enforcement has ramped up significantly in recent years. Enforcing
environmental laws across the huge area as of the Brazilian Amazon is a great chal-
lenge for regulators. For instance, the Brazilian regulator (IBAMA) uses satellite
data and field visits to issue fines and embargo economic activities on properties
with illegal deforestation. However, as Gibbs et al. (2015) note, government’s mon-
itoring is limited: as of May 2014, they estimate that “roughly half of the registered
properties with deforestation  25 ha, 2009-2013, were not embargoed”.
3.2.3 Data
We study the legal Amazon, an area of 5,032 million km2 in the north and west of
Brazil (for comparison, the U.S. area of land + inland water is 9.4 million km2). The
data on deforestation cover the entire area, for the period 2002-2013.13 These are
13In addition, the stock of historical deforestation prior to and inclusive of 1997 has been calcu-
lated, as wells as the deforestation that took place between 1997 and 2000. Therefore we observe
the stock of deforestation taking place before 2001. 2001 was the first year of annual deforestation
data, but we have currently chosen to exclude 2001, as the data suggest very high deforestation
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based on NASA satellite images which have been processed at INPE, the Brazilian
National Institute for Space Research. They come with high spatial resolution
(about 200 meters) and we aggregate them up to grid-cells of 1 km2.
Using the coordinates of the centroid of the grid cells, we assign geo-specific
information, such as distances to city, river, soy fields, road and political boundaries.
We also use data on soil quality, stock of forest cover in 2000, lagged forest cover
and share of non-forest. For the conservation zones, we observe their exact locations
(their boundaries) and the year of establishment. All data come from either INPE
or the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE).14
We focus on zones established in 2004-2010 only, which ensures that we have
deforestation data before and after for all the zones.15 We define “treated” cells as
those located within an “active” conservation zone, with active referring to years for
which the zones existed. “Control” cells are cells located outside active conservation
zones, and we assign each outside cell to its nearest conservation zone. We define
the Ever dummy as taking 1 for all cells that appear in a conservation zone at some
point, and zero for cells that are never in a conservation zones. The Post dummy
takes 1 for the years a zone is active, for all cells assigned to that particular zone.
This set up allows us to compare inside with outside cells, before and after the zone
was established.
The deforestation data are recorded as the deforestation from September to
August, i.e. the deforestation recorded for the year 2006 cover the deforestation
that occurred from September 2005 to August 2006. Since annual zone establishment
dates follow the calendar year, we exclude deforestation coded to have happen in the
year of establishment (say 2006), to avoid that the deforestation assigned to 2006 in
rates and closer investigation of the maps reveals patterns we have yet to understand.
14Detailed information is available from the authors.
15The maximum years we could use before/after is eight/nine. Since there are very few observa-
tions in the ends, we use seven years to avoid any influence of outliers: For the RD-plots, we use
averages across the 7 years before (t=-7) and 7 years after (t=7), in the regression we use annual
data for for 2002-2013 limited to t=-7 and t=7. We always exclude t=0, because the deforestation
data is recorded September-August instead of on calendar years, explained elsewhere in this sec-
tion. An alternative would be to lag the Post-dummy one period, but we find it cleaner to simply
exclude the introduction year, t = 0.
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our dataset occurred before the zone was established.
In terms of the samples, we include in the RD-plots all cells, whereas we include
only those cells within 10 km from the border in the difference-in-difference estim-
ation, to make the RD-assumption of identical cells in terms of unobservables more
likely to hold.16
3.3 Empirical results I: The effect of zones
3.3.1 Graphical evidence
Figure 3.2: Deforestation outside vs. inside and before vs. after
Left panel: Outside (left dashed) vs. inside (right solid), before (thin blue) vs. after (thick green).
Right panel: Outside (dashed) vs. inside (solid), before (thin blue) vs after (thick green). We
include only cells within 30 km of the conservation zone boundaries.
Mean DF across up to 7 years before and 7 years after. Zones established in the period 2004-2010,
DF in t=0 excluded. Inside and outside cells are matched to a given zone, i.e. the timing for the
control cells corresponds to the timing of their nearest zone.
The green/thick lines in figure 3.2 plot the deforestation outside (negative dis-
tances, plotted the the left) and deforestation inside (positive distances, plotted to
the right) of active conservation zones. Deforestation is in the graphs measured as
the % of the covered area that was deforested annually. There is clearly a drop
in deforestation as the border of the conservation zone is crossed from the left to
the right, consistent with our assumptions. However, the blue/thin lines show that
16We present robustness checks where we vary this between 5 km to 30 km. The deepest zone
we have in the data is about 65 km.
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the discontinuity was present also before the zones were established, suggesting that
the zones were located in areas with low profitability of deforestation. The lower
deforestation on both sides of the border in the treatment period (green thick lines),
reflects the general decline in deforestation rates in Brazil in our sample period. Note
that the drop in deforestation over time is higher outside than inside the zones.
The right hand side panel of figure 3.2 is a difference-in-difference graph, showing
mean deforestation over time. Zones are established at t = 0. Using the same
marking of lines as in the left hand side panel, solid lines show the deforestation
rates inside the zones, which are lower than the outside deforestation rates (dashed
lines). Outside, there was a downward-sloping time trend over the entire period,
whereas inside, the negative trend seems to have started around t = −2. After the
zones were established, the trends are similar outside and inside, with deforestation
rates levelling out on relatively low levels, i.e. about 0.2% a per year outside and
0.1 % per year inside the zones. In terms of the effect of the zones, i.e. the drop
around t = 0, we observe again that the drop in deforestation is larger for the
outside cells than for the inside cells. It is not clear that there is a discontinuity
around t = 0. Next, we investigate this more formally by estimating a difference-in-
difference model.
3.3.2 Econometric estimates
Table 3.1 presents estimates of equation 3.1. Our assumption that deforestation
drops at the border of conservation zones under non-zero enforcement, is tested by
the parameter on the ever-treated dummy (Ever) interacted with the post dummy
(Post), β2. Focusing on column 1, which pools SP and SU zones, the second row
shows a non-significant β2. The ever dummy always takes a negative and significant
coefficient, indicating that deforestation inside the zones was always lower than
outside of the zones.
In contrast, Nolte et al. (2013) find that conservation zones have reduced defor-
estation in Brazil. Furthermore, they find that strictly protected (SP) zones have
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been more effective in doing so than the sustainable use (SU) zones. Column 2
and 3 present estimates for the two types of zones separately, without revealing any
qualitative difference between them.17
Table 3.1: Difference-in-Difference estimates of the effect of zoning
(1) (2) (3)
All SP SU
D=1 ever in CZ -0.0010∗ -0.0025∗∗∗ -0.0004
(0.0005) (0.0009) (0.0006)
D=1 ever in CZ x Post 0.0007 0.0010 0.0005
(0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0007)
Post -0.0014 0.0002 -0.0011
(0.0009) (0.0012) (0.0012)
Observations 1 033 058 282 701 747 769
R-sq 0.037 0.013 0.043
Clusters 877 207 680
Meters from CZ incl. 10 000 10 000 10 000
Notes: ***p <0.01, **p <0.05, *p <0.10. Standard errors clustered at zone-t level. Based on t +/- 7
years max, zones 2004-2010, straight borders only. Dependent variable: DF , i.e. the share of a 1 km2
cell, the unit of observation, that is deforested in a given year. Ever is a dummy taking one for all cells
ever to be located inside one of the zones we consider and zero for cells outside the zones, Post is a
dummy taking one for years when a given zone is active (both for inside and outside cells assigned to
that zone), and the interaction Ever ∗ Post picks up the difference-in-difference effect of interest, β2.
We control for, separately on each side of the border, second-order polynomials in the distance to the
border. In addition we include as controls the log distance to nearest city, lagged forest cover and share
of non-forest at the cell level, and municipality-year fixed effects. See appendix table C.1 for the full
table. All refers to all zones, SP to strictly protected zones and SU to sustainable use zones.
Zones may reduce deforestation rates only if deforestation would be profitable
without the conservation zones. To test this assertion, we interact in table C.2 the
treatment variable Ever xPost with an indicator of the soil quality. The soil quality
is based on natural geography. To simplify the interpretation, we use the average soil
quality across all cells within a municipality as the measure. In addition, we subtract
the average soil quality, so the variable can be interpreted as the deviation from the
average soil quality. For the SP-zones, the interaction with the ever treated dummy
is positive, whereas the coefficient on the interaction with the treatment variable is
negative. This indicates that the deforestation before the zones became active was
higher in areas with high soil quality and that the activation of the zones did reduce
deforestation in such areas. The coefficients for “All” and “SU” are insignificant.18
17Appendix figures C.1 and C.2 present graphs for SP and SU separately. The figures show that
the pattern of deforestation is not strikingly different across the two types of zones, except that
deforestation is markedly lower inside of SP zones, after the zones have become active. This is
consistent with the regulation, which permits some deforestation in the SU zones, subject to a
licensing process.
18Using alternative measures of agriculture productivity has not produced robust results.
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We present a large set of robustness checks in the Section B in Appendix C.1.
In table C.3-C.5 we demonstrate that the results of no effect of zones are robust
to changing the set of controls. The only exception is when we include cell fixed
effects and lagged forest cover as a control. We then identify β2 from variation across
time for each 1 km2 cell (conditional on the forest cover in the previous period and
municipality wide time shocks). In other words, the fixed effect result is necessarily
driven by cells in which the deforestation actually changed over time. This points
to zones having an effect when they are placed where there is some deforestation to
reduce.
In tables C.6 and C.7, we vary the distance from the borders of the conservation
zones, down to 5 km and up to 30 km, respectively. The picture is still the same,
perhaps with the exception that 30 km produces a significant positive β2 for SP
zones. Finally, table C.8 presents estimates of our baseline model based on all
borders, instead of only straight borders. β2 is positive and significant for the
full sample and for the SP-zones separately. The positive β2 may reflect a larger
reduction in deforestation outside compared to inside the zones, consistent with for
example figure 3.2.
Our overall conclusion from the evidence presented in this section is that the
zones have not reduced deforestation in general. But SP-zones located in areas with
high soil quality seem to reduce deforestation rates. In the next section we study
where the government choose to place the zones.
3.4 Empirical results II: The location of zones
If a reduction in DF-rates matters to the government, conservation zones must
lie partly inside agriculture frontier. In this section, we test this assumption by
first showing graphical evidence on where the zones are and by describing the zone
locations by estimating a linear probability model (LPM). In the latter, we consider
variables correlated with land rent, such as distances to soy field, city, river as well as
the quality of the soil and past deforestation. If the latter takes a negative sign, the
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zones are located away from where deforestation is profitable. On the other hand,
if it takes a positive sign, it is indicative of the government strategically placing the
zones where they could bite and reduce deforestation.
Appendix figure C.3 shows the zones on a map, together with current deforest-
ation rates in 2005 and 2008.19 It seems zones have been placed as buffers.
Table 3.2: Linear probability model of zoning
(1) (2) (3)
D=1 if inside CZ D=1 if inside SP D=1 if inside SU
ln Dist soy (-1) 0.0058 -0.0027 0.0079∗
(0.0064) (0.0033) (0.0045)
ln Dist city 0.0877∗∗∗ 0.0549∗∗∗ 0.0455∗∗∗
(0.0213) (0.0158) (0.0128)
ln Dist river -0.0009 0.0055 -0.0049
(0.0049) (0.0036) (0.0047)
DF (-1) -0.1285∗∗∗ -0.0505∗∗∗ -0.0931∗∗∗
(0.0337) (0.0132) (0.0305)
DF (-2) -0.1034∗∗ -0.0486∗∗∗ -0.0677∗
(0.0434) (0.0142) (0.0396)
Soil quality (1-8) -0.0033 -0.0034 -0.0006
(0.0067) (0.0040) (0.0048)
RF 2000 0.0596∗∗ 0.0197 0.0484∗∗
(0.0243) (0.0152) (0.0196)
Constant -0.9111∗∗∗ -0.5617∗∗∗ -0.4836∗∗∗
(0.2519) (0.1961) (0.1391)
Observations 4 242 278 3 906 500 4 030 014
Clusters 742 742 742
R-sq .0923 .0648 .0507
Notes: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10. Standard errors clustered at the municipality level. Dependent
variable: Dummy taking 1 if the cell was located in a zone established in 2004-2010, and zero if a cell
was outside any zone in 2010 or before. Lagged DF are for 2002-2003 and initial RF is for 2000.
The evidence presented in table 3.2 points to zone locations away from where
agricultural production is expected to be profitable, as variables presumably posit-
ively correlated with agriculture profitability predict low likelihood of zoning. E.g.,
the closer to a soy field or a city, the lower the likelihood of the cell to be subject
to zoning, and the higher the past deforestation rates, the lower the likelihood for
zoning. These results suggest that the location decisions for the zones were domin-
ated by minimizing the efficiency loss of the policy, at the cost of the effectiveness
of the policy.
19We would like to thank Julika Herzberg for producing these maps.
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3.5 Empirical results III: Incentivicing municip-
alities
As exogenous variation in enforcement efforts are hard to come by, we present in
this section indirect evidence on the role of enforcement. In 2008, the federal govern-
ment established a list of municipalities, called priority municipalities (MPs), that
should significantly reduce deforestation. The incentives for the municipalities on
this priority list to reduce deforestation were high, as they ran the risk of losing
federal monetary transfers over the state budget. These municipalities were subject
to more rigorous environmental monitoring and law enforcement from Brazil’s en-
vironmental protection agency, IBAMA, as well as being subject to fines, embargoes
of farms and changes in subsidised credit contracts.
Figure 3.3 presents the difference-in-difference graph for the priority municipal-
ities (SP left hand side panel, SU right hand side panel). The priority municipalities
had much higher deforestation rates inside the zones, especially before the zones
were active, compared to the other municipalities (see appendix figure C.4 for a
comparison with the non-listed municipalities). From the right hand side panel of
figure 3.3, it seems that the effectiveness of the zones have increased over time for
the SU zones, consistent with the introduction of the list at some point for t > 0.
Figure 3.3: Priority municipalities
Left panel SP-zones, right panel SU-zones; otherwise as figure 3.2. Dotted lines are outside and
thick lines are inside. Figure C.4 includes also the non-priority municipalities, for comparison. We
cap the figure at five years before/after, as we have little data for 6 and 7 years before.
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To test if getting on the priority list made the zones bite more, we expand
the model from table 3.1 by including an interaction term between our treatment
variable, Ever xPost, and a dummy taking 1 for the years the municipality was on
the list. We estimate this model on the sample of municipalities that were on the
list at some point. The results, presented in table 3.3, reflect what we already saw
in figure 3.3. The list seem to have made no difference for the SP-zones, but for the
SU-zones, getting on the list corresponds with a reduction in deforestation inside the
zones (the coefficient on the triple interaction term is negative and significant). Note
also that the deforestation rates inside the SU-zones is higher than outside before
the list was introduced (the coefficient on the treatment variable is positive and
significant), again this can also be seen in figure 3.3. As deforestation in SU-zones
may be allowed subject to a licensing process, this may indicate lenient licensing
practices in these municipalities. The enhanced effect on SU-zones may have worked
via better enforcement and/or less lenient licensing practices. We do not observe
either enforcement efforts or licensing practices directly.
Assunc¸a˜o and Rocha (2014) argues that the MPs policy significantly reduced
deforestation in municipalities that were responsible for an important part of de-
forestation in the Brazilian Amazon. They control for the number of fines applied
by IBAMA to show that the list-policy worked through increased monitoring and
better targeting of law enforcement in these municipalities, and not through other
consequences of being on the “shame” list, such as political and economic sanctions.
In table 3.3, only listed municipalities are included. In the online appendix, table
C.9 presents results where also the other municipalities are included. We then find
that the extra effect in the listed municipalities of SU-zones loses its significance.
For SP-zones, the coefficient on the interaction dummy now turns negative and
significant, while β2 turns positive and significant.
Tables C.10, C.11 and C.12 present robustness tests with respect to different
distances to the zone boundaries and to the inclusion of also non-straight borders.
The significance of the triple interaction term for SU-zones is fragile, whereas the
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Table 3.3: The priority list
(1) (2) (3)
All SP SU
D=1 ever in CZ -0.0031 -0.0085∗∗ -0.0025
(0.0021) (0.0040) (0.0027)
D=1 ever in CZ x Post 0.0038 -0.0003 0.0060∗
(0.0026) (0.0032) (0.0032)
D=1 ever in CZ x Post x pr post -0.0010 0.0028 -0.0026∗∗
(0.0012) (0.0022) (0.0011)
Post -0.0058 0.0010 -0.0099∗
(0.0039) (0.0034) (0.0054)
Observations 229 444 69 354 159 157
R-sq 0.038 0.017 0.044
Clusters 280 84 186
Meters from CZ incl. 10 000 10 000 10 000
Notes: ***p <0.01, **p <0.05, *p <0.10. Standard errors clustered at zone-t level. Based on t +/- 7
years max, zones 2004-2008. Includes on each side of the border separate second-order polynomial in
the distance to the border, in addition to log distance to nearest city, lagged forest cover, share of
non-forest and municipality-year FE. The priority list started in 2008, and for simplification we drop in
this part of the analysis zones established 2009-2010. Post x pr post, D = 1 ever in CZ x pr post and
pr post drop out because of municipality-year fixed effects.
results for the SP-zones are robust.
3.6 Concluding remarks
Throughout the 2000s, the Brazilian government sought to halt forest clearing by
assigning conservation zones to large areas in the Brazilian Amazon. In this pa-
per we assess the effectiveness of this policy. We use high-resolution satellite data
on deforestation over 2002-2013 and study the effects of zones established in the
period 2004-2010. We implement regression discontinuity design and difference-in-
difference estimation to identify the effect of the zoning policy on deforestation. In
general, the zones did not reduce deforestation, as they were typically placed in
areas where deforestation most likely would be unprofitable also in the absence of
zones. When zones were placed in areas where deforestation had been profitable
in the past, they did reduce deforestation. Furthermore, when the municipalities
hosting the zones were faced with high incentives to reduce deforestation, zones were
found to be more effective.
The major identification challenge we face in estimating the effect of the con-
servation policy is that the zones may not be randomly located. It would be ideal
to have an instrument that determines the location and timing of zones that was
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excludable from equation 3.1. In the absence of such an instrument, we deal with
the potential endogeneity in the estimation of β1 in equation 3.1 by the RD-design
and by controlling for unobservables in terms of past deforestation rates and various
fixed effects. The spatial RD-design helps in principle with controlling for selection
on unobservables, as cells at the border should be the same on each side. We follow
Turner et al. (2014) in focusing on straight parts of the zone boundaries, to deal
with potentially endogenous zone location due to micro variations in the natural
geography. However, there may be that the border locations do correlate with un-
observed factors that are relevant for deforestation and that vary discontinuously at
the border. The RD-assumption may then not be valid. We therefore bring in tim-
ing and estimate the difference-in differences model. This controls for unobservables
inside versus outside by the ever-treated dummy.
In spite of such local successes in reducing deforestation, our findings point out
that factors beyond the zoning policies are needed to explain the large decline in
deforestation rates seen in Brazil since 2004. This is clearly seen in the right hand
panel of figure 3.1 and in figure 3.2, as most of the reduction in deforestation took
place outside rather than inside the zones. We leave the important task of identifying
these factors for future research.
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Chapter 4
Behavioural Interventions for
Conservation: Experimental
Evidence from South Africa1
4.1 Introduction
Public utilities need to consider the moral imperative of providing subsidised (or
free) services to extremely poor households against the environmental imperative of
encouraging efficient resource usage. As a country in the grip of one of the worst
droughts in decades, while also being one of the most unequal societies in the world,
local municipalities in South Africa have the challenge of balancing these competing
objectives. Even after more than two decades since Apartheid ended, South Africa
has an income Gini coefficient of around 0.70 (World Bank, 2016). The top 10%
of the population accounts for around 75% of the country’s wealth and 58% of
income (World Bank, 2016; Suisse, 2015). In this context of extreme water scarcity
coupled with high income inequality, behavioural nudges may be a useful adjunct
to traditional DSM for three reasons:
1Co-authors: Kerri Brick, Environmental Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Cape
Town; Martine Visser, School of Economics, University of Cape Town. I gratefully acknowledge
funding from the European Commission’s Seventh Framework Programme for the the Marie Curie
Initial Training Network for the Policy Design and Evaluation Research in Developing Countries
(PODER) project, and from the South Africa-Norway Research Cooperation.
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Firstly, traditional demand-side-management (DSM) tools, such as tariff hikes
and water restrictions can feel punitive for poor households and, while applied
equally, their outcomes are regressive (for example, poor households do not have
the means to soften the financial burden of an increase in tariffs through invest-
ments in technology) (Datta et al., 2015)2. In contrast, as non monetary incentives
do not feel punitive, they can be applied across the income spectrum.
Secondly, as 36% of water is provided free of charge and consumption in the
first two of six tariff blocks is subsidised for all income groups (pers. comm, Palmer
Development Group (2016)), low-income households - who are heavily subsidised and
thus may not internalise financial incentives- might respond more to non monetary
incentives.
Finally, revenue from the sale of utilities (water and electricity) provide (part
of) the funding needed to supply free basic services. In South Africa, as 25% of
revenue comes from consumers in the highest tariff block, local authorities need to
prioritise DSM interventions that elicit a more balanced response across the range
of users (pers. comm, Palmer Development Group (2016)). DSM initiatives that
mainly elicit responses from high users will reduce revenue while interventions that
elicit responses from low users will be revenue neutral.
Against this background, we conduct a large-scale behavioural intervention around
water conservation. More specifically, using inserts in monthly utility bills, we test
seven behavioural messages in a randomised control trial on the entire population of
residential households in Cape Town (334 475 households3). Our objectives are to
firstly determine which causal mechanisms best motivate behavioural change and,
secondly, examine how treatment effects vary across income groups. In particular,
we examine how responsiveness to financial incentives, information provision and
social preferences varies among income groups.
2See also Letsoalo et al. (2007) for analysis on triple dividend of water policy in South Africa.
3Not included in this analysis are two additional treatment arms, which bring the total sample
size to 412 418 households. The two last treatment arms are variations of the financial savings and
social recognition treatments, and are analysed in separate papers. See Chapter 5 for results on
the social recognition treatments.
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The treatments are classified into seven groups:
1. Pure information provision: the tips treatment provides tips on how to con-
serve water;
2. Price salience: the tariff graph treatment provides a visual of the nonlinear
pricing schedule and situates the household’s consumption within the stepped-
tariff schedule;
3. Financial savings: the financial gain treatment quantifies the financial savings
associated with efficient water usage;
4. Social comparison framing: the social norm treatment compares a household’s
consumption to the average household in their neighbourhood;
5. Neutral framing: the treatment appeals to intrinsic motivation by mirroring
the public water savings campaign which asks citizens to reduce water con-
sumption by 10% (no extrinsic incentive is offered if household reduces water
consumption);
6. Social recognition framing: the treatment publicly recognizes households who
conserve water; and,
7. Public good framing: as water scarcity is a classic public-good dilemma, the
public good treatment appeals for voluntary contributions to the public good.
This design enables us to unpack which of the seven mechanisms above - which
are explained more fully in the next section - best motivate behavioural change in a
context of extreme inequality. Our contribution is two-fold. Firstly, we disentangle
and identify the casual chain underlying which incentives most strongly lead to
behavioural change. Secondly, we analyse the effect of different nudges across income
groups given the high levels of income inequality.
On average, the social recognition treatment had the largest effect, reducing
consumption 520 litres on average each month (equivalent to a 2.2% decrease in
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consumption from the baseline mean). Importantly however, we find contrasting
heterogeneity effects across income groups: financial incentives work only on the
lower income groups, whereas social incentives (social norms, social recognition,
and appeals to their intrinsic motivation) work only on the higher income groups4.
The average treatment effect for the financial incentives mailer was a reduction of
300 litres each month, equivalent to a 1.3% decrease in consumption. However for
the poorest households (excluding indigents), the financial savings insert resulted,
on average, in 600 litres of water saved per month (equivalent to a 3.3% decrease in
consumption from their baseline mean).
Social recognition reduced consumption by approximately 900 litres each month
on average in the highest income group (2.6% decline from their baseline mean),
whereas the treatment resulted in an average increase of 550 litres for indigent
households5. This is a crucial finding from a public policy perspective given that
understanding heterogeneous responses to behavioural nudges improves the cost-
effectiveness of these types of interventions (Ferraro and Miranda, 2013). Specific-
ally, these interventions are low cost - our cost-effectiveness estimate per household
is R0.007 (USD 0.0006)6 for the social recognition treatment- and, it can be tar-
geted efficiently: for example, wealthy households households who are less likely
to be responsive to price signals given the relatively smaller share of their budget
allocated to water are extremely responsive to the social recognition treatment as
opposed to financial incentives. Targeting is also crucial in order to not undermine
the behaviour of sub populations who respond negatively to the incentive (such as
indigents in the social recognition treatment7).
The rollout of this intervention coincided with a city-wide water conservation
4Ferraro and Miranda (2013) similarly find that wealthier households tend to be more responsive
to social comparisons relative to low-income households.
5see Descriptives for more information on the indigent sub population
6We took the total project costs including researcher time and divided it by the number of
treatments. Then we divided this amount by the litres saved in the treatment per household per
month times the number of households in that treatment group for a rough cost estimate for a
particular treatment. This is a conservative estimate because we took total project costs over 9
months and divided it by the average monthly decrease.
7Please see Chapter 5 for a deeper analysis on the social recognition treatment as it is outside
the scope of this paper.
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campaign, the implementation of tighter restrictions in water usage and a tariff
hike. As such, reduction in consumption represents additional water savings, i.e.
water savings on top of those savings directly attributable to the campaign, water
restrictions and tariff increase (as we used a randomised control trial, these inter-
ventions are internalised in the control group). The finding of significant treatment
effects on top of water austerity measures emphasises the general usefulness of be-
havioural messaging as an adjunct to traditional DSM tools and, more specifically,
their usefulness in reinforcing DSM measures in times of extreme water scarcity.
Our study contributes to the literature on social norms and conservation (Allcott,
2011; Ferraro et al., 2011; Ayres, 2010). We find that our treatments have very
different effects compared to each other, across income groups, and compared to the
existing literature. Following the contribution from Allcott (2011) and others, we
tease out the mechanisms (and test additional mechanisms) leading to behavioural
change in U.S. home energy and water reports8 and find in our setting that the
treatment traditionally identified as the most important - social norms - is less
important than the other mechanisms at play (specifically, social recognition and
financial incentives).
The main contribution of this paper is that we use a city-wide randomised control
trial to test behavioural theories, some of which have yet to be empirically tested
in the literature and some of which have only been tested in a developed country
context. Applying behavioural nudges in a developing country context beset by
egregious inequality provides not only an opportunity to test the external validity of
behavioural nudges but most importantly an opportunity to provide timely evidence
for policy makers during an extreme environmental (water) crisis.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 4.2 presents the causal
mechanisms we empirically test with the experiment; Section 4.3 lists the treat-
ments; Section 4.4 describes the experimental design and setting; Section 4.5 shows
descriptives; Section 4.6 analyses the pre trend analysis; Section 4.7 details the
8See Appendix D.1
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empirical strategy; Section 4.8 discusses the results and Section 4.9 concludes.
4.2 Causal Mechanisms
Inexpensive, non-price and non-regulatory based behavioural interventions are in-
creasingly being seen as a means to promote proenvironmental behaviour (Ayres,
2010); and, in particular, information-based schemes have become increasingly pop-
ular in public policy (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008). In the context of reducing energy
and water consumption, many studies have appealed to social norms to reduce con-
sumption: for example, Allcott (2011) tests a behavioural intervention by home
energy report company Opower across the U.S. and finds that using social norms
results in an average decrease of 2% in energy consumption consistent over a two-
year period, which is equivalent to a short run electricity price increase of 11-20%.
Ferraro et al. (2011) use social norms messaging to reduce water consumption and
find that the impact (4.8%) can be measured two years after the study. While these
studies attribute the impact on conservation to households adjusting behaviour ac-
cording to social norms, the studies test multiple channels at once and the results
inspire further investigation of the mechanisms causing behavioural change. For ex-
ample, refer to an average Opower bill in Appendix D.1, and D.2 (page 241). Within
the same bill, it details: the comparison of the household’s consumption to that of i)
their most efficient neighbour, ii) all neighbours, in addition to iii) historical compar-
isons over 12 months, and v) financial savings tips and smart investments. Where
interventions combine private consumption feedback, average neighbour consump-
tion feedback, and monetary incentives (price savings) as well as information, the
channel(s) through which households are most motivated to change behaviour is
confounded.
We consider the primary causal channels most prevalent in the literature and
relevant in the context of water usage:
1. Individuals are motivated by self-interest. However, decisions on water and/or
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energy consumption are affected by information constraints. People have lim-
its either to information or to the cognitive ability or resources to make de-
cisions based on full information. In the context of water consumption, either
households are unaware of savings opportunities such as savings tips, or are
subject to heuristic biases. Consumption is often unobservable (toilet flush,
washing machine, irrigation, and leaks); even in cases where usage is visible, it
is not always easily quantifiable, for example a shower. Quantifying the water
used by appliances, toilets, irrigation systems and showers can be complex and
costly. As a result, as a de facto unobservable characteristic, water efficiency
receives less weighting than other preferences (for example, when purchasing
new appliances (Ramos et al., 2015)). Anecdotal evidence from focus groups
held in Cape Town indicates that consumers are not aware of the quantity of
water that they use.
Hypothesis: Decisions on water consumption are affected by information
constraints. By making the volume of everyday water use more transparent
and offering water savings tips, households will optimise their water consump-
tion.
2. Individuals may respond to increased transparency on the tariff structure and
their usage. More specifically, the choice environment is complex given the
opaque and nonlinear tariff structure used by most utilities, ostensibly to pro-
mote water conservation, and the fact that in many instances, water usage is
not quantifiable or even visible. This is compounded by that fact that, with a
conventional meter, households pay for water at the end of the billing period
and not during the instance of usage. Thus prices and usage are not sali-
ent. Anecdotal evidence from focus groups conducted in Cape Town indicated
participating households do not look at their usage within the tariff system,
but purely at the amount they owe. These factors imply that the potential
for the stepped tariff to induce more efficient usage is not being optimally
exploited. A number of studies indicate that individuals under react to non-
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salient prices (Chetty et al., 2009; Hossain and List, 2012). Borenstein (2009)
found unless customers have full comprehension of the tariff structure and are
aware throughout the billing period of the marginal price corresponding to
their real time consumption, they are unlikely to be responsive to marginal
price increases9. Gaudin (2006) finds that elasticity of demand increases by
at least 30% when price information is provided on the bill. Kahn and Wolak
(2013) use a customised online education program to inform customers of the
nonlinear price schedule on their monthly utility bill and find the education
program reduces daily consumption by 1.5% - 3%. Their study emphasises the
importance of providing timely information on the nonlinear pricing structure
for utilities to increase effectiveness of these pricing schemes. We contribute
to this literature by sending households regular feedback on both price and
consumption (and making both more salient) in the City of Cape Town. The
tariff graph treatment might provide a private signal whereby utility maxim-
izing households get closer to their private optimal water use.
Hypothesis: By making the tariff structure and nonlinear pricing more sali-
ent - that is, the more water used, the higher average price paid - and showing
where the household’s monthly consumption lies within the tariff structure,
households will be more responsive to the pricing structure and ultimately re-
duce usage.
3. Financial incentives motivate households to reduce consumption. If individu-
als are self-interested profit maximizing rational individuals, they chose their
water consumption level based on financial cost-benefit analyses. If they are
limited in their understanding of financial gains from conservation, then the
financial framing should have the greatest effect on water conservation.
Hypothesis: By making explicit the financial gains from moving into the
lower tariff block, budget constraint households will reduce their consumption.
9Many studies studies have shown that in these cases, consumers are more responsive to average
price than marginal price changes (Ito, 2014; Wichman, 2014), however we do not exploit differences
between average and marginal price in this paper.
96
4. Social comparisons provided in the social norm treatment facilitate social (ob-
servational) learning about the households’ privately-optimal level of water
usage (Allcott, 2011; Cai and Chen, 2009). Allcott (2011) and Ferraro et al.
(2011) find that social-norm based appeals reduce U.S. energy and water con-
sumption by 2% and 4.8%, respectively. Similarly, and consistent with earlier
findings in the literature, Smith, G., Visser (2010) show that reporting social
comparisons may be an effective way to mitigate household electricity con-
sumption in South Africa. As the success from using social norms has been
well documented, we use this framing as a benchmark for which to compare
the effect of other treatments.
Hypothesis: By providing a reference point as the social norm, households
will converge to the reference point.
5. People are intrinsically motivated whereby they derive utility from the act of
giving (Andreoni, 1990). The City of Cape Town initiated a Water Savings
campaign asking citizens to conserve 10% of their current water consumption
during our study. In line with the public campaign, we appealed to households’
intrinsic motivation with a neutral framing by asking them to help save water
by conserving 10% of their current water consumption in the summer months.
There is no extrinsic incentive provided if they manage to conserve by 10%.
Hypothesis: Households will reduce their consumption during drought if they
are intrinsically motivated to do so.
6. Social pressure often encourages people to do good deeds especially if the deed
is honorable in the society (Batson et al., 2003; Freeman, 1997; Be´nabou and
Tirole, 2006). Public recognition has been used in a variety of settings from
blood donations to charities to the workplace. In the context of conserva-
tion, Yoeli (2009) studies take of up energy savings technology in California.
When framed as a contribution to a public good, customers whose decision
is publicly visible are 1.5% more likely to sign up than those whose decision
is anonymous. Delmas and Lessem (2014) incentivise energy conservation in
97
college dorm rooms. While private information alone was ineffective, public
information combined with private information led to a 20% reduction in elec-
tricity consumption.
Hypothesis: By making household water consumption observable during drought,
households will be motivated to reduce their consumption to seek praise and/or
to avoid shame.
7. The public good appeal might alter the moral cost of water usage or, altern-
atively, generate conditional cooperation whereby households alter their usage
in the belief that other will also do so (Allcott, 2011). Water saving is a public
good: while it’s well known that a significant reduction in water consump-
tion at an aggregated level is needed to reduce the impact of the drought on
availability of water for all, the benefits of water savings are shared equally
by all households within the municipality irrespective of individual contribu-
tion. The incentive is to free ride (Hardin, 1968; Hasson et al., 2010; Brekke
and Johansson-Stenman; Brick et al., 2016b). Similarly, in the context of lab
experiments, while the dominant strategy in linear public good games is for
each player to contribute nothing, subjects make positive but suboptimal con-
tributions to public goods (Cherry et al., 2005), implying that it might be
possible to leverage water scarcity as a public goods dilemma to incentivise
conservation.
Hypothesis: If households are concerned about maximising collective well-
being, appeals to the public good will motivate a reduction in water consump-
tion.
4.3 Treatments
In the following section, we introduce the seven treatment arms. The treatments are
inserts delivered with the monthly bill, and are designed to test the seven hypotheses
from Section 4.2 and are ordered respective to the causal mechanism listed above.
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See an example of the City of Cape Town household municipal bill in Appendix D.2.
The messages sent with the bill are randomised across the entire sample of domestic
free-standing homes in the City of Cape Town with each household receiving only
one message throughout the treatment period. Please see Section 4.4 for details on
the experimental setting.
Message 1: Tips In the tips treatment, households were provided with water
conservation tips in a one-page insert. This information was adapted from City
sources (City of Cape Town, 2011b) and was thus widely available. Each tip is
presented using a descriptive icon, a short sentence and a paragraph quantifying the
potential water savings (liters/month for an average family of four) when the tip is
followed. Following Allcott (2011), the tips were divided into quick fixes and smart
purchases. Quick fixes include: take short showers, don’t leave taps running, have a
smaller bath, fix leaks immediately, practice water-wise-gardening; smart purchases
include: use a water-saving showerhead, fit taps with water-saving devices, reduce
the water used per flush, use pool of cover. The tips treatment is repeated in
all subsequent treatments to control for availability of information: if households
are motivated to change behaviour due to the insert, then all households across
treatments should be provided examples of ways to conserve water. An example of
the tip sheet is provided in Appendix D.5 (page 246).
Message 2: Tariff graph Tariffs are priced according to six tariff blocks ranging
from zero to R33.59 per kl (City of Cape Town, 2015b). The second treatment
augments treatment 1 by providing a graphical breakdown of the household’s bill
and tariff structure. As evident from Appendix D.7, the insert provides information
on: (i) the tariff rates, (ii) the tariff structure and, (iii) where the households’
consumption falls within the six tariff blocks. The insert includes the tip sheet in
treatment 1 on the back of the page. See Appendix D.7 (page 248).
Message 3: Financial Framing In the financial treatment, we test whether
households are most responsible to financial savings from conserving water versus the
various social preference treatments. To note, the financial gains includes the graph
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treatment, with additional details on how much the household could gain financially
from moving into the lower tariff block. In this way, the link between efficient usage
and financial savings is made explicit. The insert is provided in Appendix D.9 (page
250).
Message 4: Social Norm message The social norm message graphically
compares the household’s average daily water consumption to that of the average
for the neighbourhood. This comparison is presented in both a descriptive text and
a bar graph. The insert is illustrated in Appendix D.11 (page 252).
Message 5: Intrinsic motivation This treatment asks households to voluntary
reduce their water consumption by 10% in order to support a water saving initiative
that was recently launched by the City. Thus there is no direct external incentive
for the household to save other than being intrinsically motivated to do so. The
insert is provided in Appendix D.13 (page 254).
Message 6: Social recognition As with Message 5 (Intrinsic motivation),
this treatment encourages households to reduce their water consumption by 10% in
order to support a water saving initiative that was recently launched by the City.
However, in addition, the message further states that households that achieve this
goal over a six-month period will be publicly recognised on the City’s website. The
names and suburbs appeared on the City’s website four months after the completion
of the study, to allow time for households to opt-out if they did not want to have
their name displayed publicly. In comparison to message 5, where the motivation
to conserve water is internal, this framing explores whether the opportunity to be
socially recognised as one of the best performers (water savers) promotes conserva-
tion. If people desire to appear to society that they are doing good deeds, then it
follows that the opportunity to be socially recognised promotes conservation. See
Appendix D.15 (page 256).
Message 7: Public good The message highlights the public good context
by encouraging households to voluntary reduce their water consumption in order
to reduce the stress on water resources and prevent future water restrictions. See
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Appendix D.17 (page 258).
4.4 Experimental Setting
The City of Cape Town municipality governs Cape Town, South Africa. The popu-
lation in Cape Town is around 3.7 million, with around 1 million households (City of
Cape Town, 2011a). As a water-scarce country, South Africa must apply its available
water resources in the most efficient and equitable manner possible (Van Zyl et al.,
2008). In its Water for Growth and Development Plan, identifying water scarcity in
major urban centres, the Department of Water Affairs has highlighted the import-
ance of water conservation and demand management and, specifically, “nurturing
attitudinal and behavioural changes towards the value of water” (Department of
Water and Sanitation, 2009). More specifically, as the residential share of national
water usage is projected to reach around 35% by 2025 (Department of Water and
Sanitation, 2009), it is becoming increasingly important for local government to en-
gage with residential consumers around their water usage. As previously discussed,
water is priced according to an inclining block tariff structure consisting of six tariff
blocks: consumption in the first block is free (up to 6 kl) with tariff rates increasing
to R33.59 (excluding VAT) in the sixth tariff block (consumption in excess of 50
kl) (City of Cape Town, 2015b). The inclining tariff block structure is essentially a
built- in conservation tool to “deter unnecessarily high water use... and encourage
water conservation.” (City of Cape Town, 2015b). In December 2015, dam levels in
the City of Cape Town were at 61% of their storage capacity (as compared to 89%
and 97% in 2014 and 2013, respectively). While the City always imposes Level 1
water restrictions (to encourage a 10% water savings), in December 2015 the City
approved Level 2 water restrictions to be implemented from 1 January 2016. These
include tighter restrictions around water usage (for example, irrigation to take place
on certain days and between certain hours) as well as a tariff increase (City of Cape
Town, 2015a). In this setting, this experiment provides a test of the ability of beha-
vioural messages to encourage water conservation in times of extreme water scarcity.
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In collaboration with the City, the behavioural messages were mailed to households
as inserts with their monthly municipal bills. The messages were printed on blue
paper to make them distinctive from the bill itself. Bills are delivered to households
in twenty batches throughout the month. There exists currently six methods for
payment: online, over the counter at any Absa bank or common retail stores (Spar,
Kwikpay, Pick ’n Pay, Woolworths, Shoprite, Checkers U-Save, and Lewis stores),
ATM and electronic funds transfer (EFT) payments, postal payments to the City
of Cape Town, and debit order payment.
The initiative was launched in November 2015. Households were continually
mailed the inserts on a monthly basis over a period of six months.
4.4.1 Timeline of roll-out
The first messages were delivered in November 2015, as inserts with the monthly
municipal bill. Households receive the inserts on a monthly basis over a six -month
period - from November to April. The strategy behind the 5 month intervention
was two-fold: first we wanted to run the study over the summer months when
water usage increases. Secondly the treatment originally was to run for six months.
However, because the last insert (month 6) received for Social Recognition was
whether the household achieved a 10% consumption savings, and not the normal
message for month 1- 5, we cut analysis of the other treatments by one month in
order to compare all with the same frequency and timing of inserts.
Households receiving message 5 and 6 who have been asked to reduce their
consumption by 10%, were notified of how their household did in their May 2015
bill. Households receiving message 6 who managed to reduce their consumption by
10% over the study period and who thus qualify to have their information posted
on the City’s website, were given two months to notify the City that they do not
want their information published. Thereafter, their names would be published on
the City’s website.
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Figure 4.1: Timeline of Experiment
* = Winners for Social Recognition Treatment Announced
4.4.2 Sample
The total sample consists of approximately 335 000 households and includes all
domestic water users living in free-standing houses with access to an uncontrolled
water supply that is metered by a credit meter10. A credit meter is a physical device
on the household’s property which measures the amount of water supplied to home.
By focusing on free-standing houses only, we are able to avoid households which are
served by bulk water meters (as is the case with blocks of flats). Households are
billed on a monthly basis with a physical bill mailed to the household address. The
bill details the amount of water consumed in each tariff block, amount owed for the
billing period, and total liability (see Figure D.2 in Appendix D for an example of
a physical bill). We exclude households who receive an electronic bill (“Ebillers”)
from our sample. As the City has only recently initiated electronic billing (with
currently less than 80 000 households in the registry) we are not concerned about
the potential selection bias of not including Ebillers (who likely have higher income).
Power calculations were conducted using City of Cape Town consumption data
10Total sample for experiment is 412 478 which includes two additional treatments, which are
variations of the financial and social recognition treatments, and analysed in separate papers. See
Chapter 5 for analysis on social recognition treatments.
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for the period October 2015 as this was the only data available at the time of
randomisation. We matched municipal consumption data with the eligible sample.
We removed those consuming below 6 kl per month as well as the 95th percentile
to control for outliers. We then calculated mean consumption. We used two power
calculations: one where we look at the mean consumption over the treatment period
with an unbalanced panel and one where we use the balanced panel. With respect to
the unbalanced panel, we are able to detect a 1.5% change in means per treatment
with a minimum sample size of 18 579 per arm (with 80% power). With respect
to the balanced panel (a sample of households whose consumption we observe in
each month), we are able to detect a 1.5% change in means per treatment with a
sample size of 14 104 households per arm (with 80% power). However, the analysis
in this paper uses the months in the year prior for which our study was conducted
in order to allow for seasonality effects as consumption increases in the summer
months. Thus we run balance tests on the pre intervention period (see Table 4.6).
The sample of households is randomly allocated into either a control group (which
does not receive a behavioural message) or one of seven treatment groups where
each group receives one of the behavioural messages outlined in Section 4.3). All
treatments receive the Tips treatment to control for availability of information on
ways to change behaviour to conserve water. The sample was stratified on both
suburb and tariff block before randomising. We chose to stratify on suburb as, due
to the Apartheid legacy, income is heavily stratified by suburb lines to-date. See
Figure 4.2 below, which shows the geographic dispersion of Treatment 1. Income is
depicted in quintiles with a color gradient (red to green, with red equal to lowest
income and green highest income).
We chose to also stratify on tariff block as a control for consumption. As men-
tioned, tariffs are priced according to six inclining consumption blocks. Households
generally hover over two-three tariff blocks over the year. Thus while the suburbs
control for income, tariff block controls for unobservables such as infrastructure qual-
ity, household size, and other determinants of household consumption. The sample
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Figure 4.2: Geographic Dispersion of Treatment 1
Note: Treatment and control are depicted by the brown (treated) and yellow (con-
trol) circles.
sizes allocated to the control group as well as the treatment groups are reflected in
Table 4.1. Note, we include the number of indigent households within each treat-
ment: if the total household income is below a minimum threshold (<R300 000),
households are able to apply for indigent status and receive government grants. Be-
nefits include property rate reductions and the provision of free or subsidised basic
services including water and refuse removal. We excluded the list of indigents for
the randomisation of the graph and financial treatments (see Section 4.5.3), as these
households do not pay for their utilities. This was to avoid misleading the house-
holds as the graph and financial savings insert have the billed amount indicated on
the treatment insert. Indigents were included in all of the other treatments and
randomised across control as well. However, as Table 4.1 indicates, there are still a
number of indigents within the graph and financial treatments: at the time of ran-
domisation, we were provided a list by the municipality of all registered indigents in
the City of Cape Town. However, during the roll-out, we learned that this list was
incomplete. Thus in our regressions, we denote the original list of indigents as ‘In-
digent A’ and the additional indigents not in the original provided list as ‘Indigent
B’. We control for the indigent sample issue by only analysing heterogeneity effects,
which allows us to compare non indigents across all treatments, as well as indigents
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in all treatments except the graph and financial gain treatments (see Section 4.5.3
and Section 4.8 for details).
Table 4.1: Treatment allocation for November 2015 inserts
Treatment Treatment allocation No. of Indigents
within allocation
Control 48 206 18 485
Tips 49 928 18 942
Graph 34 000 3 609
Financial Gain 33 687 3 593
Social norm 40 001 17 895
Intrinsic motivation 40 058 17 953
Social recognition 44 174 18 348
Public good 44 421 18 805
Total 334 475 334 475
The numbers in Table 4.1 reflect the total numbers allocated to each treatment.
However, in a given month, households with estimated meter readings do not receive
a message (so as not to give households inaccurate information) as well as households
with billing periods greater than 35 days (which is usually indicative of a billing
reversal or problematic bill). Finally, so as not to put low-income households in
a vulnerable state, only households consuming in excess of the six kiloliter free
monthly allocation receive a message.
4.5 Summary statistics
This section provides some summary statistics of the households allocated to one of
the seven treatment arms.
4.5.1 Initial treatment allocation: November 2015
Table 4.1 indicates the number of households allocated to the control group and
each of the seven treatment groups in the month of November. As previously dis-
cussed, not all households will receive an insert in a particular month. Specifically,
a household will not receive an insert if:
• They are in tariff block 1
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• Their bill is an estimated reading
• Their billing period is 35 days or more
• Their bill has been referred back to the City (“Referrals”)
Table 4.2 reflects the number of households, per treatment, whose consumption
falls into tariff block 1, who received estimated readings and/or whose billing period
was greater than 35 days. As described, these households did not receive an insert
in November.
Table 4.2: Summary statistics of those who did not receive an insert: November
2015
Treatment Tariff block 1 Estimates Billing period >35
days
Control 1 929 5 290 1 927
Tips 1 825 5 378 1 967
Graph 990 3 029 1 357
Financial Gain 1 010 2 964 1 178
Social norm 1 594 4 479 1 658
Intrinsic motivation 1 646 4 493 1 648
Social recognition 1 810 4 973 1 754
Public good 1 794 5 069 1 813
Total 12 598 35 675 13 302
Against all these conditions, Table 4.3 denotes the number of households that
actually received an insert in the month of November (285 471 households).
Table 4.3: Number of households who received an insert in November 2015
Treatment/message group Inserts Mailed
Control 48 206
Tips 41 312
Graph 28 771
Financial Gain 28 669
Social norm 32 769
Intrinsic motivation 32 837
Social recognition 29 158
Public good 26 907
Total 268 629
Notes: These numbers reflect the November
attrition detailed in Table 4.2.
4.5.2 Final changes to treatment allocation
In the intrinsic motivation and social recognition treatments, households are asked
to reduce their consumption by 10% over a six-month period which was in line with
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the public awareness campaigns the City ran simultaneous to our study. Households
receive an initial announcement message which notes that “as you used X kl this
month, you need to keep your monthly consumption around Y kl.” The consumption
value (X kl) is derived from the current bill. Thereafter, this consumption value
remained unchanged and households are reminded each month that their target
level of consumption is X kl.
However, there were a number of households who did not receive the social
recognition inserts in November because of being in tariff block 1, receiving an
estimated reading or having a reading period of greater than 35 days. As they did not
receive the initial insert in November, we dropped them from the treatment entirely
as the household would otherwise be one month behind the six-month framing of
the mailer. We reallocated these households equally across the remaining treatments
(control, tips, graph, gain, loss, social norm and public good) via the randomisation
method. The updated treatment allocation is reflected in 4.4.
Table 4.4: Treatment re-allocation for December 2015 - April 2016
Treatment Treatment allocation Amt. of indigents in
allocation
Control 51 113 20 471
Tips 52 833 20 925
Graph 36 888 5 222
Gain 36 584 5 311
Social norm 33 043 14 413
Intrinsic motivation 32 724 14 324
Social recognition 38 557 14 638
Public good 47 316 20 822
Total 329 058 116 126
Notes: Due to the re-allocation in December after November’s attrition
(see description above), the sample size in each treatment was adjusted.
This remained the final sample size in each treatment for the continuation
of the experiment through April 2016.
4.5.3 Randomisation
We test whether the finalised treatment and control groups are balanced in terms
of several demographic characteristics, namely, monthly consumption, daily average
consumption, number of billing days (over the month), property value, and tariff
block. Table 4.5 shows the descriptive mean and standard deviation for all treat-
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ments and control, as well as the p-value from the t-tests of equal means whereby
the null hypothesis is equal means. As noted, we excluded the list of indigents for
the randomisation of the graph and financial treatments, as these households do not
pay for their utilities. This was to avoid misleading the households as the graph and
financial savings insert have the billed amount indicated on the treatment insert.
Indigents were included in all of the other treatments and importantly, randomised
across control as well. To control for this issue, we use the full pooled sample in
the average treatment effect (ATE) regressions and interact the treatments with the
indigent households (referred to as ‘Indigents A’ in the tables). This allows us to
compare the ATE of non-indigents across all treatments, and also compare the ATE
of the indigent households across all treatments except graph and financial gain (as
they were excluded from the randomisation of these treatments for reasons explained
above). See regressions in Section 4.8 for further details.
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Table 4.5: Demographic characteristics by treatment group for October 2015: Full sample
Treatment mean Treatment s.d. Control mean Control s.d. T-test of means
(p-value)
Observations
Consumption (kl)
Tips 21.77 39.69 22.55 104.73 0.121 49 928
Graph 22.14 33.68 22.55 104.73 0.487 34 000
Gain 22.37 43.15 22.55 104.73 0.761 33 687
Social Norm 20.89 42.72 22.55 104.73 0.006 40 001
Intrinsic Motivation 22.11 108.12 22.55 104.73 0.559 40 058
SR 22.46 45.68 22.55 104.73 0.87 44 174
Public Good 21.33 55.84 22.55 104.73 0.038 44 421
Daily average (kl)
Tips 0.67 0.92 0.67 2.3 0.952 49 928
Graph 0.71 1.22 0.67 2.3 0.001 34 000
Gain 0.7 0.97 0.67 2.3 0.027 33 687
Social Norm 0.64 0.73 0.67 2.3 0.048 40 001
Intrinsic Motivation 0.65 0.96 0.67 2.3 0.336 40 058
Social Recognition 0.65 1.07 0.67 2.3 0.271 44 174
Public Good 0.65 0.89 0.67 2.3 0.127 44 421
Property Value ($R)
Tips 741 097.72 1 111 771 727 149.37 1 073 219 0.051 49 928
Graph 1 034 363.4 1 291 790.8 727 149.37 1 073 219 0 34 000
Gain 1 027 314 1 252 492.8 727 149.37 1 073 219 0 33 687
Social Norm 681 454.17 995 674.83 727 149.37 1 073 219 0 40 001
Intrinsic Motivation 679 334.14 1 000 515.4 727 149.37 1 073 219 0 40 058
Social Recognition 718 531.62 1 091 643.2 727 149.37 1 073 219 0.262 44 174
Public Good 714 324.75 1 110 165.9 727 149.37 1 073 219 0.092 44 421
Billing period (days)
Tips 32.96 24.26 33.26 26.24 0.06 49 928
Graph 32.23 21.28 33.26 26.24 0 34 000
Gain 32.5 22.57 33.26 26.24 0 33 687
Social Norm 32.46 22.24 33.26 26.24 0 40 001
Intrinsic Motivation 32.73 24.32 33.26 26.24 0.003 40 058
Social Recognition 32.7 23.56 33.26 26.24 0.001 44 174
Public Good 32.79 23.45 33.26 26.24 0.006 44 421
Tariff block
Tips 3.17 1.03 3.15 1.01 0.001 49 928
Graph 3.28 1.02 3.15 1.01 0 34 000
Gain 3.27 1.01 3.15 1.01 0.016 33 687
Social Norm 3.15 1.01 3.15 1.01 0.761 40 001
Intrinsic Motivation 3.16 1.01 3.15 1.01 0.406 40 058
Social Recognition 3.17 1 3.15 1.01 0.034 44 174
Public Good 3.15 1.02 3.15 1.01 0.416 44 421
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As noted, we stratified the sample on suburb and tariff block. Thus we use
suburb and tariff block fixed effects in all regressions. Furthermore, we control for
property value and separately, billing period using month dummies as billing period
is a seasonal trend.
4.6 Pre intervention analysis
While we randomised the sample based upon October 2015 data as this was the only
data available at the time, we later received access to historical consumption data. In
order to control for seasonality, we chose to use December 2014 to April 2015 as the
pre intervention baseline period in our analysis. Figure 4.3 graphically depicts water
use trends in the pre intervention period. From Figure 4.3 it is evident that there
is a seasonal component to water usage: specifically, average monthly consumption
is higher in the warmer summer months. However, this seasonal trend is common
across the groups. All groups experience a spike in average billing days around
January/February (see Figure 4.4). The increase over the warmer summer months
in January and February come from both an absolute increase in consumption due
to higher temperatures and more time spent at home during the holidays but also an
increase in billing period as the City of Cape Town works on a skeleton staff during
the holiday season. Given the data depicted in these graphs, we need to control for
seasonality effects. We also control for month-fixed effects in all of our models due
to the increase in consumption in January. The graph also shows similar trends in
treatment and control groups, which supports the parallel trends assumption for a
difference-in-difference estimation.
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Figure 4.3: Mean monthly consumption by Treatment group
Figure 4.4: Mean billing days by Treatment group
Table 4.6 tests if the sample is balanced across treatment and control groups for
the pre intervention period. The estimates are based on a regression of the out-
come variable/characteristic as the dependent variable and dummy variables for the
treatment groups (omitting the control group) as explanatory variables. Following
Bruhn and McKenzie (2009), we control for stratification by including tariff block
and suburb dummy variables in the regressions.
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Table 4.6: Balance test regressions for the pre intervention period of December 2014
to April 2015
I II III IV V
Means Monthly
consumption
(kl)
Daily average
(kl)
Property
Value ($R)
Billing period
(days)
Tips 20.86 0.038 -0.002 -2652.741 0.003
0.081 0.003 3627.477 0.007
Graph 22.41 0.074 -0.002 -1336.874 -0.005
0.086 0.004 4387.197 0.008
Gain 22.19 0.004 0.00 -6488.949 -0.014
0.085 0.004 4027.763 0.009
Social norm 20.42 0.037 0.00 -1775.921 -0.016**
0.080 0.004 3261.424 0.007
Intrinsic motivation 20.59 0.174** 0.004 367.503 -0.002
0.084 0.004 3705.814 0.007
Social Recognition 20.65 0.127 0.00 94.626 0.108***
0.085 0.004 4052.323 0.028
Public Good 21.00 0.086 0.001 -6507.887 0.084***
0.077 0.003 4062.262 0.023
Constant 15.722*** 0.529*** 804726.811*** 30.383***
0.177 0.006 7200.799 0.013
Indigent status Yes Yes Yes Yes
TB fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Suburb fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1 186 621 1 186 621 1 186 621 1 126 282 1 186 621
Treated 1 044 622 1 044 622 1 044 622 991 028 1 044 622
Treat1 144 622 144 622 144 622 137 537 144 622
Treat2 105 364 105 364 105 364 98 813 105 364
Treat3 104 183 104 183 104 183 97 804 104 183
Treat4 108 334 108 334 108 334 103 384 108 334
Treat5 107 981 107 981 107 981 103 323 107 981
Treat6 122 610 122 610 122 610 116 594 122 610
Treat7 126 378 126 378 126 378 120 301 126 378
Control 141 999 141 999 141 999 135 254 141 999
Fpvalue 0 0.492 0.911 0.131 0
R-squared 0.019 0.411 0.211 0.719 0.019
Notes: Regressions include tariff block and suburb fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the
suburb level and are presented below the coefficient. Regressions are run for the pre-intervention
period December 2014 - April 2015.
Although the randomisation was conducted on October 2015 data and not pre
intervention data from December 2014-April 2015, the treatment and control groups
are still balanced. Billing period is an exception, and we control for billing period
with month-fixed effects as the billing period increases due to seasonal staff adjust-
ments during the holiday period. Thus households receive a longer period bill in
January and February after the holidays which often includes December consump-
tion. We also control for billing period with a frequency variable which indicates the
cumulative number of times the household appears in the sample (due to differences
in billing period days or reasons listed in Section 4.5).
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4.6.1 Pre Intervention trend analysis
One of the key identifying assumptions of the difference-in-difference model is that
water usage trends would be the same in the control and treatment groups in the
absence of the treatments and that the intervention induces the deviation from this
common trend (Angrist and Pischke, 2008). While Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4 sug-
gests that treated and control households have comparable pre intervention trends,
following Abramitzky and Lavy (2014), we use pre intervention data from Decem-
ber 2014 to April 2015 to determine whether the treatment and control groups have
differential time trends with respect to water usage. Means are reported in Table
4.7. The estimated results are reflected in Table 4.8. Panel A reflects the results of
a constant linear time trend model which allows for an interaction of the trend with
the treatment indicator, while, in Panel B, the linear time trend variable is replaced
by a series of month dummies as well as an interaction of the treatment indicator
with each of these time dummies (Abramitzky and Lavy, 2014). While the results
from both models confirm the presence of a time trend with respect to water usage,
in general this trend is identical for treated and non-treated households. The results
in Panel A suggest that, on average, water consumption decreases by approximately
180 liters per month. However, as evident by the interaction term (Treatment X
Trend), this trend does not differ significantly for treatment and control groups for
most of the treatments. The estimates in the dummies model (Panel B) however
shows the heterogeneity across months. As trend does seem to differ across some of
the treatment and control groups, we control for trend in the regressions.
Table 4.7: Pre Intervention Means
Baseline means (kl consumption)
Income - 1st quintile 18.23
Income - 2nd quintile 18.44
Income - 3rd quintile 20.12
Income - 4th quintile 24.10
Income - 5th quintile 34.72
Long run baseline mean (Dec 2014 - April 2015) 23.37
Short run baseline mean (Dec 2014) 21.26
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Table 4.8: Differences in the time trend of water usage in treated and control households during pre treatment months (November to
April 2015)
I II III IV V VI VII
Monthly
consumption (kl)
Monthly
consumption (kl)
Monthly
consumption (kl)
Monthly
consumption (kl)
Monthly
consumption (kl)
Monthly
consumption (kl)
Monthly
consumption (kl)
Tips Graph Gain Social Norm Intrinsic
Motivation
Social Recognition Public Good
Panel A
Pre-intervention trend -0.182*** -0.178*** -0.177*** -0.182*** -0.177*** -0.180*** -0.179***
0.037 0.037 0.037 0.037 0.037 0.037 0.037
Treatment 0.116 0.266* 0.157 -0.047 0.136 0.307** 0.224*
0.109 0.14 0.151 0.112 0.124 0.135 0.125
Treat x Pre-trend -0.028 -0.058* -0.043 0.03 0.012 -0.055* -0.039
0.023 0.031 0.034 0.026 0.026 0.03 0.03
Panel B
Treat -0.071 -0.185* -0.249** 0.068 0.181* 0.482*** 0.362***
0.094 0.11 0.11 0.097 0.1 0.103 0.099
14-Dec -1.121*** -1.137*** -1.142*** -1.119*** -1.138*** -1.133*** -1.135***
0.177 0.178 0.178 0.177 0.177 0.179 0.178
15-Jan 4.714*** 4.710*** 4.705*** 4.712*** 4.700*** 4.709*** 4.710***
0.25 0.251 0.251 0.249 0.25 0.248 0.249
15-Feb 1.053*** 1.043*** 1.040*** 1.053*** 1.048*** 1.056*** 1.045***
0.262 0.261 0.261 0.262 0.261 0.262 0.261
15-Mar 0.374*** 0.371*** 0.364*** 0.376*** 0.371*** 0.366*** 0.365***
0.127 0.127 0.127 0.127 0.128 0.128 0.127
15-Apr 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
. . . . . . .
DEC2014 x treat 0.128 0.008 -0.002 -0.062 0.105 0.178 -0.2
0.087 0.126 0.135 0.104 -0.132 0.144 0.175
JAN2015 x treat 0.119 0.794*** 0.731*** -0.195 0.13 0.249 0.301
0.125 0.185 0.187 0.131 0.097 -1.047*** 0.229
FEB2015 x treat 0.156* 0.438*** 0.461*** 0.121 0.114 0.219 -0.954***
0.094 0.152 0.166 0.102 -0.017 -0.663*** 0.198
MAR2015 x treat 0.1 0.179* 0.226** 0.012 0.095 0.14 -0.452***
0.082 0.1 0.105 0.09 0 0 0.127
APR2015 x treat 0 0 0 0 . . 0
. . . . . .
Constant 14.671*** 14.738*** 14.702*** 14.739*** 14.691*** 14.646*** 14.829***
0.235 0.216 0.222 0.25 0.249 0.229 0.258
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Indigent status Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
TB fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Suburb fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 286 621 247 363 246 182 250 333 249 980 264 609 268 377
Treated 144 622 105 364 104 183 108 334 107 981 122 610 126 378
Control 141 999 141 999 141 999 141 999 141 999 141 999 141 999
R-squared 0.42 0.429 0.424 0.417 0.418 0.423 0.425
Notes: Regressions include tariff block and suburb fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the suburb level and are presented below the coefficient.
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Overall the models indicate that treatment and control households followed the
same trend with respect to water usage in the year preceding the intervention
(December 2014-April 2015).
4.7 Identification Strategy
The estimate of interest is the “treatment-on-the-treated” (TOT), which estimates
the impact of the program on those who were sent an insert in their monthly muni-
cipal bill and who received the insert in that month compared to those in the control
who did not receive an insert. This is in contrast to the “intention-to-treat” estimate
(ITT), which is a straight comparison of those who were allocated the treatment
versus the control who did not receive an insert. The difference between TOT and
ITT is due to billing issues as described in the section above. If the treatment, T , is a
behavioural nudge to reduce water consumption in household i, we want to estimate
the causal effect of T on the water consumption (daily average and monthly total)
of household i in the City of Cape Town. In order to understand the causal effect,
we need to measure the average water consumption in household i in time t = 1
randomly chosen from the population in the City of Cape Town, if we provided a
behavioural nudge via insert in their monthly municipal bill, Ti = 1, as opposed to
not providing a behavioural nudge via insert in their monthly municipal bill, Ti = 0.
E[Y¯ T=1i,t=1]− E[Y¯ T=0i,t=1] (4.1)
However, it is not possible to study the counterfactual, as we cannot observe
two states of the household simultaneously. A simple before-after study would only
show the overall outcome on the household, not controlling for factors outside of the
experiment that could have contributed causally to the current level of consumption.
Thus we use a randomised controlled trial whereby every free-standing domestic
household in the City of Cape Town had an equal probability of receiving an insert.
The outcomes of interest in our experiment are i) total monthly consumption
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and ii) average daily, and iii) relative consumption (compared to relative change
from the same month in the year prior). To determine whether the intervention
influenced water consumption, we regress post-intervention water consumption on
treatment and control for baseline water consumption (Datta et al., 2015; Bhanot,
2015). The econometric specification is as follows:
Yi = β0 + βmTreatmentm + i (4.2)
Where Yi is water usage by household i measured in kilolitres per month in post-
intervention period and Treatmentm are dummy variables for the seven treatments
(with the control group as the reference case). We also replicate the regressions
including a number of control variables. Once again, standard errors are clustered
at the suburb level. The pooled regressions for all three outcomes are included in
Appendix D. See Tables D.3, D.4, D.5. We find the financial gains, intrinsic motiv-
ation, social recognition and appeals to the public good equally reduce consumption
by approximately 170 litres on average each month. When using relative consump-
tion as the outcome variable, we see all treatments reduce consumption significantly
approximately 1-2% over the month with the exception of social norms where we
see no significant effects. However, these regressions do not control for trend over
the pre and post period.
In order to compare the effect of our treatments on water consumption in house-
hold i and control for trend, we use difference-in-difference methods as our main
method. Difference-in-differences compares the changes in outcomes over time between
treated households, T = 1, and control households, where T = 0. Difference-in-
differences compares the before-and-after outcomes for the households that received
the insert (the first difference) and the before-and-after outcomes for the households
that did not receive the insert but was exposed to the same set of economic and
environmental conditions (Gertler et al., 2011). Then the difference between the
difference in outcomes for the treated and the comparison is calculated. This con-
trols for factors that are constant over time as well as factors that are time-varying
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(Gertler et al., 2011).
E(Y ) = [E[Y¯ T=11 ]− E[Y¯ T=10 ]]− [E[Y¯ T=01 ]− E[Y¯ T=00 ]] (4.3)
Difference-in-differences assumes time trends in the absence of the intervention
are the same in both groups. However we control for differential time trends as
a robustness check. As we can see in Figure 4.5, there is a significant time trend
difference in pre intervention versus post-intervention.
Figure 4.5: Mean consumption, Dec 2014 - April 2015 and Dec 2015 - April 2016,
by Treatment
Our reduced form expression for the causal effect of a reduction in water con-
sumption due to receiving an insert is estimated by the below regression:
E(Y ) = α+ β1DT=1,0i + β2DAfter + β3D
T=1,0
i ×DAfter + β4Trend+ β5X ′i + i (4.4)
where DT=1,0 is the observation if the household is in a treatment group, either
before or after the treatment is received. DAfter = 1 is the observation if the
household is in either group after the treated group has received the treatment. β1
captures the underlying differences between the treatment and control groups, β2
captures the underlying differences between the two time periods, and β3 captures
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the effect of the treatment on the treatment compared to the control group after
the intervention. β4 controls for the effect of trend.
X ′i is a vector for controls. As stated, our main controls are informed from
the balance and pre intervention trend regressions, which include property values,
baseline tariff block, month and suburb fixed effects and indigent status. In addition,
we also include a control if the household was a “late receiver”, a status given to
households billed later in the period month. We also control for the amount of times
the household appears in the panel (frequency), and the following two separately:
the billed amount, and the tariff rate billed at, in the month prior. The reason for
the latter controls is to control for the effect of the previous bill’s amount/tariff rate
on the current household consumption. For example, if a household was charged at
a higher rate in November, either due to an increase in tariff or due to higher con-
sumption/presence of a leak, this might reflect a change in behaviour in December.
We then estimate heterogeneous treatment effects by interacting the treatment
with indigent households. Indigent status in the City of Cape Town is provided
to households who struggle to pay for public utilities. Given the household has a
property value under a certain threshold( <R300 000), or are considered eligible
after a means assessment, the household qualifies for subsidised rates or service
free-of-charge. β6 represents the effect of the treatment on indigent households.
Yi = α + β1DT=1,0i + β2DAfter + β3D
T=1,0
i ×DAfter + β4Trend+
β5Indigenti + β6Indigenti ×DT=1,0i + β7Indigenti ×DT=1,0i + β2DAfter + β8X ′i + i
(4.5)
All standard errors are clustered at the suburb level. We use a fixed effects model
to control for the unobserved heterogeneity across treatment and control that does
not vary over time. We include robustness checks for the difference-in-difference
regressions for models without fixed effects and without trend in Appendix D.6
(page 272) and D.7 (page 274). Short-run (once-off) regressions are also included in
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D.1 (Page 261).
4.8 Experimental results with DiD
The DiD estimates for the average treatment effects for the panel (December 2015 -
April 2016) are reported in Table 4.9. As the indigent households were not assigned
to the graph and financial mailers, we are only able to analyze the full sample when
including indigent interaction effects. This allows us to interpret the coefficients
on the non-indigents for the graph and financial gains treatments (columns I-III
in Table 4.9). All regressions show a significant reduction in consumption due to
graph, financial gains, social recognition and public good.
In the pooled results, all treatments have a significant effect on the non-indigents,
reducing consumption between 200-530 litres/month. However social recognition has
the largest impact on non-indigents (500 litres, columns I-III in Table 4.9). Con-
versely, we see that the indigents reacted negatively to all social incentives compared
to the indigents in the control group: they increased their consumption if given the
social norms, intrinsic motivation, social recognition, or public good mailer.
Social approval is a key finding from our study: publicly faming has large impacts
but must be used with caution. Publicly recognising non-indigent citizens for their
water savings efforts had a significant effect on reducing consumption over and above
conventional tariff hikes and water restrictions. Stating in an insert that the City
will publicly recognise water savers on the City’s website had an average reduction
of 520 litres for non-indigents (equivalent to a 2.2% decrease in consumption from
the baseline mean). Yet, indigents respond to the treatment by increasing their
consumption by 550 litres. See Chapter 5 for a deeper analysis on this issue as it is
outside the scope of this paper.
Appeals to the public good resulted in an average decrease of 300 litres, equi-
valent to a 1.3% reduction in consumption (columns V in Table 4.9).Social norms
- the incentive promoted by Allcott (2011); Ferraro et al. (2011); Ayres (2010) -
resulted in an average increase of 550 litres for indigents (Table 4.9), equivalent to
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a 2.4% increase in consumption. Conversely, social norms reduces consumption by
approximately 300 litres in the non-indigent sample, which is equivalent to a 1.3%
decrease in consumption (columns I-III in Table 4.9). Again we see that a social
incentive - social norms in this case - increases consumption in the indigent sub
sample (by approximately 500 litres). This is likely due to the rebound effect: they
were consuming below the average and rebound to the reference point. However,
local averages were computed for the household’s suburb. As income corresponds
to suburb lines in Cape Town, we would assume that their neighbour is comparable
in income, and by extension, consumption. We leave this for further research.
The overall results highlight the relative successes of behavioural messaging in
reducing consumption over and above the tariff increases and water restrictions
(note, we could not separate the effect of the tariff increases during this time period
as it was nearly perfectly collinear with the Post variable). In the following section
we conduct heterogeneity analysis on income quintiles excluding CoCT indigents in
Table 4.1011.
Using our main model - income quintile regressions12 - we observe that lower in-
come households respond only to the financial gains mailers, whereas higher income
households respond only to the social incentives. We calculate the percentage re-
duction of consumption from each treatment using the pre intervention mean values
in Table 4.7.
The poorest households reduce their water consumption most when provided
the financial incentive. The financial savings mailer had a significant and negative
11Table D.2 in the Appendix on page 263 shows the ATE in the sample excluding CoCT indigents.
In the average treatment effects excluding CoCT indigents, where we see significant effects on all
treatments and social recognition having the largest impact on water savings, reducing consumption
by approximately 380 litres/month (column V in Table D.2). The main difference between the ATE
in the full sample in Table 4.9 versus the sample excluding CoCT indigents, Table D.2, is that the
effects on the financial treatments are muted in the Table D.2 excluding CoCT indigents. This is
due to the sample having on average higher income than the main sample, as we find results differ
significantly depending on which income quintile the household sits (please see income quintile
analysis below to see how strongly different income groups respond to different incentives).
12excluding CoCT indigents in order to compare across treatments. We chose to use the full
model in the ATE to balance the income, however when conducting quintile regressions we are
able to analyse the sample excluding indigent households (‘Indigents A’) in order to compare the
graph and financial treatments across a balanced sample within each income quintile.
122
impact on consumption: 600 litres (column 2 of Table 4.10) equivalent to a 3.3%
decrease for the lowest income quintile. The impact decreases to approximately 260
liters (column 4 of Table 4.10) in the third quintile, and then the effect goes away
in higher income quintiles13.
Wealthier households (those in the fourth and fifth income quintiles) do not
respond to the financial gain mailer: we observe no significant effects on consumption
for these households who are likely to be less responsive to price signals given the
relatively smaller share of their budget allocated to water.
Rather, the higher income groups respond only to the social incentives: social
recognition, social norms, appeals to their intrinsic motivation, and appeals to the
public good. Social norm and intrinsic motivation mailers have an equal effect,
reducing consumption by 290 litres in the third quintile (column 3 in Table 4.10)
and 360 liters in the fourth quintile (column 5 in Table 4.10). This is equivalent to
an effect size of 1.5% for fourth income quintile.
Appeals to the household’s intrinsic motivation reduces consumption by 315
litres (column 5) and 500 litres (column 7), respectively, in the 4th and 5th quintile,
equivalent to a 2.1% effect for the wealthiest households.
The highest income households are also responsive to the public good framing,
reducing consumption by 480 liters per month (2% of consumption). Relative to the
previous income group, it appears that responsiveness to both intrinsic motivations
and public good appeals increase with income.
Finally, social recognition has the highest impact in the highest income quintile,
reducing water usage by 900 liters per month (2.6% of consumption). We interpret
these results in the conclusion.
13Note, we cannot analyse the first income quintile in the sample excluding CoCT indigents as
it is too small of a sample.
Table 4.9: Long Run Analysis (Dec 2015 - April 2015): Difference in difference
model using fixed effects with trend
Monthly
consumption
(kl)
Monthly
consumption
(kl)
Monthly
consumption
(kl)
Monthly
consumption
(kl)
I II III IV
Tips x Post -0.202** -0.210*** -0.201*** -0.191**
0.08 0.08 0.072 0.083
Graph x Post -0.239*** -0.234*** -0.242*** -0.231***
0.081 0.081 0.073 0.085
Financial gains x Post -0.316*** -0.323*** -0.299*** -0.283***
0.076 0.078 0.07 0.077
Social norm x Post -0.305*** -0.314*** -0.288*** -0.286***
0.09 0.09 0.08 0.09
Intrinsic motivation x Post -0.319*** -0.317*** -0.308*** -0.294***
0.086 0.088 0.08 0.087
Social recognition x Post -0.503*** -0.516*** -0.521*** -0.498***
0.096 0.097 0.09 0.099
Public Good x Post -0.286*** -0.294*** -0.315*** -0.270***
0.085 0.086 0.077 0.088
Trend -0.269*** -0.261*** -0.283*** -0.279***
0.015 0.014 0.014 0.016
Indigent Status 1.412*** 1.434*** 1.425*** 0.941**
0.389 0.389 0.388 0.369
Frequency (-1) -0.022
0.037
Billed amount (-1) 0.005***
0
Tariff rate (-1) -0.053***
0.003
Post x indigent 2.079*** 2.059*** 2.020*** 2.187***
0.235 0.238 0.224 0.268
Tips x indigent 0.142 0.14 0.197 0.077
0.249 0.237 0.228 0.269
Graph x indigent - - - -
- - - -
Financial gains x indigent - - - -
- - - -
Social norm x indigent -0.506 -0.406 -0.367 -0.365
0.323 0.324 0.307 0.336
Intrinsic motivation x indigent -0.481 -0.507* -0.413 -0.341
0.295 0.298 0.279 0.323
Social recognition x indigent -0.534* -0.541* -0.435 -0.607*
0.301 0.3 0.279 0.32
Public Good x indigent -0.585** -0.574** -0.508** -0.555**
0.268 0.276 0.256 0.267
Tips x indigent x Post 0.235 0.259 0.23 0.280*
0.158 0.162 0.143 0.156
Graph x indigent x Post - - - -
- - - -
Financial gains x indigent x
Post - - - -
- - - -
Social norm x indigent x Post 0.566*** 0.551*** 0.479*** 0.563***
0.155 0.159 0.139 0.158
Intrinsic motivation x indigent
x Post 0.243* 0.276* 0.253* 0.258*
0.142 0.146 0.132 0.15
Social recognition x indigent x
Post 0.567*** 0.585*** 0.540*** 0.608***
0.159 0.165 0.15 0.163
Public Good x indigent x Post 0.261* 0.251 0.231* 0.307**
0.155 0.157 0.138 0.156
Constant 27.642*** 27.632*** 26.652*** 28.730***
0.316 0.296 0.349 0.298
Observations 2074219 2042709 2042709 1821003
Treated 1769214 1742722 1742722 1553673
Control 305005 299987 299987 267330
Clusters 672 672 672 672
124
Fpvalue 0 0 0 0
R-squared 0.078 0.079 0.097 0.092
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the suburb level and are presented below the coefficient.
Pre-intervention period: December 2014 - January 2015. Post-intervention period: December 2015 -
January 2016. Treated category include all treatments with at most five months of observations. We
cannot analyse coefficients on the indigent interactions for tariff graph and financial gains mailer given
they were not provided the treatment.
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Table 4.10: Income Quintile Analysis excluding CoCT Indigents: Difference in Difference model using fixed effects with trend
2nd Quintile 3rd Quintile 4th Quintile 5th Quintile
1 2 1 2 1 2 1
Monthly
consumption (kl)
Monthly
consumption (kl)
Monthly
consumption (kl)
Monthly
consumption (kl)
Monthly
consumption (kl)
Monthly
consumption (kl)
Monthly
consumption (kl)
Tips x Post -0.238 -0.204 -0.177 -0.183 -0.079 -0.07 -0.22
0.178 0.182 0.13 0.129 0.151 0.153 0.183
Graph x Post -0.022 -0.014 -0.208 -0.205 -0.084 -0.082 -0.233
0.193 0.212 0.134 0.133 0.166 0.166 0.169
Financial gains x Post -0.394** -0.596*** -0.244* -0.261** -0.178 -0.173 -0.1
0.191 0.222 0.129 0.128 0.146 0.146 0.184
Social norm x Post -0.222 -0.239 -0.287* -0.277* -0.358** -0.350** -0.308
0.187 0.226 0.154 0.149 0.155 0.154 0.212
Intrinsic motivation x Post -0.3 -0.294 -0.035 -0.05 -0.314** -0.304** -0.498**
0.225 0.265 0.136 0.136 0.151 0.152 0.199
Social recognition x Post 0.101 0.012 -0.266* -0.281** -0.208 -0.203 -0.895***
0.221 0.228 0.14 0.14 0.161 0.163 0.221
Public Good x Post 0.071 0.123 -0.345** -0.356** -0.02 -0.015 -0.476**
0.199 0.233 0.144 0.145 0.15 0.15 0.211
Tips x Indigent B x Post -0.134 1.021 -8.655
0.47 2.255 5.257
Graph x Indigent B x Post -0.035 -2.774 -0.109
0.422 2.875 4.475
Financial gains x Indigent B x Post 0.719 3.161 -5.529
0.497 2.194 5.148
Social norm x Indigent B x Post 0.058 -3.17 -5.062
0.581 5.313 6.54
Intrinsic motivation x Indigent B x
Post -0.036 3.729 -8.936
0.482 2.847 10.742
Social recognition x Indigent B x Post 0.332 2.829 -3.909
0.462 2.833 4.842
Public Good x Indigent B x Post -0.196 1.451 -2.999
0.433 3.021 4.968
Constant 4.243*** 4.301*** 5.181*** 5.169*** 8.933*** 8.936*** 14.490***
0.367 0.36 0.354 0.354 0.567 0.568 0.508
Observations 199714 199714 377576 377576 403491 403491 397246
Treated 174606 174606 331304 331304 353927 353927 349255
Control 25108 25108 46272 46272 49564 49564 47991
Clusters 289 289 390 390 460 460 459
126
R-squared 0.218 0.219 0.244 0.244 0.249 0.249 0.269
Notes: We chose to use the full model in the ATE to balance the income, however when conducting quintile regressions we are able to analyse the sample excluding
indigent households (‘Indigents A’) in order to compare the graph and financial treatments across a balanced sample within each income quintile. We did not have
enough power to estimate the effects on the 1st income quintile when excluding indigents, as the majority of indigents sit in the 1st income quintile. In the other quintiles,
we are able to measure heterogeneity effects of the ‘Indigent B’ group: recall during the intervention we learned the City provided us with an incomplete list of registered
indigent households. Thus some indigents did receive the graph and financial gains treatment (labeled as ‘Indigent B’): those who are indigents but were not on the
master list (labeled as ‘Indigent A’) that we were provided before the roll-out of the intervention. Tariff block, suburb and month fixed effects included. Standard errors
are clustered at the suburb level and are presented below the coefficient. Pre-intervention period: December 2014 - January 2015. Post-intervention period: December
2015 - January 2016. Treated category include all treatments with at most five months of observations.
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4.9 Discussion and Conclusion
Social norms have been identified as the strongest incentive to promote proenviron-
ment behaviour both in the energy and water context in the United States (Allcott,
2011; Ferraro et al., 2011; Ayres, 2010). We contribute to the literature by using a
city-wide randomised control trial in the City of Cape Town, South Africa, to pro-
mote water conservation in the summer months when water consumption is higher,
and at the time of a severe drought, in a population suffering from extreme income
inequality. Following the contribution of Allcott (2011) and others, a sample of over
330 000 residential households in the City of Cape Town were sent monthly inserts
with their municipal bill over a period of five months.
The broad objective of the study is to disentangle the channels through which
people are incentivised to conserve in a developing country context beset by ex-
treme inequality as well as drought. To do so, we disaggregate various elements
within common social norm messages used in U.S. home energy and water reports
(Allcott, 2011; Ferraro et al., 2011; Ayres, 2010) into individual treatments (tips,
tariff graph, financial gains, social norms, and additionally test new treatments: ap-
peals to intrinsic motivation, social recognition, appeals to the public good). We
used randomisation methods when sampling to analyse causal impacts. To control
for any issues with the randomisation as well as the observed decrease in consump-
tion across all treatment and control from baseline, we use difference-in-difference
methods and control for time trend and observable household characteristics. In
order to compare all treatments, we only analyse indigent heterogeneity effects in
order to control for our inability to analyse the impact of graph and financial gain
mailers on the indigent households.
Surprisingly, when comparing the effect of each treatment on water consumption,
the social norm message is outperformed by financial savings and social recognition
mailers. Even more striking, we find heterogeneity in responsiveness to the treat-
ments at the two extremes of the income spectrum. While low income households
only respond to the financial gain mailers, high income groups only respond to social
128
incentives. In fact, the average treatment effect of the financial gain inserts (300
litres, or 1.3% on average) is almost fully attributable to the low income groups,
whereas the average treatment effect from social recognition is dampened by the
low income groups.
For the poorest households (excluding indigent households) in Cape Town, the
financial savings insert resulted, on average, in 600 litres of water saved per month
(equivalent to a 3.3% decrease in consumption). In contrast, social recognition
reduced water usage on average by 520 litres for non-indigents (equivalent to a 2.2%
decrease in consumption from the baseline mean). For the wealthiest households,
social recognition decreased water consumption by 900 litres each month, on average,
which is equivalent to approximately 2.6% from their baseline consumption.
Two vastly different mechanisms - financial incentives and social recognition -
lead to behavioural change in our setting. When considering the impact of the
financial mailer, which made explicit the financial gains from moving into the lower
tariff block, budget constrained households responded to increased salience of water
usage and price. The choice environment is complex given the nonlinear pricing
structure. More so, even if the household understands the structure and pricing,
they cannot monitor water usage throughout the month nor determine their marginal
price at time of use with conventional meters. By making the information relevant
and clear to the agent, even if just at the end of the billing cycle, it is possible to
change their behaviour. Further research should investigate if the impact increases
with time-of-use meters.
High income households spend a smaller share of their budget on water relative
to low income households and are less responsive to price signals (Brick et al.,
2016a). In order to understand behavioural change in this group, we draw inference
from Maslow’s hierarchy of needs. More specifically, as these households are likely to
have their basic physiological needs met (food, water and shelter), we can attempt to
change their behaviour by appealing to higher-order needs: love and belonging. By
appealing to the need for belonging and acceptance in society, the social recognition
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treatment motivates behavioural change in our setting. Chapter 5 investigates this
channel in further detail.
A strong critique of our intervention is that the mailers are not perfectly com-
parable: specifically, the tariff graph, financial gains, and social norms interventions
depicted images to make the information more clear to the reader. The intrinsic
motivation, social recognition, and appeals to the public good mailers did not have
images as, at the time of design, we decided images would not add to increased com-
prehension of the message. In the end, we observe the strongest effects on the inserts
without images. However our results may be downward biased if lower income groups
relied on images more than text to understand the insert. Furthermore, the social
recognition mailer offered a reward at a future date - the results were published
on the City’s website a few months after the study’s completion. Thus monthly
feedback was not provided after the first month, as it was in the other treatments,
and only at the end of the intervention. A natural concern with behavioural nudges
is fatigue14. Further research is needed to study the impact both during and post-
treatment period (before the results were published) to determine if there was a
decay effect over the months. Additional research is also needed to analyse whether
households changed behaviour once the results were published publicly by the City.
Another limitation of this analysis is that we do not know which households read
their water bills and/or read our inserts accompanying their bill. However, we have
no reason not to assume random attrition. We also do not know if the person who
read the insert i) pays the water bill and ii) is the main influencer when it comes
to enforcing behavioural change in the household. To explore this idea, we will
test if sending the inserts with the bill decreased non-payment, and if it decreased
non-payments for all utilities or just water.
Given South Africa’s extreme income inequality, the finding of asymmetrical
treatment effects across income groups highlights the need for better targeting of
14Our analysis indicates that the effect of social recognition is equivalent in the once-off treatment
(first month) compared to the entire five month long treatment (see short run analysis in the
Appendix on Page 261 in Table D.1).
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incentives. More broadly, our findings suggest that the behavioural messages signi-
ficantly reduced consumption - even in a context of extreme water scarcity, and over
and above tariff increases and water restrictions - and can lead to greater results
when targeted appropriately to different income groups. With a cost-effectiveness
estimate of R0.004 (0.0003 USD) per household for the financial treatment, beha-
vioural interventions such as ours are extremely low-cost. And, messages can be
adjusted (and substituted) according to varying constraints (or fatigue) faced by
households of different income groups.
For further research, we will merge our data with the Census data to analyse
heterogeneity not only across income but also race and changes to dwelling infra-
structure over time. With access to data on other utilities, we plan to test the
assumption that changing behaviour in the water context may have spillovers to
other utilities reported on the municipal bill such as electricity usage. Finally, as the
municipality is also gripping with issues of non-payment, we plan to test if receiving
any of the treatments lead to a significant decrease in default or late payments.
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Chapter 5
Image Motivation for prosocial
behaviour: Evidence from South
Africa
5.1 Introduction
“Man naturally desire, not only to be loved but to be lovely... he naturally fears not
only be to hated but to be hateful, i.e. a natural and proper object of hatred” -
Adam Smith (1790).
Mankind’s desire for social approval can be leveraged to drive prosocial beha-
viour. For example, in a lab setting experiments have demonstrated that revealing
identity increases contributions to public goods (Andreoni and Petrie, 2004; Rege
and Telle, 2004). Randomised field experiments have used social recognition to in-
crease public good contributions in varying public good contexts, for example, char-
ity contributions, voter turnout and blood donations (Gerber et al. (2008); Lacetera
et al. (2011), qtd. in Samek and Sheremeta (2015)).
Social recognition for doing-good creates a signal by distributing information
about socially desirable behaviour. However, while social recognition demonstrably
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facilitates prosocial behaviour, the drivers behind behavioural change are less clear.
For example, prosocial behaviour may be intrinsically motivated (irrespective of
social recognition), or it may be driven by the desire to be recognised for “good”
behaviour in society, raising self-evaluation and welfare derived from the activity
(Frey, 1992). It also might be driven by image/reputational motivation, in which
case it creates an “impure” form of altruism (Be´nabou and Tirole, 2006). Support
for image motivation also come from the economics and psychology literature: fear
or avoidance of shame motivates individuals to contribute to the welfare of the group
(Coricelli et al., 2014). Public commitments and “faming and shaming” campaigns
during drought in the south and southwest United States are used to leverage this
strand of theory into action (McKinley, 2008).
Conversely, prosocial behaviour could be diminished if intrinsically and image-
motivated individuals have misgivings about their behaviour being misconstrued by
others as driven by the extrinsic incentive (image motivation). In this instance, social
recognition could crowd out prosocial behaviour. These individual impacts of social
recognition on motivation are difficult to observe given that, in a field-experiment
setting, individuals’ heterogeneous social-preferences coalesce and become indistin-
guishable from one another. Against this background, the aim of this study is to
disentangle intrinsic motivation, extrinsic incentives (social recognition) and image
motivation.
The extent of desire for social approval (if any) is heterogeneous across a dis-
tribution of preferences and perspectives. For example, let us assume driving a
Toyota Prius acts as a visible signal of proenvironment behaviour and thus has a
reputational value. Motives for buying the Toyota Prius may differ: some might be
intrinsically motivated to have a lower carbon footprint while others, who are image
motivated, may want to signal environmental concern even in the absence of any
intrinsic motivation. Conversely, some intrinsically and image-motivated individuals
might refrain from purchasing a Toyota Prius altogether (opting for a more anonym-
ous car) amid concerns that their actions will be misinterpreted as actively seeking
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social approval (see Ek and So¨derholm (2010); Johansson-Stenman and Martinsson
(2006) on status concern and green purchase choices).
Be´nabou and Tirole’s (2006) model on incentives and prosocial behaviour com-
bines heterogeneity in individuals’ levels of altruism with reputational concern. As
per their model1, public praise (social recognition) can have an amplifying effect
on prosocial behaviour if reputation strengthens the social signal. However if there
is any degree of heterogeneity in the individuals’ image motivation, the incentive
increases the noise-to-signal ratio: public praise could still have an amplifying ef-
fect for those who are purely image motivated but lack strong intrinsic motivation;
alternatively, it could have a reverse effect for those concerned about appearing in-
terested in public attention (Be´nabou and Tirole, 2006). With a high noise-to-signal
ratio, the incentive may have an overall net dampening effect and result in limited
effectiveness (Be´nabou and Tirole, 2006).
This paper’s main contribution is an empirical test of Be´nabou and Tirole (2006)
hypotheses by disentangling intrinsic motivation, extrinsic incentives, and image mo-
tivation. More specifically, we test whether (i) extrinsic incentives crowd out intrinsic
motivation and, (ii) whether social recognition obscures the signal of prosocial beha-
viour and ultimately crowds-out cooperation. For (i), we find social recognition as an
extrinsic incentive, on average, does not crowd out intrinsic motivation, but rather
image motivation, on average, crowds in motivation to conserve. To understand
the second question, we analyse if full visibility of the social recognition treatment
(image motivation) compared to the same treatment with an explicit opt out op-
tion crowds in or out cooperation. We find image motivation crowds in cooperation
from wealthier households. For these households, the signal of doing-good is strong
enough to elicit cooperation. However image motivation crowds out cooperation
for the indigent2 sub sample: the signal is noisy and results in an increase in wa-
ter consumption. We discuss the potential channels for this result in the following
sections.
1See page 275 in Appendix E for the model as it applies to this study.
2Recipients of free or subsidised utility provision given property level and income.
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The second main contribution is empirically testing Be´nabou and Tirole (2006)
hypotheses in a highly unequal developing country where the signal of “doing good”
is hypothesised to be noisy. Furthermore, with our results, we are able to provide
timely policy advice to government counterparts grappling with finding quick, low
cost, and effective policy solutions to the water crisis. We conducted a randomised
field experiment on over 220 0003 households in the City of Cape Town, South Africa,
during a severe drought to analyze the impact of social recognition on residential
water savings across income groups. Refer to Section 4.4 in Chapter 4 for details on
the intervention and experimental setting.
To disentangle pure intrinsic motivation, extrinsic incentives, and reputational
value per Be´nabou and Tirole’s (2006) model, we assigned randomly selected house-
holds into one of four treatment groups (approximately 33 000 each) and a control
group (approximately 50 000 households). The control group receives only their
municipal bill, which details their monthly water consumption. In the first treat-
ment group, an insert (sent with their municipal bill) displays tips (quick fixes and
smart purchases) for reducing water consumption. Tips is then replicated on the
back sheet of all treatments in our study. A second insert appeals to households’
intrinsic motivation to reduce water consumption with a neutral framing by encour-
aging them to decrease water usage by 10% over the summer months, but offers
no extrinsic incentive if they do so. 10% is directly in line with appeals from the
public water savings campaign during our study. To then disentangle the effect
of image motivation, we exogenously vary the visibility of the non monetary ex-
trinsic incentive (social recognition) using two further treatments: in addition to
the information provided in the first treatment, those in the second treatment are
additionally told households that do manage to conserve by 10% will be publicly
recognised by having their details (name and suburb) published on the City of Cape
Town’s website. Throughout the text, we refer to this compulsory social recogni-
tion as “image motivation”. A fourth treatment receives the same message but are
3Part of a larger trial on the entire population of free-standing domestic households (440k) in
the City of Cape Town, which is inclusive of other treatments not discussed in this paper.
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further provided with an explicit opt-out: they are given a number to call should
they wish to not have their information published on the website in the event that
they reduce consumption by 10%4. Please see the Appendix E.2 on page 276 for the
inserts.
Overall, 51% of those households allocated to intrinsic motivation, image motiv-
ation or social recognition with an opt-out reduced their consumption by 10% over
the treatment period5. Contrary to Be´nabou and Tirole’s (2006) model, our res-
ults indicate that the image motivation (compulsory social recognition) treatment
crowds in motivation. If a household received the image motivation treatment they
decreased their monthly water consumption on average 2.6% (560 litres of water
saved per month) in the once off treatment6. We repeat the experiment for five
months and find that image motivation still has the highest effect although it is
lower: the treatment results in an average decrease of 250 litres per month from a
baseline mean of 23.37 kiloliters - equivalent to a 1% decrease. Tips, intrinsic motiv-
ation, and social recognition with an opt-out option7 have an equal effect on water
conservation. On average, these three treatments reduce consumption by approx-
imately 130 litres per month, equivalent to a 0.6% decrease in water consumption
from the pre-intervention mean.
Thus, in our setting, the signal of social recognition for prosocial behaviour, on
average, is strong enough to elicit cooperation. Our findings suggest that social
approval is key to galvanizing behavioual change in our setting. However the study
points to a stronger potential channel than simply achieving social approval. As
households conserved if they received the compulsory (“image motivation”) versus
the explicit opt-out, our results suggest that revealing identity triggers the fear or
4Thus we are also testing the “turning down of rewards” as modeled by Be´nabou and Tirole
(2006). However Be´nabou and Tirole (2006) assume that the issue does not arise if givebacks are
not observable to whom actors are trying to signal.
5This includes over-estimations for any version of 10% (month on month, month-to-November,
April-to-November). The conservative estimate is the 27% if we use only month-to-November.
6We use a difference-in-difference model and thus compare treatment versus control and pre -
intervention baseline versus intervention outcome.
7Approximately 100 households called the hotline over the treatment period to be excluded
from the recognition treatment.
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avoidance of shame, motivating individuals to contribute to the welfare of society
(Coricelli et al., 2014).
In an interesting twist, consistent with Be´nabou and Tirole’s (2006) hypotheses,
our indigent heterogeneity results show that the average treatment effect for image
motivation is dampened by the indigent sub sample: whereas the effect magnifies to
520 litres saved (2.2%) in the non-indigent sample, the image motivation treatment
increases consumption by 580 litres per month for the indigent sub sample. This
suggests having one’s name publicly recognised is viewed differently by different
social groups, thus confirming the noisy signal of doing-good. Specifically, the image
motivation crowds out motivation in the indigent sub sample. The undermining
effect of the incentive leads to an increase in consumption compared to the control
group. Potential channels are discussed in the conclusion.
In application to public policy, our findings suggest that for the higher income
population, public recognition can be used as an adjunct to more traditional demand
side management tools, such as water restrictions and tariff increases, to achieve
additional conservation. Importantly, the effect is only observed in the households
who use the most water and are least responsive to price signals (Brick et al., 2016a).
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 5.2 presents the theoretical
framework which motivates our experiment; Section 5.3 describes the experimental
design and setting; Section 5.4 shows descriptives; Section 5.5 the pre trend ana-
lyses; Section 5.6 details the empirical strategy; Section 5.7 discusses the results and
Section 5.8 concludes.
5.2 Modeling Incentives and Motivation
In economics, rational choice explains behaviour (Friedman, 1953); individuals max-
imise utility given their constraints. Carrots (rewards) and sticks (sanctions) change
these trade-offs (Olson, 1965; Ostrom, 1997). Cognitive psychologists found that an
activity can be rewarding of its own, independent of any external reward or sanction;
this is called intrinsic motivation (Deci, 1971) or the “warm glow” effect (Andreoni,
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1990). Solow (1971) assumed extrinsic incentives were synergetic to behaving al-
truistically. However, this is not always the case; extrinsic rewards may crowd out
intrinsic motivation (Deci and Ryan, 1985; Lane, 1991; Andreoni, 1990; Be´nabou
and Tirole, 2003; Be´nabou and Tirole, 2006).
Frey (1992) introduced the possibility of an external incentive crowding in or
crowding out intrinsic motivation into a simple rational choice model. The principal
seeks to affect the agent’s behaviour with the use of an external instrument. The
agent adjusts their optimal choice as the principal adjusts the strength of the in-
strument. If the cross derivative of the external instrument and intrinsic motivation
is non-zero, there is crowding in or out of motivation.
Frey (1992) discerns two conditions that affect this cross derivative - self - de-
termination and self - evaluation. An individual may perceive that the external
instrument is used to control or regulate the individual’s intrinsic motivation; it
diminishes self - determination and therefore welfare. Alternatively, the external
instrument may be interpreted as recognition by the principal that the agent is
behaving well, raising their self evaluation and thus welfare.
Additionally, a large literature indicates that, independently of monetary incent-
ives, individuals tend to follow social norms (customary rules that prescribe accepted
behaviour) (Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000). Within the ambit of social convention, it
is possible that a non monetary incentive such as public recognition - which signals
the socially acceptable behaviour to others - would promote prosocial behaviour. In
the context of water scarcity (which is the backdrop of the current study), we admire
those who conserve water and are either ambivalent towards or dishonor those who
fail to moderate their consumption (see for example “drought shaming” newspaper
articles and mobile apps used in California and Texas to publicly shame high water
consumers (McKinley, 2008)).
In contrast, Be´nabou and Tirole (2006) examine how the presence of a reward
may diminish the value of good deeds, creating doubt as to the extent to which
they were performed for the incentives rather than purely out of intrinsic motiva-
138
tion. Such doubt could crowd out prosocial behaviour. While most empirical studies
solely analyse the impact of extrinsic incentives on crowding in or out motivation,
Be´nabou and Tirole (2006) incorporate reputational or “image” concerns into the
individual’s utility maximization problem. As such, according to their model, ex-
trinsic incentives impact on behaviour through two channels. Firstly, extrinsic mo-
tivations might crowd out one’s internal justification for a prosocial activity and,
secondly, also provide a social signal to others in their environment. According to
Be´nabou and Tirole (2006), if agents are heterogeneous in their image concerns, the
public recognition increases the noise-to-signal ratio, and can dampen the policy’s
effectiveness.
Be´nabou and Tirole’s (2006) model helps us to structure our questions and hypo-
theses at hand as we randomise the visibility of social recognition. We hypothesise
that if an individual is intrinsically motivated, then the purely intrinsic motivation
treatment - “T2” (see E.118) will prompt them to save water. If this same individual
is intrinsically motivated and discouraged by the public recognition due to image
concerns, they will either maintain or increase their consumption in response to the
image motivation incentive (T3, see E.12). This same individual will instead opt-out
of receiving the public reward (T4, see E.13), but will remain intrinsically motivated
and decrease their water consumption.
If this individual is purely image motivated, then the neutral treatment (T2, see
E.11) will have no effect, and both public recognition treatments might have the
same effect of a a decrease in water consumption, yet the individual will not opt out
in the opt out treatment (T4, see E.13).
For those who are concerned about appearing greedy for public recognition, they
will either maintain or increase their consumption in response to T3 (see E.11).
This same individual will opt out of T4 (see E.12) and decrease their consumption.
Please see Figures E.11, E.12, and E.13 in Appendix E.3 for graphical examples of
the hypothesised effects of each treatment applied to the theory.
8T1 is the tips-only treatment
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We test the empirical validity of two hypotheses, both of them motivated by eco-
nomic theory: (i) does an extrinsic incentive (social recognition) crowd out intrinsic
motivation? (Frey, 1992) and (ii) does social recognition increase the noise-to-signal
ratio and crowd out cooperation? (Be´nabou and Tirole, 2006). To test (i), we will
compare the effects of the social recognition treatments against the effects of the
intrinsic motivation treatment. To test (ii), we will compare the effects of the two
social recognition treatments to each other. Specifically we look at whether full
visibility leads to higher cooperation.
In addition to empirically testing economic theory, our findings contribute to
the literature on public and private recognition for energy savings. Pallak and
Cummings (1976) find that soliciting public commitment over a private commitment
induces energy savings in the United States. Milinski et al. (2006) similarly find
individual investments in climate products are highest if the individual is aware
that their decision is public. In a separate study incentivizing customers to allow
their utility company to install a remotely-controlled air conditioning device during
peak demand in California, customers whose decisions were made public were 1.5
percent more likely to sign up than those whose decisions remained private (Yoeli,
2009). The author also found social approval to be more effective at increasing
participation relative to monetary incentives. When trying to incentivise energy
conservation in college dorm rooms, Delmas and Lessem (2014) find that private
information alone was ineffective, but public information combined with private
information motivated a 20% reduction in electricity consumption.
Our analysis relates also to public recognition for charity contributions (Car-
penter and Myers, 2010; Soetevent, 2011; Bodner and Prelec, 2003). Faming and
shaming in competition has recently been shown to increase contribution to charit-
ies (Samek and Sheremeta, 2015). However, we use the household’s baseline water
consumption as a benchmark to reduce by 10% - as it mirrors the public savings cam-
paign - which importantly removes the element of competition (another potential
motivation for public recognition).
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Thus our study adds to the literature on the effect of faming and shaming in
non-competitive settings. According to Rege and Telle (2004) and Milinski et al.
(2006) people coordinate to improve their self image and reputation and to avoid
shame. Our contribution is analysing the impacts of naming and praising water
savers and teasing out the impact of visibility on contribution. Few studies have
empirically tested when image motivation incentives crowd out intrinsic motivation.
Separating the effect of the potential “greedy signal” from social recognition, Exley
(2014) examines three image-related effects in a lab experiment: i) the Negative
Image Effect, whereby public incentives compared to private incentives discourage
public volunteerism; ii) the Reputations Effect, whereby public reputations poten-
tially decreases the strength of the prosocial signal; and iii) the Interactions Effect.
She uses a lab experiment to show that a crowd-out in response to public incentives
is much less likely among those with public, as opposed to private, reputations. The
strength of the greedy signal might be a determinant of the outcome. As Exley
(2014) explains, mixed empirical findings in the literature show a net positive effect
when the studies involve established volunteers with likely public reputations (Car-
penter and Myers (2010), qtd. in Exley (2014); Lacetera et al. (2012, 2011) qtd. in
Exley (2014)), and the backfire effect is observed when public volunteer behaviour
is unestablished (Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000; Mellstro¨m and Johannesson, 2008;
Ariely et al., 2009).
5.3 Experimental Setting
For details on the experimental setting and timeline of the roll-out, please refer to
Chapter 4.
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5.3.1 Treatments
Message 1: Tips
See Section 4.3 in Chapter 4 for the description on the tips treatment. Again, the
tips treatment is repeated in all subsequent treatments to control for availability of
information: if households are motivated to change behaviour due to the insert, then
all households across treatments should be provided examples of ways to conserve
water. An example of the tip sheet is provided in Appendix E.1.
While Section 4.3 in Chapter 4 also details Intrinsic Motivation and Social Recog-
nition (image motivation), we include them here to more readily explain the nuances
between these and additional the social recognition treatment with an opt-out.
Message 2: Neutral framing/Intrinsic motivation
This treatment asks households to voluntary reduce their water consumption by
10% in order to support a water saving initiative that was recently launched by the
City. This figure is directly in line with the appeal from the public savings campaign
to reduce consumption by 10%. It offers no extrinsic incentive to do so. The insert
is provided in Appendix E.3.
Message 3: Image Motivation
As with Message 2 (Intrinsic motivation), this treatment encourages households to
reduce their water consumption by 10% in order to support a water saving initiative
that was recently launched by the City. However, in addition, the message further
states households that achieve this goal over a six-month period will be publicly
recognised on the City’s website. The reader is referred to Appendix E.5.
In comparison to Message 2, where the motivation to conserve water is internal,
this framing explores whether the opportunity to be socially recognised as one of the
best performers (water savers) promotes conservation. If people desire to appear to
their society that they are doing good deeds, then it follows that the opportunity to
be socially recognised promotes conservation.
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Message 4: Social Recognition (Opt-out)
This message is the same as Message 3 (Image Motivation) with the exception that
households are explicitly given the ability to opt-out of having their names published
on the City’s website: as evident from Appendix E.7, households are provided a
number to call should they wish to not have their name published.
The latter two messages test whether social recognition crowds out intrinsic
motivation. For example, the imposition of social recognition (whether there is an
option to opt-out or not) upon intrinsically-motivated individuals might well reduce
their water-saving attempts relative to Message 2 (Intrinsic motivation). The call
number was explicitly for those who want to opt out of the contest (for opt out of
the prize, see below). See Appendix E.7.
Households receiving Message 2, 3, and 4 received a new insert with their May bill
informing them if they succeeded in achieving a 10% reduction in water consumption
over the treatment period. Only the social recognition treatments (Messages 3 and
4) were provided the website address where their names will be published if they
achieved the 10% savings. For ethical reasons, both treatments were given an opt-
out for the website publication at the end of the treatment period9. See Appendix
E.9.
5.3.2 Sample
Please see in Chapter 4 for details on the entire sample and power calculations.
The sample sizes allocated to the control group as well as the treatments dis-
cussed here are reflected in Table 5.1.
9We recorded each account number, reason for opt out, and for which insert they were calling
in reference to. Less than 100 households in the image motivation treatment opt-ed out at the end
of the experiment, and thus we do not have enough power to analyse this sample.
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Table 5.1: Sample sizes for the control and treatment groups
Treatment/message group Allocated to treatment
Control 48 206
Tips 49 928
Intrinsic motivation 40 058
Image Motivation 44 174
Social recog. (opt out) 43 930
Total 226 296
The numbers in Table 5.1 reflect the total numbers allocated to each treatment.
Sample sizes changed during implementation due to several factors; in a given month,
households with estimated meter readings do not receive a message (so as not to
give households inaccurate information) as well as households with billing periods
greater than 35 days (which is usually indicative of a billing reversal or problematic
bill). Finally, so as not to put low-income households in a vulnerable state, only
households consuming in excess of the six kiloliter free monthly allocation receive a
message.10
5.4 Summary statistics
This section provides Some summary statistics for the months of November and
December 2015 when the initiative was launched.
5.4.1 Initial treatment allocations
Table 5.1 indicates the number of households allocated to the control group and each
of the four treatment groups in the first month of the experiment (November). As
previously discussed, not all households will receive an insert in a particular month.
Specifically, a household will not receive an insert if:
• They are in tariff block 1
• Their bill is an estimated reading
10As per South Africa’s Free Basic Water Policy, all households are provided with a free water
allocation of six kilolitres per month.
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• Their billing period is 35 days or more
• Their bill has been referred back to the City (“Referrals”)
Against all these conditions, Table 5.2 denotes the number of households that actu-
ally received an insert in the month of November (139 438 households).
Table 5.2: Number of households receiving inserts in November 2015
Inserts Mailed
Tips 41 312
Intrinsic motivation 32 837
Image Motivation 29 158
Social Recognition: Opt Out 36 131
Total 139 438
Note: SR English did not receive inserts during the first five
portions in November.
As evident from the table, we experienced operational issues during the first
five billing portions (1st to 5th of the month) in November whereby the inserts
for the image motivation treatment (English only) were not printed. In order to
accommodate those households who did not receive an insert in November, these
households received their first treatment at the beginning of December and were
messaged through the beginning of May. We control for this in all regressions and
also perform robustness checks where we alter the control group to mirror the late
receivers.
5.4.2 Final changes to treatment allocations
As described previously, households in the social recognition treatment are asked to
reduce consumption by 10% relative to their consumption in November (or December
in the case of those households that did not receive an insert in portions 1-5 in
November). However, there were a number of households who did not receive the
social recognition inserts in November because of being in tariff block 1, receiving an
estimated reading or having a reading period of greater than 35 days. As they did
not receive the insert, we reallocated these households equally across the remaining
treatments (tips, graph, gain, loss, social norm and public good, see Chapter 5).
The updated treatment allocation is reflected in Table 5.3.
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Table 5.3: Treatment re-allocation from December 2015
Treatment/message group Allocated to treatment
Control 51 113
Tips 52 833
Intrinsic motivation 32 724
Image Motivation 38 557
Social recognition (opt out) 36 014
Total 211 241
5.4.3 Randomisation
We test whether the treatment and control groups are balanced in terms of sev-
eral demographic characteristics, namely, monthly consumption, daily average con-
sumption, number of billing days (over the month) and property value. The means,
standard deviations, and p-value of the t-tests for difference in means is shown in
Table 5.4. Note, this is the reallocation sample after issues in the November billing.
Thus there is some imbalance in the tables due to the need to reallocate and also,
due to the first 5 portions of English speakers not receiving inserts (and received
their first insert with their December bill instead). We control for all observables in
the regressions, use difference-in-difference with trend methods in addition to pooled
regressions, and include robustness checks where we alter the control group for the
late receivers.
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Table 5.4: Demographic characteristics by treatment group for October 2015 11
Treatment mean Treatment s.d. Control mean Control s.d. T-test of means
(p-value)
Observations
Consumption (kl)
Tips 21.77 39.69 22.55 104.73 0.121 49 928
Intrinsic Motivation 22.11 108.12 22.55 104.73 0.559 40 058
Image Motivation 22.14 33.68 22.55 104.73 0.487 44 174
SR Opt Out 22.46 45.68 22.55 104.73 0.87 43 930
Daily average (kl)
Tips 0.67 0.92 0.67 2.3 0.952 49 928
Intrinsic Motivation 0.65 0.96 0.67 2.3 0.336 40 058
Image Motivation 0.65 1.07 0.67 2.3 0.271 44 174
SR Opt Out 0.68 0.88 0.67 2.3 0.312 43 930
Property Value ($R)
Tips 741 097.72 1 111 771 727 149.37 1 073 219 0.051 49 928
Intrinsic Motivation 679 334.14 1 000 515.4 727 149.37 1 073 219 0 40 058
Image Motivation 718 531.62 1 091 643.2 727 149.37 1 073 219 0.262 44 174
SR Opt Out 704 014.68 1 087 076.3 727 149.37 1 073 219 0.001 43 930
Billing period (days)
Tips 32.96 24.26 33.26 26.24 0.06 49 928
Intrinsic Motivation 32.73 24.32 33.26 26.24 0.003 40 058
Image Motivation 32.7 23.56 33.26 26.24 0.001 44 174
SR Opt Out 33.11 26.6 33.26 26.24 0.377 43 930
Tariff block
Tips 3.17 1.03 3.15 1.01 0.001 49 928
Intrinsic Motivation 3.16 1.01 3.15 1.01 0.406 40 058
Image Motivation 3.17 1 3.15 1.01 0.034 44 174
SR Opt Out 3.2 1.07 3.15 1.01 0 43 930
Indigent Status
Tips 0.32 0.47 0.33 0.47 0.208 49 928
Intrinsic Motivation 0.39 0.49 0.33 0.47 0 40 058
Image Motivation 0.35 0.48 0.33 0.47 0 44 174
SR Opt Out 0.38 0.49 0.33 0.47 0 43 930
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It is important to note the indigent sample. As it is not balanced, we will control
for them in all regressions. As stated, indigent status is granted to a subset of the
poorest population whose property value is under R300 000 or households who are
considered eligible after a means assessment. These particular indigents qualify for
a stipend for their water bill (a reduction of R53.27 on each bill). Indigents typically
consume on average less water than non-indgents (an average of 18.32 kl over the
entire panel, versus 19.45kl for non-indigents). The indigents make up approximately
41% of our sample.
5.5 Pre-intervention consumption analysis
As mentioned in Chapter 4, we received historical consumption data after the ran-
domisation. In order to control for seasonality, we chose to use December 2014 to
April 2015 data as the pre-intervention baseline period in our analysis. Figure 5.1
graphically depicts water use trends in the pre-intervention period for the sample
of interest in this paper. Identical to what we see in Chapter 4, from Figure 5.1
it is evident that there is a seasonal component to water usage: specifically, av-
erage monthly consumption is higher in the warmer summer months. December
consumption (January bill) is often the highest as households are home for more
days of the month due to the holidays. The graph depicts an absolute increase in
water consumption and an effect coming in from an increase in billing period as the
City works on skeleton staff during the holiday season. Figure 5.2 indicates that the
billing period is broadly consistent across treatment and control groups. All groups
experience a spike in average billing days around January/February. Given the data
depicted in these graphs, we need to control for seasonality effects. We control for
month-fixed effects in all of our models due to the increase in consumption in Janu-
ary. This graph also shows similar trends in treatment and control groups, which
supports the parallel trends assumption for our difference-in-difference model.
Table 5.5 tests if the sample is balanced across treatment and control groups for
11Data used for randomisation
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Figure 5.1: Mean monthly consumption by Treatment group
Figure 5.2: Mean billing days by Treatment group
the pre-intervention period. The estimates reported in 5.5 are based on a regres-
sion of the outcome variable/characteristic as the dependent variable and dummy
variables for the four treatment groups (omitting the control group) as explanatory
variables. Following Bruhn and McKenzie (2009), we control for stratification by
including tariff block and suburb dummy variables in the regressions.12 The table
indicates that the treatment and control groups are balanced on key characteristics
12As households frequently changed tariff blocks throughout the course of the study, we desig-
nated the household the tariff block the household was in in October 2015 when the randomization
was conducted. The same procedure was used for suburb.
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such as consumption and number of billings days. Regardless, we include all as
controls in the regressions.
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Table 5.5: Balance tests with pre-intervention data (December 2014 - April 2015)
I II III IV V VI
Means Monthly consumption (kl) Daily average
(kl)
Property
Value ($R)
Billing period (days) TB baseline
Tips 20.86 0.003 0.038 -0.002 -2 652.741 0.003
0.007 0.081 0.003 3 627.477 0.007
Intrinsic motivation 20.59 -0.002 0.174** 0.004 367.503 -0.002
0.007 0.084 0.004 3 705.814 0.007
Image Motivation 21.00 0.108*** 0.127 0 94.626 0.108***
0.028 0.085 0.004 4 052.323 0.028
SR opt-out 20.65 -0.002 0.115 0.001 4 547.779 -0.002
0.007 0.077 0.003 3 861.908 0.007
Constant 30.383*** 15.722*** 0.529*** 804 726.811*** 30.383***
0.013 0.177 0.006 7 200.799 0.013
Indigent status Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
TB fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Suburb fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1 186 621 1 186 621 1 186 621 1 126 282 1 186 621
Treated 1 044 622 1 044 622 1 044 622 991 028 1 044 622
Intrinsic Motivation 107 981 107 981 107 981 103 323 107 981
Image Motivation 126 378 126 378 126 378 120 301 126 378
SR opt-out 122 610 122 610 122 610 116 594 122 610
Control 141 999 141 999 141 999 135 254 141 999
Fpvalue 0 0.492 0.911 0.131 0
R-squared 0.019 0.411 0.211 0.719 0.019
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As in Chapter 4, we follow Abramitzky and Lavy (2014) by using pre-intervention
data from December 2014 to April 2015 to determine whether the treatment and
control groups have differential time trends with respect to water usage. Means
are reported in Table 4.7. The estimated results are reflected in Table 5.6. Again
Panel A reflects the results of a constant linear time trend model which allows for
an interaction of the trend with the treatment indicator, while, in Panel B, the
linear time trend variable is replaced by a series of month dummies as well as an
interaction of the treatment indicator with each of these time dummies (Abramitzky
and Lavy, 2014). While the results from both models confirm the presence of a time
trend with respect to water usage, in general this trend is identical for treated and
non-treated households.
The results in Panel A suggest that, on average, water consumption decreases
by 180 liters per month. However, as evident by the interaction term (Treatment
X Trend), this trend does not differ significantly for treatment and control groups.
The estimates in the dummies model (Panel B) however, shows the underlying
heterogeneity in the trend: many of the interaction terms (of the treatment indicator
with the month dummies) are significant and thus we must control for trend in our
regressions.
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Table 5.6: Differences in the time trend of water usage in treated and control house-
holds, Dec 2014 - April 2015
Monthly
consumption (kl)
Monthly
consumption (kl)
Monthly
consumption (kl)
Monthly
consumption (kl)
Tips Intrinsic
Motivation
Image Motivation SR Opt-Out
Panel A
Pre-intervention
trend -0.182*** -0.177*** -0.180*** -0.182***
0.037 0.037 0.037 0.036
Treatment 0.116 0.136 0.307** 0.208*
0.109 0.124 0.135 0.113
Treat x Pre-trend -0.028 0.012 -0.055* -0.031
0.023 0.026 0.03 0.027
Panel B
Treat -0.071 0.181* 0.482*** 0
0.094 0.1 0.103 0.095
Dec-14 -1.121*** -1.138*** -1.133*** -1.119***
0.177 0.177 0.179 0.176
Jan-15 4.714*** 4.700*** 4.709*** 4.716***
0.25 0.25 0.248 0.25
Feb-15 1.053*** 1.048*** 1.056*** 1.058***
0.262 0.261 0.262 0.261
Mar-15 0.374*** 0.371*** 0.366*** 0.375***
0.127 0.128 0.128 0.127
Apr-15 0 0 0 0
. . . .
DEC2014 x treat 0.128 0.105 0.178 0.124
0.087 -0.132 0.144 0.109
JAN2015 x treat 0.119 0.13 0.249 0.148
0.125 0.097 -1.047*** 0.122
FEB2015 x treat 0.156* 0.114 0.219 0.220**
0.094 -0.017 -0.663*** 0.108
MAR2015 x treat 0.1 0.095 0.14 0.083
0.082 0 0 0.088
APR2015 x treat 0 . . 0
. . .
Constant 14.671*** 14.691*** 14.646*** 14.797***
0.235 0.249 0.229 0.249
Indigent status Yes Yes Yes Yes
TB fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Suburb fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 286 621 249 980 264 609 262 100
Treated 144 622 107 981 122 610 120 101
Control 141 999 141 999 141 999 141 999
R-squared 0.42 0.418 0.423 0.416
Notes: Regressions include tariff block and suburb fixed effects.
Standard errors are clustered at the suburb level and are presented in parenthesis
Regressions are run for the pre-intervention period of December 2014 - April 2015
5.6 Identification Strategy
We also observe a significant decrease in the overall trend as seen in Figure 5.3
below, so we employ the same Difference-in-difference methods as our main method
to compare the effect of our treatments on water consumption in household i. See
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Section of Chapter 4 for details on the identification strategy.
Figure 5.3: Mean consumption, Dec 2014 - April 2015 and Dec 2015 - April 2016,
by Treatment
5.7 Experimental results with DiD
For robustness we use three outcome measures for the pooled regressions: monthly
consumption, relative consumption (compared to the same month in the year prior),
and daily average. See Tables E.2, E.3, E.4 in Appendix E.4. In the pooled re-
gressions, across all specifications and outcome variables, the treatments had an
equal and significantly negative effect on consumption (approximately 180 litres
each month). In the indigent heterogeneity analysis, we see the size of the treat-
ment effect increases to 220 litres each month for the non-indigents.
However our main model is the difference-in-difference which provides better
identification for our study as it controls for time trend across all groups.
Image motivation is the only treatment which shows an effect in the short run.
Table E.1 in Appendix E.4 provides the regression results for the difference-in-
difference with fixed effects estimates for the once- off treatment. Image motivation
reduces water consumption on average 590 litres per month (Column IV).
Table 5.7 presents the results for the long run treatment which uses the full
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panel of five months. Table 5.8 (below) presents the results for the income quintile
regressions.
In the longer run analysis (Table 5.7), the average treatment effect for those who
received the image motivation treatment compared to the control is a decrease of
257 litres per month (column III) from a baseline mean of 23.37 kiloliters (1.1%
decrease). This magnifies to 518 litres saved per month for the non-indigent sub
sample when we analyse heterogeneity effects (column VII): image motivation has
a 2.2% decrease on consumption per month in the non-indigent households. This
is equivalent to 43 toilet flushes assuming an older inefficient toilet which uses 12
litres to flush.
The average treatment effect (260 litres) is dampened by the indigents - image
motivation actually increases consumption by 560 litres in the indigent sub sample in
the heterogeneity analysis (see column IX). This suggests having one’s name posted
publicly is viewed differently by different social groups.
Tips has a consistent significant decrease on consumption across specifications,
decreasing water consumption by approximately 125 litres (column III), which mag-
nifies to 215 litres saved (column VII). Again we see that the increase in effect size
amongst the non-indigents in the heterogeneity analysis (column VII). Indigents, on
the other hand, increase their consumption by 283 litres.
Intrinsic motivation, and social recognition with an opt-out option, have an equal
and significant reduction in consumption for non-indigents (no significant findings
in the indigent sub sample): these treatments decrease consumption by 292 litres
(intrinsic motivation) and 250 litres (social recognition with an opt-out), equivalent
to a 1% decease in consumption from the pre-intervention period (Dec 2014 - April
2015). In the basic model (column I), we see on average, these treatments reduce
consumption by approximately 130 litres per month, equivalent to a 0.6% decrease
in water consumption from the pre-intervention mean.
We also include robustness checks for the late receivers by creating a counter-
factual control group which balances the dates and sample for which we analyze
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consumption (found in Table E.7 in Appendix E). The results are nearly identical:
intrinsic motivation and social recognition are not significant. Image motivation is
significant and reduces consumption approximately 250 litres (Column 5). In the
indigent heterogeneity analysis, this increases to 520 litres saved. Intrinsic motiv-
ation (300 litres) and social recognition with an opt-out (280 litres) are significant
and negative for the non-indigent sample. Image motivation leads to an increase of
500 litres on average in indigent households. See Table E.7.
Thus, only the non-indigents from our sample respond well to the image motiv-
ation treatment, and to a lesser degree, the three other treatments. None of the
treatments resonate with the indigents. To investigate if this heterogeneity derives
from the income effect whereby indigents have lower income on average than the rest
of the sample, or, because they receive a subsidy for (or free provision of) utilities
and thus do not internalise incentives sent with the municipal bill, we analyse the
treatment effects by income quintile. See next section.
Table 5.7 reflects the estimates from the panel from five months of inserts
(December 2015- April 2016 panel). Figure 5.4 graphs the coefficients.
Figure 5.4: Graphical representation of the coefficients (Column 3 and Column 7 in
Table 5.7
Differences with regards to heterogeneity across the sample is also poignant when
we consider the impacts for different income quintiles. See Table 5.8, and graphical
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Figure 5.5: Graphical Representation of Coefficients in Income Quintile Analysis
representation of the coefficients in Figure 5.5.
In particular, none of our treatments have any effect on the lowest (first and
second quintile) income groups.
Social recognition - both image motivation and with an opt-out - have an equal
and significant impact on conservation efforts for the middle quintile. Both types of
social recognition decrease consumption on average by 340 litres (1.7%).
However the effect from social recognition with an explicit opt-out disappears
in the highest quintiles (fourth and fifth). Interestingly, intrinsic motivation has
the greatest impact on water conservation for the fourth income quintile. Intrinsic
motivation on average decreased consumption by 380 litres, equivalent to a 1.6%
decrease in consumption. In contrast, the image motivation treatment decreases
consumption by 280 litres, equivalent to a 1.2% decrease. Thus for the fourth
income quintile, image motivation crowds out intrinsic motivation. However, the
effect is only marginal: households in the fourth income quintile still conserve water
if given the image motivation treatment, it is just to lesser extent than if they were
provided an appeal to their intrinsic motivation.
In the highest quintile, image motivation crowds in motivation: the treatment
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reduces consumption by a remarkable 980 litres on average, which is equivalent to
2.8% decrease.
Its impact therefore more or less doubles from the impact it had on the third
and fourth income quintiles. Intrinsic motivation also reduced consumption by 550
litres on average, equivalent to a 1.6% effect.
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Table 5.7: Longer run analysis (Dec 2015 - April 2016): Difference in difference model using fixed effects with trend
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX
Monthly
consumption
(kl)
Monthly
consumption
(kl)
Monthly
consumption
(kl)
Monthly
consumption
(kl)
Monthly
consumption
(kl)
Monthly
consumption
(kl)
Monthly
consumption
(kl)
Monthly
consumption
(kl)
Monthly
consumption
(kl)
Tips x Post -0.137* -0.127* -0.124* -0.123* -0.099 -0.203** -0.215*** -0.203*** -0.196**
0.072 0.072 0.073 0.064 0.073 0.081 0.082 0.073 0.084
Intrinsic x Post -0.123* -0.101 -0.079 -0.079 -0.063 -0.292*** -0.292*** -0.282*** -0.278***
0.068 0.067 0.069 0.062 0.07 0.087 0.089 0.081 0.088
Image Motivation x
Post -0.252*** -0.247*** -0.257*** -0.278*** -0.240*** -0.502*** -0.518*** -0.522*** -0.510***
0.085 0.084 0.088 0.079 0.089 0.096 0.097 0.089 0.099
SR Opt Out x Post -0.139* -0.115 -0.109 -0.108 -0.077 -0.242*** -0.250*** -0.234*** -0.234***
0.076 0.075 0.077 0.068 0.078 0.085 0.085 0.077 0.086
Trend -0.190*** -0.193*** -0.184*** -0.210*** -0.197*** -0.270*** -0.264*** -0.285*** -0.279***
0.028 0.015 0.016 0.014 0.016 0.015 0.015 0.014 0.016
Indigent status 2.369*** 2.398*** 2.415*** 2.022*** 1.443*** 1.446*** 1.447*** 0.994***
0.319 0.33 0.338 0.327 0.39 0.388 0.388 0.365
Frequency (-1) -0.027 -0.014
0.038 0.038
Billed amount (-1) 0.005*** 0.005***
0 0
Tariff rate (-1) -0.053*** -0.053***
0.004 0.004
Post x indigent 2.173*** 2.157*** 2.107*** 2.289***
0.234 0.238 0.223 0.266
Tips x indigent -0.054 -0.004 0.064 -0.118
0.255 0.25 0.239 0.273
Intrinsic x indigent -0.445 -0.46 -0.368 -0.341
0.321 0.324 0.304 0.354
Image Motivation x
indigent -0.438 -0.426 -0.331 -0.509
0.307 0.307 0.287 0.331
SR Opt out x
indigent -0.115 -0.134 -0.099 -0.036
0.3 0.286 0.278 0.322
Tips x indigent x
Post 0.258 0.283* 0.248* 0.300*
0.158 0.161 0.14 0.157
Intrinsic x indigent
x Post 0.162 0.192 0.174 0.166
0.141 0.145 0.131 0.149
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Image Motivation x
indigent x Post 0.527*** 0.541*** 0.495*** 0.556***
0.166 0.172 0.156 0.171
SR Opt Out x
indigent x Post 0.181 0.178 0.143 0.203
0.174 0.176 0.156 0.178
Constant 23.720*** 26.258*** 26.352*** 25.354*** 27.388*** 27.042*** 27.048*** 26.014*** 28.125***
0.195 0.323 0.313 0.362 0.308 0.328 0.311 0.359 0.309
Observations 1 380 281 1 380 281 1 307 866 1 307 866 1 167 551 1 327 866 1 307 866 1 307 866 1 167 551
Treated 1 075 276 1 075 276 1 027 405 1 027 405 917 123 1 043 132 1 027 405 1 027 405 917 123
Tips 313 199 313 199 291 135 291 135 260 033 295 668 291 135 291 135 260 033
Intrinsic Motivation 235 372 235 372 228 258 228 258 203 723 231 838 228 258 228 258 203 723
Image Motivation 265 693 265 693 254 714 254 714 227 136 258 300 254 714 254 714 227 136
SR Opt Out 261 012 261 012 253 298 253 298 226 231 257 326 253 298 253 298 226 231
Control 305 005 305 005 280 461 280 461 250 428 284 734 280 461 280 461 250 428
Clusters 653 653 653 653 653 653 653 653 653
Fpvalue 0.058 0.067 0.065 0.012 0.105 0 0 0 0
R-squared 0.012 0.072 0.074 0.094 0.086 0.077 0.079 0.098 0.091
Standard errors are clustered at the suburb level and are presented under the coefficient
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Table 5.8: Income Quintile Analysis: Difference in Difference model using fixed effects with trend
1st Income Quintile 2nd Income Quintile 3rd Income Quintile 4th Income
Quintile
5th Income
Quintile
I II III IV V VI VII VIII
Monthly
consumption
(kl)
Monthly
consumption
(kl)
Monthly
consumption
(kl)
Monthly
consumption
(kl)
Monthly
consumption
(kl)
Monthly
consumption
(kl)
Monthly
consumption
(kl)
Monthly
consumption
(kl)
Tips x Post 0.116 0.705 -0.011 -0.104 -0.216 -0.236* -0.045 -0.262
0.215 0.803 0.119 0.171 0.139 0.135 0.15 0.18
Intrinsic x Post -0.175 -0.108 -0.047 -0.167 -0.011 -0.041 -0.381** -0.532***
0.16 0.602 0.124 0.251 0.146 0.143 0.15 0.199
Image Motivation x Post 0.037 0.733 0.049 -0.131 -0.357** -0.373** -0.263* -1.017***
0.195 0.513 0.166 0.228 0.156 0.152 0.159 0.22
SR Opt Out x Post -0.191 0.654 0.025 -0.203 -0.338** -0.363** -0.152 -0.165
0.222 0.489 0.136 0.226 0.156 0.156 0.145 0.181
Trend -0.056 -0.083 -0.124*** -0.122*** -0.173*** -0.171*** -0.252*** -0.303***
0.042 0.077 0.026 0.028 0.021 0.021 0.026 0.029
Indigent status 2.879*** 2.513*** 2.391*** 2.504*** -0.521 2.044 -0.042 1.053
0.343 0.391 0.366 0.455 0.445 1.923 0.897 4.13
Frequency (-1) 0.203*** 0.202*** 0.153*** 0.153*** 0.207*** 0.207*** -0.032 -0.693***
0.063 0.063 0.057 0.057 0.052 0.051 0.062 0.081
Post x indigent 0.266 -0.039 -2.773*
0.645 0.258 1.515
Tips x indigent 0.662* -0.083 -2.234
0.392 0.316 2.046
Intrinsic x indigent 0.536 -0.374 -3.581*
0.468 0.376 2.15
Image Motivation x indigent 0.116 -0.467 -1.857
0.383 0.443 2.191
SR Opt out x indigent 0.794* 0.025 -2.957
0.431 0.326 2.264
Tips x indigent x Post -0.626 0.147 2.145
0.817 0.237 1.635
Intrinsic x indigent x Post -0.079 0.183 2.9
0.625 0.275 1.919
Image Motivation x indigent x Post -0.725 0.279 2.117
0.507 0.289 1.962
SR Opt Out x indigent x Post -0.896* 0.338 2.639
0.465 0.258 2.039
Constant 18.160*** 18.215*** 19.811*** 19.844*** 24.163*** 24.148*** 29.949*** 41.164***
0.66 0.75 0.543 0.519 0.435 0.435 0.362 0.481
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Month fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Suburb fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Tariff fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 283 131 283 131 274 057 274 057 220 490 220 490 238 139 230 685
Treated 226 361 226 361 217 123 217 123 171 355 171 355 184 547 179 854
Tips 58 873 58 873 58 215 58 215 50 485 50 485 55 490 53 803
Intrinsic Motivation 55 102 55 102 50 772 50 772 36 813 36 813 38 327 37 210
Image Motivation 55 695 55 695 54 267 54 267 41 903 41 903 45 707 44 630
SR Opt-Out 56 691 56 691 53 869 53 869 42 154 42 154 45 023 44 211
Control 56 770 56 770 56 934 56 934 49 135 49 135 53 592 50 831
Clusters 180 180 260 260 351 351 423 427
Fpvalue 0.496 0.307 0.968 0.911 0.084 0.063 0.044 0
R-squared 0.043 0.043 0.062 0.062 0.077 0.077 0.119 0.137
Standard errors are clustered at the suburb level and are presented under the coefficient
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5.8 Discussion and Concluding Remarks
Making individual behaviour observable has been shown to increase contributions
to public goods in lab experiments. The tendency to seek social approval in human
behaviour could be leveraged in public policy to achieve socially optimal outcomes.
However, Be´nabou and Tirole (2006) challenge this generalised statement by showing
that the introduction of a public reward (recognition) might cast doubt on the
true motive of the behaviour, and could crowd out cooperation if the individual is
concerned about the noisy signal of their do-good behaviour.
We test Be´nabou and Tirole’s (2006) hypotheses by conducting a randomised
field experiment throughout the City of Cape Town, South Africa to investigate the
impact of social recognition treatments on water consumption in times of drought.
To our knowledge, this empirical analysis has not been executed elsewhere and
contributes both to the academic literature as well as policy recommendations for
alternatives to traditional demand side management tools during times of resource
scarcity.
Our sample is approximately 220 000 randomly selected households, stratified
across income and water consumption bands. 40% of the sample are indigent recipi-
ents - a subset of poor households who receive utility subsidies from the government -
and 60% non-indigents. We find support both for and against Be´nabou and Tirole’s
(2006) hypotheses: image motivation crowds in motivation for our full sample (and
thus the signal of good-doing is strong enough to elicit cooperation), it marginally
crowds out13 intrinsic motivation in the 4th income quintile, and it unequivocally
crowds out motivation in the indigent sub sample.
We varied whether the household received a neutral framing to reduce their
water consumption (an appeal to their intrinsic motivation) or a combination of an
appeal to their intrinsic motivation as well as an extrinsic incentive, namely: social
recognition. We exogenously varied the visibility of the public prosocial signal by
13Households in the fourth income quintile still conserve water if given the image motivation
treatment, it is just to lesser extent than if they were provided an appeal to their intrinsic motiv-
ation.
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adding an additional treatment where households were given the option to opt-out
of the recognition incentive. Thus the household still had the ability to conserve but
could opt- out of the public award and only receive the private feedback, obviating
the potential noisy signal of their good-doing.
For the average household in our setting, image motivation does not increase
the noise of the prosocial signal (which might otherwise crowd-out cooperation),
and thus we cannot confirm Be´nabou and Tirole’s (2006) hypothesis. While we do
not find significant effects on the social recognition treatment with an opt-out, con-
sumption reduced on average over 520 litres per month if the household was assigned
the image motivation treatment - equivalent to 2.2% in relative consumption - com-
pared to the control group. This is in line with the success of crowdsourced “drought
shaming” campaigns in the United States, which have been effective at distributing
a public signal of socially desirable behaviour by identifying and shaming high water
users. While we do not directly “shame” non-water savers due to ethical reasons,
the absence of their name in a public domain reserved for the City’s water savers
might be seen as a passive shaming14. However, the channel of avoidance or fear of
shame is suggestive in our setting.
In the income quintile regressions, we observe that none of the treatments had
an effect on the poorest households. The middle income quintile of our sample
decreased consumption equally in both social recognition treatments (opt-out and
image motivation). Social recognition with an opt-out had no impact on the fourth
and fifth quintiles. Rather intrinsic motivation (fourth quintile) and image motiv-
ation (fifth quintile) had the highest impacts. Image motivation in the wealthiest
households reduced consumption by almost 1000 litres on average each month.
However, when one considers indigent sub sample alone, then we do find sup-
port for Be´nabou and Tirole’s (2006) hypothesis. The image motivation treatment
increases consumption (560 litres per month) for these households. Thus the noisy
14Households who received the image motivation treatment should assume everyone received the
same insert. Thus if the household was curious about their neighbours, their neighbour’s absence
from the list would indicate a lack of water savings. Whereas for the opt-out, absence from the
list is indicative either of the household opt-ing out, or, becaause they didn’t conserve water.
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signal as hypothesised by Be´nabou and Tirole’s (2006) might be due to differences
in norms across social groups (i.e. indigent versus non indigent).
The paradox is that image motivation leads to a crowding out of motivation to
conserve water in the indigent sub sample, but yet we pick up no significant effect
in the lowest income quintiles. Note, indigents exist within the lowest income quin-
tiles, but not all low income households have indigent status: if not automatically
granted given their property value, households must prove low income status to the
government. Thus we hypothesise three potential channels driving this result: indi-
gents receive subsidised (or free provision of) utilities, and thus may not internalise
the incentives if they do not look at their monthly utility bill. However, in Chapter
4, we observe that the tariff graph and financial gains inserts lead to a decrease in
consumption in the indigent sub sample, whereas the social incentives (social norm,
social recognition and public good) lead to an increase in consumption. This would
imply the indigents do look at their bills.
The second channel could be that indigents do not internalise the incentive if
they feel it is not applicable to them: as part of the right to safe and sufficient
water (a constitutionally protected right in South Africa), their indigent status is a
signal that they are marginalized and legitimizes the rebate they receive (they are
entitled to it). In the case of the social incentives, where there is no financial gain,
the household’s (justified) feeling of entitlement to a minimum level of consumption
likely superseded the social incentive.
A third channel is that this social group assigns different norms to social recog-
nition than the non-indigents (including low income non-indigents). In line with
Be´nabou and Tirole (2006), public recognition is a noisy signal for this social group
and crowds out their motivation. Following Exley’s (2014) hypothesis, the strength
of the greedy signal might be a determinant of the outcome. We find evidence of
this in the income quintile analysis: in the lowest quintile, the indigent sub sample
decreases consumption by almost 900 litres only if provided the opt-out.
A significant limitation of this chapter is that some may argue that the treatment
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for intrinsic motivation is an extrinsic incentive. However, the message is in line
with the public campaigns during the drought asking households to reduce their
consumption by 10% and written with a neutral framing. There was no direct
incentive offered nor punishment threatened if the household succeeded or failed,
respectively, to reduce their water consumption. Another critique of the intrinsic
motivation treatment is that it could instead be interpreted as a challenge to compete
with one’s self. We are not aware of studies which test the competition with one’s
self in relation to conservation behaviour. However, this critique reinforces the
motivation behind the treatment: if an individual was not intrinsically motivated to
conserve, they would likely not interpret the insert as a challenge to improve their
conservation behaviour.
Further research is needed to i) disentangle how many of the “opt outs” were
indigents who then saved water, and ii) conduct a sub sample analysis only on
indigents to investigate the channels further. We also plan to merge our data with
the Census data to look at the interaction of race with image motivation.
In application to public policy, the results suggest that at least in times ofwater
scarcity, public recognition incentives can be effective at promoting water conserva-
tion amongst the wealthiest households. In a separate working paper (Brick et al.,
2016a) we find wealthier households are less responsive to price signals. The price of
water is nominal for these households, and thus marginal tariff increases may be less
effective at motivating the highest consumers to reduce their water consumption.
The finding that non monetary extrinsic incentives are particularly impactful on
the middle to upper income groups can be a useful policy tool for those households
whose behaviour is difficult to change with price effects alone.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
Conservation often yields higher benefits to society than to the individual. Thus
incentive structures for individuals need to be designed in order to achieve socially
optimal outcomes. Currently, various monetary incentives are being deployed by
multilaterals, governments, municipalities and corporations throughout the world
(see Cavelier and Munro Gray (2012)) to galvanize conservation with the expecta-
tion that such interventions motivate sustainable consumption of natural resources.
Yet, few studies have rigorously tested the impact of monetary and non monetary
incentives on behaviour to determine which incentives work and whether they are
cost effective.
The central research question of this thesis is “what are the incentives for in-
dividuals to conserve the environment: monetary incentives, social incentives, or
appealing to one’s intrinsic motivation?”. A deeper investigation in this thesis seeks
to understand i) if individuals have intrinsic motivations to conserve the environ-
ment (and if so, how to measure them), and ii) do extrinsic incentives crowd in or
out intrinsic motivation, a question which has not yet been sufficiently explored in
the economics literature. The questions are informed by theoretical contributions
on motivation and incentives by Frey (1992) and Be´nabou and Tirole (2006).
This thesis presents empirical evidence on the use of different incentives to pro-
mote conservation and provides new empirical evidence on the interaction of incent-
ives and motivation. In this conclusion, I will first summarize the key contributions
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and limitations of each chapter, potential avenues for future research, and then re-
flect on contribution of findings in this thesis as well as behavioural economics more
generally.
Chapter 2 exploits data from a field experiment in Sa˜o Paulo, Brazil to ana-
lyse the role of extrinsic and intrinsic incentives in shaping individual demand for a
Payments for Environmental Services (PES) program. We contribute to the literat-
ure by developing a taxonomy of motivations and test whether monetary incentives
crowd in or crowd out preexisting intrinsic motivations. Our findings suggest that,
in contrast with predictions from rational choice theory, individuals’ responses to in-
centives are not monotonic: demand does not increase with price. When interacting
the incentive offer level with preexisting intrinsic motivations, we find proenviron-
ment and prosocial landholders are less likely to accept the incentive, and their
refusal increases at higher offer levels. However, results must be taken lightly: if
the instrument did not capture the landholders’ true willingness to accept (WTA)
value, then we cannot adequately measure the interaction of accepting the incentive
and motivations.
To the extent that people do have preexiting motivations to conserve, implement-
ation of a PES program might crowd out their conservation behaviour in the long
run, whereas if no such motivations existed previously, or the motivations have no
effect on participation, then crowding out is unlikely to be an issue. Further research
is needed to understand the long run effects of the introduction and implementation
of a self-selecting PES program in the community on conservation behaviour for
both those who did and did not enroll in the program.
Chapter 3 examines the causality between conservation zones established in the
period 2004-2010 and the large reduction in deforestation rates in the Amazon. By
combining satellite data on deforestation with data on the location and timing of
the conservation zones, we provide spatial regression discontinuity estimates and
difference-in-difference estimates indicating that the policy cannot explain the large
reduction in deforestation rates. The reason is that the zones are located in areas
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where agricultural production is likely to be unprofitable. Thus a major limitation
of our work is that the zone placement is endogenous. Our findings point to the
need for explanations other than the conservation zones to explain the sharp decline
in deforestation rates in the Brazilian Amazon since 2004. As most of the decline
in deforestation rates in Brazil took place outside rather than inside the zones, a
future avenue for research is identifying factors which reduced deforestation in areas
outside of conservation zones. We do, however, find supporting evidence that put-
ting municipalities on a “shame” list by the federal government led to a decrease in
deforestation rates in zones within those municipalities. The list increases visibility
and thus accountability as these municipalities were subject to more rigorous envir-
onmental monitoring and law enforcement from Brazil’s environmental protection
agency.
In Chapters 4 and 5, we design and implement a randomised control trial across
400 000 households in the City of Cape Town, South Africa, to test various non
monetary incentives to promote water conservation during drought in a developing
country beset by high inequality.
In a context where water conservation must be promoted but the price signal
is diluted either because the poor do not pay full price1, or, because higher income
households have a high elasticity of demand, it is pertinent for government to create
policy which incentivises households at all income levels, while being low-cost, and
non-punitive to the poor.
Similar interventions in developed country settings find an impact of approx-
imately 2%, which the authors attribute to the influence of social norms (Allcott,
2011). Using data on the 400 000 randomised households, we break down the social
norms intervention into possible causal channels, and include intrinsic motivation
and social recognition treatments. We find social norms has a significant impact on
conservation behaviour (1.3%) but its impact is equal to all other treatments with
the exception of social recognition, which has an average treatment effect of 2.2%.
1To help alleviate financial constraints of the poorest households, the City of Cape Town in the
Western Cape province subsidises water and other utilities for those who qualify for the grant.
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More importantly, given South Africa’s extremely unequal income distribution,
we are interested in heterogeneous responses across income groups, which are im-
portant for improving cost-effectiveness and understanding the causal mechanisms
of the treatment effects (Ferraro and Miranda, 2013). Akin to Maslow’s hierarchy of
needs, we find lower income households respond only to financial incentives (a 3.3%
decrease from their baseline mean) whereas higher income households respond only
to social incentives (a 2.6% decrease from their baseline mean).
Critical for South Africa, these incentives are non-punitive and low-cost: the cost
- effective estimate is R0.005 (0.0004 USD) per household for the financial treatment
and R0.007 (USD 0.0006) per household for the social recognition treatments. These
estimates improve to R0.002 and R0.003, respectively, when targeted at the most
responsive groups (lower income quintiles for the former, higher income quintiles for
the latter).
Our results show that non-pecuniary incentives can promote conservation over
and above traditional demand side management tools but need to be adapted ap-
propriately according to income groups. A limitation of our quintile analysis is that
the confidence intervals for the estimates are large, so the interpretation of the es-
timates is not precise. A limitation of our design is that the social recognition and
intrinsic motivation treatments provided an explicit target level for which to reduce
consumption. However, the 10% target was in line with the City’s wide-spread
public media campaign. Thus all households were subject to being asked to reduce
their consumption by 10%, but our two treatments made the public campaign more
salient. Finally a large limitation of the implementation is the inability to meas-
ure compliance. We only know if the household was mailed the insert; we do not
not know if the household read the insert (and if so, if the reader is the influencer
of behaviour in the household and/or bill payer). Nonetheless, we have no reason
to postulate that there are systematic differences in the probability of reading the
insert across arms of the trial. Thus, we assume random attrition.
In Chapter 5, we tease out the social recognition treatments to analyse if ex-
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trinsic incentives - social recognition - crowds out intrinsic motivation2. We find
both support for and against Be´nabou and Tirole’s (2006) hypotheses. When exo-
genously varying the visibility of the “doing good” behaviour, by creating an explicit
opt-out in one of the social recognition treatments, we find image motivation - or
“compulsory” social recognition - crowds in motivation for the full sample. We find
no effect when social recognition is not fully visible. This shows that social approval
is key to galvanizing behavioural change. However, the effects are heterogeneous:
in contrast to the findings from the average treatment effect, we find that image
motivation treatment increases consumption in the indigent sub sample, validating
Be´nabou and Tirole’s (2006) hypotheses. Thus appearing on the public list is a
noisy signal as it is viewed different by different social groups.
A significant limitation of this chapter is that some may argue that the treatment
for intrinsic motivation is an extrinsic incentive. However, the message is in line
with the public campaigns during the drought asking households to reduce their
consumption by 10% and written with a neutral framing. There was no direct
incentive offered nor punishment threatened if the household succeeded or failed,
respectively, to reduce their water consumption.
For further research, we will analyse the impact of household names appearing
on the City’s website to see if behaviour changed - both in the households who op-
ted out and those for whom the recognition was compulsory - as a result of the list
existing in public domain. We also intend to merge our data with the Census data
to analyse heterogeneity not only across income but also race and changes to dwell-
ing infrastructure over time. Furthermore with access to data on other utilties, we
plan to test the assumption that changing behaviour in the water context may have
spillovers to other utilities reported on the municipal bill such as electricity usage.
We also need to investigate further the results with the indigent group by conduct-
ing a separate estimation for this population. Another key avenue for research is
2The social recognition treatment in Chapter 4 corresponds to the “image motivation” treatment
in 5, where it has the same effect, with the only difference is that in Chapter 4 we pick up more
effect on indigents in the lowest quintile.
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also whether the intervention improved bill non-payment and amongst which income
groups.
While each of the studies within this thesis are internally valid, the results do
not have external validity. However, it is important to reflect on the overarching
empirical results which are consistent across the chapters. I find monetary incentives
are not effective on those with prosocial or proenvironment motivations. This overall
finding supports Frey’s (1992) hypothesis that monetary incentives may be perceived
as an external instrument to regulate intrinsic motivation, which diminishes self
determination and thus welfare associated with ecological behaviour. However, while
we find monetary incentives undermine proenvironment and prosocial motivations in
Chapter 2, monetary incentives are indeed effective in Chapter 4. Yet when we look
closer, households who are motivated by social incentives (“prosocial”), or by appeals
to the public good, or by their intrinsic motivation to save water (“proenvironment”)
do not respond to the monetary incentive treatment in Chapter 4. Rather only
the lower income households respond to the monetary incentive treatment, and
these households are not motivated by social incentives nor by appeals to help the
environmental crisis.
However, while I find evidence that monetary incentives undermine intrinsic
motivations - as in Chapter 2 the landholders are less likely to accept the high levels
of the monetary incentive and in Chapter 4 the households do not respond to the
incentive - I do not find evidence that it actually reduces intrinsic motivation. In
Chapter 2, the main limitation is that we cannot observe their behaviour change with
regards to conservation practices because we do not have end line data. In Chapter
4, we do not see that the high income households increase their water consumption
with the monetary incentive - we only observe that they do not decrease their water
consumption. Thus, we can only say monetary incentives are not effective on people
with proenvironment and prosocial motivations in these studies.
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Non monetary incentives, on the other hand, do not crowd out intrinsic mo-
tivation on average and are highly effective across higher income groups. Image
motivation vis-a´-vis public recognition, as well as appeals to intrinsic motivation
and the public good incentivises - on average - a large decrease in water consump-
tion, and this effect is amplified in the higher income quintiles. However, they must
be applied appropriately: the causal channels through which the non monetary
incentives affect behaviour vary across income groups, as non monetary extrinsic
incentives do decrease desired conservation behaviour of low income and especially
indigent households. We find in Cape Town that, while providing monetary in-
centives decrease consumption in the lower income quintiles, these households and
especially indigent households respond negatively to social incentives by increasing
their consumption (social norms, image motivation, appeals to the public good).
Thus we find support for and against Be´nabou and Tirole’s (2006) hypotheses on
image motivation crowding out cooperation. Comparing the results of Chapter 5 to
Chapter 3, we see that public shaming (or faming) leads to a positive change in be-
haviour, on average, over and above regulations: the creation of a Federal “shame”
list of municipalities with high deforestation led to a decrease in deforestation in
those listed municipalities in Chapter 3. Visibility and thus accountability is a key
finding from this thesis: whether it’s publicly rewarding or shaming, we find recog-
nition can be a highly effective incentive to change environmental behaviour when
applied appropriately.
Critically, this thesis explores behavioural theories that deviate from the rational
choice model. In each chapter, we see that the rational model does not always hold:
in Chapter 2, we assumed that landholders’ demand was monotonic in price, yet
landholders were less likely to accept higher monetary offers than lower offers. In
Chapter 3, we hypothesise zoning regulation caused the decrease in deforestation in
Brazil, yet we are not able to attribute the introduction of conservation zoning to
the decrease in deforestation. In Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, while we cannot casually
measure if tariff hikes and structural adjustments incentivised households to lower
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their water consumption, we do see a large decrease in water consumption from the
year prior in both the treatment and control groups. Yet, we were able to show that
low-cost behavioural interventions can cause even greater reduction in water use at
the household level on top of existing tariff increases, water restrictions, and public
campaigns.
When evaluating the value added from behavioural economics, we first recognise
the standard model works well when information is made available and presen-
ted well: a key take away is that people respond most strongly when information is
understood and made relevant (Chapter 2 and 4). However individuals are also irra-
tional: people respond strongly to social incentives such as shaming (Chapter 3) and
faming (Chapter 5). While standard economic policy (i.e. changing the cost-benefit
analysis through a change in price, regulation, and/or law) is often necessary, espe-
cially for structural issues, policy design should incorporate behavioural economics
to account for the psychological processes that make individuals think automatic-
ally (using heuristics) and socially (World Bank, 2015). Importantly, behavioural
economics offers low-hanging solutions which complement standard economic policy,
and, are cost-effective.
The main limitation which permeates throughout the chapters is that there is no
one-size-fits-all policy to incentivise conservation at the individual level and across
income groups. Human behaviour is complex: individuals are heterogenous in their
preferences and make choices under varying constraints. Policy makers should expect
to use a toolbox of monetary and non monetary incentives to promote sustainab-
ility of resources across different income groups and in different settings. Thus in
order to achieve fiscal sustainability while creating equitable policies, policy makers
may consider running randomised controlled trial pilots, varying the subsidy levels
and/or non monetary incentives and eliciting motivations, to establish potential im-
pact of monetary and non monetary incentives on their population. Such studies,
complemented with information campaigns, can be powerful ex ante instruments to
improve the design of the policy in times of resource scarcity.
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Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 2
A.1 Indices
Indices
Proenvironment If border areas of rivers and springs were recovered with forest,the
most important benefit to landowners would be preservation of the
environment or improving air quality (over income effects).
Burning, dumping of trash, dumping of toxins, deforestation, and
damming of their neighbors property will harm the environment.
The supply of drinking water will not last forever.
Prosocial The community and landowners are the most responsible to protect
the environment for future generations.
Progovernment The government is the most responsible entity to pay to protect water
resources on private land.
The government is the most responsible entity to pay to protect water
resources on public land.
Social norms The respondent plans to discuss the project with his or her neighbor
after the survey.
The respondent will participate in the program if he or she found out
his or her neighbor is participating.
Prolegal The household is currently already conserving 100 percent of the land
under legal APP boundaries.
Access to information Heard of PES or a similar scheme before Heard of the Mina d’ A´gua
project before.
Fully understands the APP Forest Code.
A.2 Survey instrument for WTA
Interviewer1: Imagine a government project to compensate landowners for pro-
tecting water sources as a way to help other water users. This type of program has
already been implemented in several countries and in other parts of Brazil. This
program is called Payment for Environmental Services. To participate in any gov-
ernment project for Payment for Environmental Services, you must comply with
1The instrument is only one section of a seven section baseline survey. I did not design this
instrument; rather it was designed by the World Bank team along with other experts who designed
the full baseline survey. Please note, the original survey is in Portuguese. The translation is not
professional.
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environmental legislation. You will need, for example, to stop planting and prevent
access to livestock in areas along the banks of rivers and streams and also around
the source. These areas are called APP “Areas of Permanent Preservation”. In the
APPs of rivers, streams and springs, you must plant trees in a strip along the body
of water. You, a small landholder, may even have fruit trees or cultivate some other
type of product among the native species, under specific norms, in what we call
the SAF- Agroforestry System, but can not cut the vegetation or develop activity
Extensive range in this range, ranging from 5m to 15m depending on the size of
your property.
You will also need to contact the state environmental agency to register your
property in the CAR - rural environmental registry. In addition to planting in APP,
as previously reported, you must indicate in the CAR the areas of native vegetation
that has to be kept as Legal Reserve. The CAR will be mandatory for all rural
properties in Brazil and will allow the owner to have access to programs such as
PRONAF and various other benefits, including the commercialization of their nat-
ive vegetation areas.
(Show card with watersheds at various conservation stages)
Interviewer:(Discuss overall problems that these studies have.) Before talking
about how you would respond to this type of conservation program, I want to talk
about problemS we have in studies like this. People do not always think carefully
about how they would actually respond if it were a real conservation program, or
just give the answer they think the interviewer wants to hear. But if people do this,
the answers will not reflect how they would actually respond to the conservation
program, so that it may be poorly designed and probably will not work very well. It
is important to understand that in these studies there are no right or wrong answers.
1. Have you ever heard of any such program? (Select one option only)
(i) Yes you have already heard
(ii) Yes you have heard but did not know what it was
(iii) Never heard of it.
2. Would you like to participate in such a program? (Select one option only) (Y/N)
3. Did you know what was an Are of Permanent Preservation was (APP)? (Re-
quest the interviewee to explain the main aspect of the law. Do not read options,
select which best characterizes their knowledge)
(i) Never heard of
(ii) Know the law
(iii) Know a little
(iv) They say that they know, but they missed or do not know some details
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(v) They speak about it, but refer to the previous legislation
(vi) They know the the law
Section I: Conservation and regeneration of native vegetation
1. Imagine a government project that pays a certain amount to save APPs. Consid-
ering the actions that you will have to take to participate, would you be interested
in participating by receiving R $X per year to conserve one hectare? (Y/N) (If Yes-
go to Question 3, if No- go to Question 2)
2.Would you be interested in participating by getting $ X per year to conserve
one hectare? (Y/N)
3. Are you sure of your answer? (Y/N)
4. Which of the sentences best represents the reason for you to be willing to receive
this amount to conserve the forest in the APP areas?
(i) The guarantee of having enough water for the domestic activities and in the
property / house.
(ii) The guarantee of having quality water to give to animals and plants .
(iii) So that my children and grandchildren have enough water to drink, cook,
bathe for life
(iv) For the simple fact of finding important the existence of the river or dam,
regardless of its current or future use
(v) So you can use the dam or the river as a place of leisure for you and your
family;
(vi) I do not know
(vii) Other, specify
5. Why would not you like to receive no money to recover the woods in the APP
areas? (Do not read the options, select all that apply)
(i) To keep the area is the obligation of the owner, I should not receive compens-
ation for this
(ii) Conserving one hectare compromises productive areas
(iii) The incentive is low
(iv) Do not trust that this program will be deployed
(v) It is not my responsibility
(vi) Would use the area for other purposes
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(vii) I do not need the money
(viii) I do not want anyone to control what I do on my property
(ix) Bureaucracy
(x) I do not have the necessary documents
(xi) I do not know
(xii) Other, specify
Section II: Restoration
1. Imagine another government project that pays value to restore APPs that are not
yet covered by forest. Considering the actions you will have to take to restore one
hectare of your property and the necessary actions to participate in any government
project, would you be interested in participating by receiving a one-time payment of
R $X to restore one hectare? (Y/N) (If Yes- go to Question 3, if No- go to Question 2)
2. Would you be interested in participating by receiving a one-time payment of
R $ X per hectare? (Y/N)
3. Are you sure of your answer? (Y/N)
4. What is the main reason for you have this provision to receive for the res-
toration of the forest in the areas of APP? (Just to reinforce the argument ask, if
these would be the other reasons)
(i) I would restore anyway
(ii) The payment is good
(iii) Payment is little, but it is an incentive to comply with the law
(iv) The payment is greater than the expenses I will have
(v) I need money
5. Why would you restore it anyway?
(i) Because the area is not productive
(ii) Because I want to fulfill the legal obligation
(iii) Because I want to conserve the water I use
(iv) Because I want to conserve the water that others consume
(v) Other, which:
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6. Which of the sentences best represents the reason for you to be willing to receive
this amount to recover the forest in the APP areas?
(i) The guarantee of having enough water for the domestic activities and in the
property / house
(ii) The guarantee of having quality water to give to animals and plants
(iii) So that my children and grandchildren have secured enough water to drink,
cook, bathe for life
(iv) For the simple fact of finding important the existence of the river or dam,
regardless of its current or future use
(v) So you can use the dam or the river as a place of leisure for you and your
family;
(vi) I do not know
(vii) Other, specify
7. Why would not you like to receive no money to recover the woods in the APP
areas? (Do not read the options, select all that apply])
(i) To recover the area is the obligation of the owner, should not receive for this
reason
(ii) Recovering a hectare greatly compromises my productive area
(iii) The incentive is low
(iv) Do not trust that this program will be deployed
(v) It is not my responsibility
(vi) Would use the area for other purposes
(vii) Do not need the money
(viii) I do not want anyone to control what I do on my property
(ix) Bureaucracy
(x) I do not have the necessary documents
(xi) Other, specify
(xii) I do not know
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Section III: (Show a visual card with different types of watersheds and water qual-
ity): The springs are formed from the rainwater that falls in the forest. The water
you use on your property comes from this spring. The better the forests around
the source the better the quality and quantity of water. The river will have enough
water of good quality to supply you and the cities for many decades with reduced
consumption and recovery of springs.
1. Knowing this, would you change your mind about not joining the program?
(Y/N)
2. If you have free technical assistance available, such as free mapping of your
property, you receive the donation of fences for the adequacy to the legislation,
the donation of Seedlings, and specialized technical assistance for the development
of productive SAFs, would you change your mind about not participating in the
program? If yes, which one does it matter most? ((Select one option only))
(i) Yes, mapping
(ii) Yes, hedges
(iii) Yes, seedlings and seeds
(iv) Yes, technical assistance
(v) No
3. If your neighbor participated in this program, would you also participate? (Y/N)
4. Would you talk to your neighbor about this program? (Y/N)
5. How do you characterize your APP?
(i) Completely preserved
(ii) Little preserved
(iii) Partially preserved
(iv) Not preserved
A.3 Frey’s (1992) Model on Extrinsic Incentives
Crowding out Intrinsic Motivations
Frey (1992) was one of the first economists to introduce this phenomenon into eco-
nomic theory by proposing a simple rational choice model where individual be-
haviour, B, is determined not only by external incentives, E, such as prices and
regulation, but also by intrinsic motivation, M .
B = B(E,M) (A.1)
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The principal maximises the agent’s performance by choosing the appropriate
intensity of external instruments:
dB
dE
= BE +BM(dM
dE
) = 0 (A.2)
Agents increase their utility by applying their intrinsic motivation.2 Marginal
utility is assumed to be decreasing and marginal cost increasing. When the principal
varies the intensity of instrument E, the agents adjust the optimal choice of intrinsic
motivation according to
UME + UMM
dM
dE
= 0 (A.3)
Whereby the sign of dM/dE is determined by UME, that is, the effect of the ex-
ternal instrument on the marginal utility of acting through intrinsic motivation.
The principal takes this motivational adjustment into account when the intensity of
the instrument is chosen:
dB
dE
= BE +BM( UME−UMM ) = 0 (A.4)
When UME >0, the instrument raises the marginal utility of exerting intrinsic motiv-
ation, thus a “crowding-in” effect, versus when UME <0, the instrument is damaging
the marginal utility of intrinsic motivation and is thus “crowding-out”. The prin-
cipal choses to apply the instrument, and at what intensity, or not, depending on
the outcome.
But how is UME determined? Frey (1992) draws on psychology literature (Deci
and Ryan, 1985) to discern two conditions that diminish or increase marginal util-
ity of intrinsic motivation - self-determination and self-evaluation. UME is reduced
when the individual perceives that the external instrument is used to control or
regulate the individual’s intrinsic motivation. It is then said to diminish their
self − determination. Alternatively, UME increases if the external instrument is
interpreted as a recognition by the principal that the agent is exercising their in-
trinsic motivation in the task, which is seen as raising their self − evaluation.
Frey states that a prize given for good performance supports intrinsic motivation,
so long as it is not seen as a direct substitution for monetary payments nor is
regularly given, while a monetary reward is usually interpreted as a sign that the
principal does not acknowledge the efforts arising from intrinsic motivation (Frey,
1992). However, Frey contradicts himself by suggesting that in an application to
environmental policy, subsidies support the marginal utility of acting intrinsically
in favor of the environment because the agent’s ethical behaviour is acknowledged
and their self-determination is not challenged.
The result is dependent on how the agent perceives the incentive. If the gift or
monetary reward is given for something the agent considers to be within terms of
contract, or if its interpreted as an effort to externally control self-determination
and intrinsic motivation then UME will diminish. In terms of self-evaluation, if the
principal gives the impression that they do not recognise that the agent exercises
intrinsic motivation in the task, it is worth less to the agent. Therefore, it is im-
portant to understand individual’s perceptions in a PES scheme to understand if it
2Initial level of intrinsic motivation is assumed to exogenously given
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may crowd-out intrinsic motivation.
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Appendix B
Second Appendix to Chapter 2:
Do They Do As They Say? Stated
versus Revealed Preferences and
Take Up in an Incentives for
Conservation Program in an
Incentives for Conservation
Program
B.1 Introduction
Conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs have become common in development
policy due to their success in boosting health and education outcomes (see, among
others: Fiszbein et al. (2009); Gertler (2004); Skoufias et al. (2001)). Payments
for Environmental Services (PES) are similar in concept, offering cash payments
for conservation (Ferraro and Kiss, 2002; Wunder, 2005; Pagiola and Platais, 2007;
Engel et al., 2008; Wunder, 2008). PES is subject to the same question as CCTs,
namely: do such programs actually motivate people to change their behaviour?
Due to the self-selection nature of many incentive programs, there is a risk that
the incentives go to those who already comply with the program’s conditions, thus
limiting the program’s additional conservation impact on the environment (“ad-
ditionality”). Despite an increased use of PES in the field, the analysis of such
programs have received less attention in the economics literature than other types
of CCTs (Pattanayak et al., 2010). The impact of these programs has significant
fiscal and environmental implications, which are relevant for policy making.
Of the few impact evaluations of PES programs that have been conducted to
date, the results are mixed. While some programs have had high impacts (Alix-
Garcia et al., 2015; Pagiola and Rios, 2013; Pagiola et al., 2016; Arriagada et al.,
2012), others appear to have had limited impacts (Ferraro and Pattanayak, 2006;
Robalino and Pfaff, 2013). In cases where the impact has been limited, the hypothes-
ised mechanisms are (i) low or no additional conservation (“additionality”) because
participating landholders would have conserved their land even in the absence of
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the incentive program (Sierra and Russman, 2006; Sills et al., 2008; Robalino and
Pfaff, 2013); and, (ii), “slippage” or “spillovers”, whereby deforestation is diverted
to areas not covered by the program (Alix-Garcia et al., 2012).1
An additional explanation for low conservation impact - which is yet untested
- is that offering payments for conservation might undermine intrinsic motivations
to conserve. This question can be divided into two: (i) whether landholders in fact
have intrinsic motivations to conserve, the basis for these motivations, and if these
motivations drive participation in PES programs; and (ii) whether participation in
PES programs undermines or supports these motivations. In this paper, we use
data from a PES program being implemented in Sa˜o Paulo, Brazil to examine the
first of these questions (examining the second will require waiting for the project
to be completed in order to collect end line data). The program’s objective is
to preserve and improve the water quality by incentivizing upstream landholders
to maintain and/or recover trees surrounding springs on their private property in
critical watershed areas which are already protected under the Brazil Forest Code.
Thus, the payments are an incentive to comply with the law. Payments will be made
annually over a three year renewable term and land is monitored through annual
field visits (see Section B.2 for more on the program).
In principle, PES seeks to change the land use behaviour of land degrading prop-
erty owners for the benefit of the community. The assumption behind PES is that
intrinsic motivations are less important than economic incentives in determining be-
haviour. However, the effect of a payment on behaviour may vary across individuals
depending on their pre existing intrinsic motivations and what triggers those motiv-
ations. Insights from Self-Determination Theory (SDT) suggest that the outcome
is dependent on how payments satisfy not only the landholder’s need for profit but
also his need for purpose and self-satisfaction (Deci and Ryan, 1991; Ryan and Deci,
2000). Specifically, the decrease or increase in intrinsic motivation is due to three
psychological factors: how the incentive affects the need to feel competent, the need
to be self-determined, and the need to feel connected to others. Ezzine-de Blas et al.
(2015) extend SDT to also include the need to feel connected to the environment.
Depending on how the incentive triggers these psychological factors, the incentive
may feel imposed on the individual and result in a crowding out of their motivation;
or alternatively, the incentive may be internalised if it triggers self-satisfaction and
crowds in their motivation. The outcome may determine whether the landholder
enrolls in the program.
The assumption behind the crowding out literature is that individuals (i) have
pre existing intrinsic motivations and (ii) these motivations can be triggered by
an external incentive. If we assume PES contract designers have asymmetric in-
formation, then gathering information on pre existing motivations of potential PES
recipients may better inform the principal prior to both parties signing the con-
tract. Landholders who are already intrinsically motivated to conserve according
to program conditions may not be the preferred participants in a PES program if
the program goals are cost-effectiveness and high additionality. Furthermore, to
determine if landholders not yet conserving their land are incentivised by the in-
troduction of payments, an analysis of how motivations interact with the incentive
might help explain take up patterns which can be used for program targeting to
1There are also concerns that impacts may not be permanent (Pagiola et al., 2016). Lack of
permanence would not affect results at the end of the program, however.
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achieve additional conservation.
The intention of capturing intrinsic motivations is grounded in the hypothesis
that PES program take-up is not fully explained by observable proxies for oppor-
tunity costs. Thus by capturing and measuring motivations, we can obtain more
information on the landholders. We can use this information to test the mechanisms
through which intrinsic motivations interact with an incentive to participate in a
conservation program.
However, intrinsic motivations are latent and thus difficult to measure. This pa-
per contributes to the literature on incentives and motivation in the context of PES
program take up by providing tools to understand how to disentangle and measure
latent motivations; by testing the validity of the measured latent motivations on
revealed preferences of conservation; and by using the latent motivations to analyse
determinates of take up for a PES program.
behavioural analysis using survey responses relies on stated preferences, which
may or may not correspond to revealed preferences (for example, see Nolan et al.
(2008)). In the baseline survey for the PES program, we capture stated preferences
through an exhaustive survey asking questions on the role of society and individu-
als with respect to the environment. We conduct factor analysis on these stated
preferences to elicit latent motivations, which include proenvironment, prosocial,
progovernment and social norms. We use these latent motivations as the “stated
preferences” in this paper.
To overcome the weaknesses inherent in the analysis of stated preferences, we also
measure revealed preferences by documenting the pre existing level of conservation
on each hectare of property at the time of the baseline survey. We then use this data
to first examine the role of motivations as a determinant of conservation behaviour
by studying if the indices constructed from the stated preferences predict revealed
preferences, as captured by observed conservation behaviour.
We hypothesise that landholders with proenvironment motivations will already
be conserving land that is not under legal protection,2 controlling for observable
opportunity costs. Confirming these assumptions, we find that proenvironment and
prosocial landholders are significantly more likely to conserve land not under legal
protection before the program is introduced when controlling for a comprehensive
set of demographic, socio economic and land characteristics.
With validation that the stated preferences in our sample capture intrinsic mo-
tivations, we explore the extent to which the interaction of these motivations with a
monetary incentive affects participation in the PES program. We find that proenvir-
onment landholders are more likely to participate in the program. Social norm and
prosocial motivated landholders, on the other hand, are less likely to participate.
Bridging the stated preference analysis with the take up analysis, we find proso-
cial landholders and proenvironment landholders are more likely to be conserving
private land outside of legal protection, but only prosocial landholders are more
likely to be already conserving land under legal protection before the introduction
of the payments program. The finding that proenvironment landholders are then
more likely to enroll in the program demonstrates that offering an incentive to those
close to the margin of conserving land within legal protection helps to crowd in
2“Legal protection” refers to land demarcated as “Areas of Permanent Protection” (APPs),
which requires 100 percent conservation. In the case of springs, the permanent forest preservation
areas (APP) consist of a 50 m radius from the center of the spring.
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intrinsically motivated landholders. These landholders are the preferred recipients
as opposed to prosocial landholders whose enrollment would not result in additional
conservation. However, to achieve high additionality, program administrators would
benefit most if those with high opportunity costs were motivated by the incentive;
we find these landholders are in fact less likely to enroll in the program. We discuss
all findings in light of the SDT theoretical framework.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section B.2 describes the context
and Section B.3 describes the data collection; Section B.4 discusses the construction
of stated preference indices; Section B.5 describes the estimation strategy; Section
B.6 discusses the results; and Section B.7 concludes. The main regressions can be
found at the end of the paper in Section B.8.
B.2 Context
The Mina d’A´gua (MdA) pilot program is being implemented in 21 municipalities,
one in each of Sa˜o Paulo’s Hydrographic Water Management Units (UGRHI) (von
Glehn et al., 2012). All participating municipalities have a legal framework that
allows payments to landholders for environmental services. This is the first PES
pilot implemented directly by the Sa˜o Paulo state government. It falls under the
state policy on climate change adaptation and mitigation.3
The objective of the MdA program is to preserve and improve the water quality
by incentivizing upstream landholders to maintain and/or recover trees surrounding
springs on their private property in critical watershed areas. These areas are already
protected by the Brazil Forest Code, and are referred to as Areas of Permanent
Protection (henceforth “APPs” or “within legal protection”). Hence the payments
are an incentive to comply with the existing law. However, in addition to conserving
100 percent of land demarcated by the government, the full Brazil Forest Code also
obliges the landholder to conserve 20 percent of land outside of demarcated areas.
The MdA program does not impose the second requirement of the full Brazil Forest
Code.
3An earlier pilot was implemented in collaboration with The Nature Conservancy (Padovezi
et al., 2012).
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Figure B.1: Location of the Mina d’A´gua pilots in Sa˜o Paulo, Brazil
Priority watershed areas for conservation and restoration are defined as those
watersheds that drain to the intakes of local water companies. The project will
pay landholders for sustainable land use practices that protect or regenerate forest
coverage in a 50m radius around these critical water springs. As mentioned, the PES
program does not require any additional conservation and/or restoration. Payments
are for up to four springs per landholder and can range from R$74-R$300 per year
per spring. The payments are based on a formula that weights the volume of water
from the spring, its location, and the degree of conservation. It requires a change in
behaviour, unless landholders are already conserving their springs, and potentially
a loss of income depending on their current land use practices.
B.3 Data collection
A baseline survey was carried out in two of the 21 participating municipalities,
Guapiara and Ibiu´na. It covered all potential participants (landholders with springs
in the priority areas) as well as landholders in areas adjacent to the priority areas
who were surveyed as controls for a future end line evaluation of the Mina d’A´gua
program. Data was collected on the landholder’s demographics, socio economic
characteristics, characteristics of each individual plot on their property, cultivation
and pasture practices, costs and revenues of land use, characteristics of the water
springs on their property, willingness to accept compensation for conservation or
restoration, and perceptions on the environment. Figures B.8 - B.10 in the Appendix
to this chapter (page 220) illustrate conditions at the Guapiara study site.
We carry out the revealed preferences analysis of conservation (Models 1 and 2,
described in the next section) using the total pooled survey sample of 350 households.
This comprised of households eligible for the program (211 households) and ineligible
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households (140 households). We then use the sub level data on eligible households
(211 households) to study take up of the program4. In total 107 out of the 211
eligible households enrolled in the program.
The average age of landholders responsible for agricultural activities is 55 years,
and most landholders live on the property. On average, the landholders have two
springs on their property, and over 75 percent of the forest on the property is within
APP boundaries. The landholders generally use the springs for both family and
livestock consumption. Most landholders do not use credit; the majority indicated
that they did not need it, and did not select potential reasons for not using credit
(such as lack of access, lack of a guarantor, fear of debt, bureaucracy, or failed
payments on other loans). Thus we are likely analyzing a sample population that is
either not credit constrained or not undertaking investments.
Balance tests compared landholders who enrolled in the program to those who
chose not to enroll (see Table B.5 in the Appendix to this paper on page 222). The
two groups are generally similar: the average property size is 12 ha, with an average
of two agricultural workers. The proportion of steep land in properties in each group
is high (77 percent). Approximately 80 percent use land primarily for agriculture.
Landholders who did not enroll are currently conserving 71 percent of APP land
and 33 percent of non-APP land, while those who enrolled conserve 77 percent of
APP and 38 percent of non-APP land.
T-tests of means were used to compare landholders from Guapiara and Ibiu´na.
When comparing descriptive statistics disaggregated at the municipal level, we see
significant differences in multiple variables. Therefore, we cluster the standard errors
at the municipal level and use municipality fixed effects in all regressions (see Tables
B.8, B.9, B.10 in the Appendix on page 224).
B.4 Capturing Motivations
The strength of the baseline survey lies in the exhaustive list of questions on per-
ception of the environment and society’s role in protecting the environment. While
we acknowledge that there is a large strand of existing literature on survey meth-
odology to capture proenvironment attitudes (see Clark et al. (2003)), we adopted
our questions from a previous survey developed by the Sa˜o Paulo State Secretariat
of Environment (SMA) to ensure compatibility with SMA’s surveys in other muni-
cipalities. The customised set of questions for participants were context-driven and
thus relate directly to the water quantity and quality supply issues in the region5.
B.4.1 Proenvironment motivation
Proenvironment landholders are those who are intrinsically motivated to protect the
environment. As a partial proxy to capture this motivation, we explored responses
4During the rollout of the project, all farmers within the priority areas with at least one spring
were visited by the municipal implementing agency. Extensive information was provided regarding
eligibility criteria, conditions and general compensation during these visits. Conversion from in-
terested farmers into project participants likely suffers from some degree of non-random attrition
due to misunderstanding of the conditions and benefits. Similar to analysis of potential take-up
between control and treatment areas we analyse the intent-to-treat households (those eligible who
expressed interest).
5Please contact the authors for the full survey.
204
to questions on whether they believed land degrading activities of their neighbor
cause environmental harm (see Table B.2 for a set of preference questions). We
further queried landholders on their perception on the long term supply of water.
We asked if landholders believed there were any benefits to restoration and, if so,
what they were (see Figure B.2). Improvements in the quality and supply of water
were most commonly identified as the largest benefit of restoration. However, strong
heterogeneity of beliefs exists in the sample, as the second most popular response
was “no benefits”.
Figure B.2: Perceived benefits and costs of restoration
B.4.2 Prosocial Motivation
We asked respondents who is responsible for protecting the environment for future
generations. “Everybody” was the most frequent response, which conveys a strong
sense of community-driven protection and social connection as defined in SDT (Fig-
ure B.3). Multiple questions were also asked regarding who is responsible to protect
and pay to protect water resources on private and public land (see Tables B.6 and
B.7 in the Appendix).
Figure B.3: Household perceptions of responsibility to protect the environment for
future generations
B.4.3 Social norm indicators
Social norms differ from prosocial motivations in that the landholder gives weight to
the enrollment decision of their neighbors when making their participation decision.
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This preference may also be viewed as a collective action motivation. In the survey,
landholders were asked whether they would change their decision to enroll in the
program if they discovered their neighbors had enrolled. Most responded “No.” An-
other question asked whether landholders planned to discuss this particular project
with their neighbors after the survey before making their decision. The majority
responded that they would do so, highlighting the importance of peer effects in the
community (see Figure B.4).
Figure B.4: Effects of neighbors
B.4.4 Mechanisms Driving Take Up
In the conceptual framework detailed in Ezzine-de Blas et al. (2015), the authors
use SDT to explain the channels through which changes in motivations are caused
by the introduction of PES. We attribute the four psychological factors outlined in
their paper to the intrinsic motivations of interest in this paper, as shown in Table
B.1.
Table B.1: Effect of PES incentive on landholder’s need satisfaction
Intrinsic Motivation Psychologicalmoderators triggered
Hypothesized channel of how the landholder’s needs
satisfaction are modified by a PES incentive
Prosocial Social connection
If the community values conservation irrespective of
payment, the payments modify the needs satisfaction by
increasing the quality of the landholders’ relations with
others in the community. The incentive may have a
reverse effect, however, if accepting a payment for
conservation is against social norms in the community.
Self-determination
The incentive may support self-determination if
landholders are acting in accordance with their free will
to conserve the environment. The incentive may decrease
self-determination if compensation is viewed as a control
mechanism.
Proenvironment Environmentalconnection
The incentive may reward the desire to interact and
connect with the environment.
Self-determination
The incentive may support self-determination if
landholders are acting in accordance with their free will
to conserve the environment. The incentive may decrease
self-determination if compensation is viewed as a control
mechanism.
Competence
The incentive may enhance competence if the incentive is
interpreted as positive feedback on landholders’ existing
conservation behavior. Alternatively, it may undermine
competence if landholders interpret the incentive as a
tool the government finds necessary to increase its
existing conservation efforts.
Progovernment Self-determination
The incentive may enhance self-determination if land
conservation is in accordance with their free will and
landholders willingly accept compensation from the
government.
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Competence
The incentive may enhance competence if landholders
believe the government is rewarding them for their
ability to achieve positive environmental outcomes
(conservation).
Social norms Social connection
The landholders’ participation decision is dependent on
their valuation of how conservation behavior, and how
accepting a monetary reward in return for positive
conservation outcomes, is judged by their community.
Information Self-determination
The incentive may enhance self-determination through
the channel of self-development by learning the legal
requirements and context. Their participation decision is
based on their own intrinsic valuation of costs and
benefits.
Notes: a. Although not an “intrinsic motivation”, we consider access to full information outside of the
strict rational choice model of decision making.
B.4.5 Constructing indices
As there are less than 350 observations, we reduce the dimensionality of the explan-
atory variables by creating indices that capture the various motivations of interest.
We consider landholders as having intrinsic motivations: prosocial, proenviron-
ment, progovernment, and social norms.6 The focus on these motivations is driven
by the desire to disentangle social preferences and understand the main intrinsic
drivers of PES uptake.
We create composite indices to capture latent preferences. We hypothesise that
sets of variables in the baseline survey capture the different motivations. Each in-
dex was created by first taking all variables from the baseline survey that could
possibly measure the preference and perform factor analysis on them, otherwise
known as latent variable analysis7. Specifically we hypothesise that separate groups
of variables capture: (i) preferences for protecting the environment (protecting the
environment from current land degrading activities, the costs and benefits of restor-
ation, and protecting the environment for future generations); (ii) preferences for
who is responsible to protect and pay to protect water sources on public and private
property; (iii) attitudes towards the government’s role in environmental protection;
and (iv) social norms in the community.
In order to test our hypotheses, we use confirmatory factor analysis as opposed
to exploratory factor analysis, the former of which is used when the researchers
have a pre-defined idea of the structure on a set of variables they want to test. After
taking the groups of variables we assume to capture the latent motivations, we
first perform factor analysis and then rotate the factors using the default varimax
rotation to produce orthogonal factors. Where correlations were high, we used
oblique rotations of the factor dimensions. We follow the Kaiser Rule, whereby we
retain factors with an eigenvalue cut-off of 1. If there are multiple factors with an
eigenvalue higher than 1, then the set of variables are measuring not just one latent
motivation, but multiple dimensions of the latent motivation. Please refer to the
main factor analysis presented in Table B.2. All other factor analyses are included
6These categories are not necessarily mutually exclusive. However, we tested equality con-
straints to determine if the motivations have equal effects on the outcomes of interest. We reject
that the parameters are equal.
7This method analyses observed variation and covariation among observed variables. We used
the unbiased Barlett method rather than the default regression method for the purposes of a
smaller MSE.
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in the Appendix (see tables B.6 and B.7 in the Appendix).
Taking the factors with an eigenvalue greater than 1, we used the variables
which had high factor loadings in the expected direction (see shaded factor loadings
in Table B.2). We then chose to aggregate by summing the variables with high factor
loadings and standardizing the composite variable to mean 0, standard deviation of
1 to create the indices.
In total, three factor analyses were conducted after systematically reviewing
the survey to include all questions that could potentially reflect the motivations of
interest. The main factor analysis used to create the latent motivations used in the
quantitative analysis - shown in Table B.2 - has multiple factors with eigenvalues
higher than 1. Pairwise correlations were all under 20% for the indices created by
the main factor analysis and thus we chose to include each of them in the regressions
as they represent unique latent motivations. However, we observe high correlations
when we compare them against the indices created by the remaining two factor
analyses (see Tables B.6 and B.7 in the Appendix). For example, “prosocial” is
highly correlated (=0.97) with the index created from the second factor analysis
(B.6 in the Appendix). F-tests and likelihood ratio tests conclude us to restrict our
model to include only “prosocial”. When we include the index from the third factor
analysis, f-tests and likelihood ratio tests force us to restrict our model to include
only the “Progovernment” index. Thus we only use the main factor analysis. The
questions used to create the indices are included in Table B.2.
The following non-factored indices were constructed by adding dichotomous vari-
ables (0/1) and then standardizing the index with a mean 0 and standard deviation
of 1:
Social norms The respondent plans to discuss the project with their neighborafter the survey.
The respondent would participate in the program if they found out
their neighbor is participating.
Informed Heard of PES or a similar scheme before.
Heard of the Mina d’A´gua project before.
Fully understands the APP Forest Code.
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Table B.2: Factor Analysis I (rotated factors)
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4
Responses to survey questions Proenv 1 Prosocial Proenv 2 Progovt
Recovering areas around rivers and springs with forest using public resources would:
Improve water quality 0.043 0.023 -0.113 -0.293
Conserve the environment 0.080 -0.023 0.036 -0.028
Improve air quality 0.011 -0.019 0.087 0.991
Improve air quality and conserve environment 0.068 -0.031 0.095 0.760
Improve the environment 0.077 0.002 0.097 0.200
Forest surrounding springs is very important for water quality and quantity 0.005 -0.216 0.078 0.121
Deforestation by your neighbor causes harm 0.053 0.011 0.485 0.042
Damming by your neighbor causes harm 0.081 -0.056 0.825 0.112
Trash disposal by your neighbor causes harm 0.006 -0.137 0.269 -0.052
Use of toxins by your neighbor causes harm 0.064 -0.003 0.327 -0.002
Burning land by your neighbor causes harm -0.006 -0.075 0.261 0.040
All of the above does harm 0.051 -0.016 0.860 0.106
Water supplies (whether considered abundant, sufficient, or insufficient):
Will not diminish -0.997 0.035 -0.044 -0.021
Will diminish 0.997 -0.035 0.044 0.021
Recovering areas around rivers and springs with forest using public resources would
have no negative effects for landowners 0.015 -0.048 0.094 0.124
Understands Brazil’s Forest Code and APPs 0.063 -0.047 0.071 0.077
Landholder is highly educated -0.043 -0.074 0.022 0.036
Responsible for protecting the environment for future generations lies with:
Community, landholders, or everybody 0.061 0.085 -0.024 -0.018
Landholders only -0.048 0.989 -0.024 -0.014
The community only 0.034 0.105 -0.005 -0.021
Community and landholders -0.028 0.947 -0.024 -0.022
Responsible for protecting water sources in public areas: Community 0.008 -0.048 0.093 -0.081
Eigenvalue 2.035 1.985 1.980 1.762
Proportion of Variance 0.161 0.157 0.156 0.139
Notes: Pro Env 1: Concerned about future supply of water; Pro-Social: Concerned for future generations; Pro Env 2: Concerned about negative impacts of land degrading activities;
Pro-Govt: Favors public financed restoration
Shaded cells show within each factor, those with high factor loadings in the same direction, and thus included in an index together.
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We might be interested in how intrinsic motivations are related to observable
characteristics. While observed baseline conservation and proxies for opportunity
costs are crucial for understanding take up, these observables fall short in captur-
ing all of the noise in the underlying drivers of take up. By also measuring intrinsic
motivations, we aim to explain more of the mechanisms in addition to proxies for op-
portunity costs. Thus, we should observe very low correlation between our intrinsic
motivations and the observable characteristics of the landholders, as observed in
Table B.3.
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Table B.3: Correlation between latent motivation and demographic variables
Demographic variable Proenv I: Concerned about
future supply of water
Prosocial: Concerned
for future generations
Proenv II: Concern
about negative
impacts on env
Progov: Public
financed restoration
Social norms (std) Informed on PES
(std)
Household size -0.04 0.01 0.06 -0.11 0 -0.09
Gender of household head (1=male) 0.02 0.1 -0.04 0 -0.1 -0.05
Age of household head -0.07 0.08 -0.06 -0.02 -0.12 0.02
Education level of household head 0.01 -0.06 0.13 0.11 0.05 0
Household income from agriculture 0.03 -0.07 0.03 0.03 0.08 0.09
If household uses credit -0.09 0.01 -0.1 0.07 0.08 0.09
Profit (in logs) -0.05 0.03 0.02 0.02 -0.03 0.03
Last yr income not typical (earned less) 0.02 0.05 -0.11 -0.07 0.05 -0.06
Area of property (in ha) -0.11 -0.01 -0.07 0.06 0.01 0.07
Number of agricultural workers 0 0.04 -0.09 -0.11 -0.05 0.06
Possess legal documents8 0 0.05 -0.11 0.02 -0.01 0.09
Land type: Clay -0.05 0.08 0 0.07 0.02 -0.26
Land type: Sand 0.03 -0.02 0.1 0.01 -0.04 0.07
Land type: Clay-Sand -0.04 0.04 -0.06 -0.08 0.06 0.03
Land type: Terra Roxa -0.04 0.03 -0.11 0.03 -0.08 0.06
Proportion of steep land in total property -0.16 0.04 -0.11 -0.11 -0.02 -0.05
Number of properties eroded -0.02 0.06 -0.06 -0.02 -0.13 -0.06
Land used for agriculture 0.07 0.1 -0.09 0.01 -0.07 0.15
Area of APPs conserved with trees -0.05 0.05 0.03 0.05 -0.11 -0.01
Area of non APPs conserved with trees 0.15 0.03 0.1 -0.06 0.02 -0.07
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To verify the indices are also independent of each other, Table B.4 displays the
correlation matrix of the indices measuring the latent motivations.
Table B.4: Correlation matrix of indices
Proenv I Prosocial Proenv II Progovt Social
norms
(std)
Informed
on PES
(std)
Pro Env I 1
Pro-Social -0.0744 1
Pro Env II 0.1068 -0.0955 1
Pro-Govt 0.1175 -0.0478 0.2034 1
Social norms (std) 0.0926 -0.2174 0.0918 0.0907 1
Informed on PES (std) -0.0561 -0.0258 -0.0564 0.0093 0.0133 1
B.5 Estimation strategy
As described earlier, we use a two-step method for our quantitative analysis. First
we estimate if stated preferences, measured by factor analysis, predict revealed pref-
erences of conservation behaviour on land under legal protection (Model 1) and
conservation behaviour on land not under, or outside, legal protection (Model 2).
Then with validation that the indices predict conservation behaviour, we use the
indices to explain PES program take up when controlling for a set of observable
proxies for opportunity costs (Model 3).
B.5.1 Stated versus Revealed Preferences model
First we test if the stated preferences as captured by the indices predict revealed
preferences as reflected in the level of existing conservation on the property at the
time of the baseline survey. The hypothesis is that those with proenvironment and
prosocial motivations will already be conserving land that is not under legal pro-
tection, controlling for observable proxies for opportunity costs as explained below.
Conservation is specified as the amount of forest cover both within APPs, and as a
separate outcome variable, on the remainder of the landholder’s property outside of
APPs (Table B.8 and B.9 in Appendix).
The starting point is strict homo economicus landholders. In line with the ex-
pectations of rational choice models of behaviour, these landholders conserve only
if the net benefit of doing so is positive, taking into account the opportunity cost of
foregone revenue from alternative uses of the land.
Proxies for opportunity cost controls are captured by the SocioEconomics′i and
LandCharacteristics′i vectors. We define these as observable opportunity costs be-
cause from a landholder’s point of view, the quality of their land, inputs and income
determine their willingness to accept the incentive for the program.9 Conservation
beyond the expected level of a strict homo economicus landholder suggests the in-
dividual may hold attitudes that lead him or her to conserve some portion of land
8Holds a certificate of registration and/or ownership document
9Income may correlate with unobserved factors, such risk and time preference as well as intellec-
tual ability and competence. If this were the case, then the variable income would capture the joint
effect of opportunity cost and these unobserved factors on conservation and program participation
decisions.
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irrespective of costs and benefits. The remaining vectors capture these attitudes.
PercentAPPConservedi,t=0 = α + β1.SocioEconomics′i
+ β2.LandCharacteristics′i + β3.P roEnv′i
+ β4.P roSocial′i + β5.P roGovt′i
+ β6.SocialNorms′i + β7.Informed′i + εi
(1)
and;
PercentNonAPPConservedi,t=0 = α + β1.SocioEconomics′i
+ β2.LandCharacteristics′i
+ β3.P roEnv′i + β4.P roSocial′i
+ β5.P roGovt′i + β6.SocialNorms′i
+ β7.Informed′i + εi
(2)
Where i is household at time=0 (baseline survey). As the outcome variable in
both equations is a proportion, we used a generalised linear model (GLM) with a
logit link and the binomial family. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality
level, as t-tests indicate significant differences in means (see Appendix). Standard
errors are bootstrapped with 1000 replications.
SocioEconomics′i is a vector of covariates conventionally used in PES take up
analysis and include education, age, and gender of the head landholder, total income
and (log) profits from agriculture10, credit access and use, and if last year was typical
(and if not, if the landholder earned less or more income). These variables are
critical for assessing opportunity cost; if the landholder has significant profits from
agriculture, they may be less likely to enroll in a PES program unless the payments
for the program are higher than their profits from land use. Information on credit
access and use are helpful to understand if people have the ability or willingness to
take investments on their land. Alternatively, if they are credit constrained they
may need a conditional cash transfer program to overcome investments needed for
conservation/restoration.
LandCharacteristics′i is a vector of covariates including the size of property
in hectares, number of people working on the land, possession of required legal
documents for ownership or renting of the property, soil characteristics (sand, clay,
mix, red soil), steepness of land (proportion of property with steep parcels), evidence
of erosion on property, number of springs on property, and if the property is used for
agriculture. Included are also variables regarding the landholder’s plans to deforest
their land or the trees around the spring. Although it is an empirical question, if the
landholder has more land, and more workers on the land, we may expect them to be
more willing diversify land use and to enroll part of their property in a PES program
compared to a smaller landholder who may not have the ability to diversify their
land use. As this depends on the motivations of the landholder, we will observe the
effects when including motivations as independent variables (see below). Those with
property rights that are well defined may be more likely to invest and take care of
their land. If the land suffers from high erosion, the landholder may be more willing
10Parameter tests and likelihood ratio tests lead us to restrict our model to two proxies for
income (income shock last year and credit use).
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to participate in a restoration program. Furthermore, flatter land is expected to be
more productive so conserving it would entail higher opportunity costs.
ProEnvironment′i, ProSocial′i, ProGovt′i, and SocialNorms′i and Informed′i
are as defined in the previous section.
B.5.2 Participation model
We estimate landholder-level probit regressions (Table B.10 in Appendix) where the
dependent variable Yi is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if landholder i enrolled
in the PES program, and 0 if not. Municipality fixed effects are included. Marginal
effects are computed for continuous and dichotomous explanatory variables.
Participatei = α + β1.SocioEconomics′i
+ β2.LandCharacteristics′i + β3.P roEnv′i
+ β4.P roSocial′i + β5.P roGovt′i
+ β6.SocialNorms′i + β7.Informed′i + εi
(3)
Vectors SocioEconomici, LandCharacteristicsi,ProEnvironmenti, ProSociali,
ProGovti, and SocialNormsi and Informedi remain.
B.6 Results
B.6.1 Stated versus Revealed Preferences (Models 1 and 2)
Opportunity costs
Observable opportunity costs are predictive of conservation behaviour on land under
legal protection (within APPs). As the total area of property in hectares increases,
conservation of APPs increases by 2 percent (Table B.8). Landholders have more
land to divert their land use activities outside of the APPs. Further, as the total
number of properties eroded increases by one, conservation of APPs increases by 27
percent.
As we might expect, opportunity costs are more strongly predictive of conser-
vation behaviour on land outside of legal protection. If the land is mostly used for
agriculture, conservation outside APPs decreases by 68 percent (Table B.9). As the
number of agricultural workers on the property increase by one, conservation of land
outside of APPs decreases by 10 percent. We see strong negative associations when
analyzing income dynamics: conservation outside APPs decreases by 25-27 percent
if the landholder experienced an income shock in the year prior and earned less in-
come than usual. However, forest cover changes slowly. One would not expect forest
cover to respond to short-term fluctuations, so the size of this impact in correlations
is surprising.
Motivations
In pairwise correlations, the percent of APP conserved is not highly correlated with
the percent of non-APP area conserved (12 percent). Thus we may assume different
motivations are at play for choosing to conserve land under legal protection versus
land outside of legal protection.
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Prosocial landholders - those who are concerned about protecting the environ-
ment for future generations - are more likely to conserve land both within and outside
legal protection. In both regressions, when controlling for proxies for opportunity
costs as defined by socioeconomic and land use vectors, the coefficient is positive
and statistically significant: a one standard deviation increase in the index results
in a 7 percent increase in conservation within APPs, and a 10 percent increase in
conservation outside APPs. Therefore these findings are in line with the hypothesis
that prosocial motivations drive conservation both inside and outside APPs.
Proenvironment landholders - those who are concerned about the future supply
of water and those concerned about the negative impact of land degrading activities
on the environment - are more likely to conserve land outside APPs (Table B.9).
Controlling for opportunity costs, if the landholder believes the future supply of
water will diminish, conservation of land outside of APPs increases by 80%. A
one unit standard deviation increase in the concern of negative land use activities
results in a 7 percent increase in conservation outside APPs. This is in line with
the hypothesis that those who are concerned for the environment would conserve
irrespective of the zoning laws as they value the existence of the environment. The
results are robust under different specifications.
These findings are in line with the hypotheses that proenvironment and prosocial
motivations drive conservation both within and outside APPs. The results also
confirm the hypothesis that stated preferences of conservation are strong predictors
of revealed preferences in our survey. This result provides a robustness check for
using the factored indices to proxy latent motivations as independent variables in
the take up analysis.
However, if the landholder believes that restoration of border areas of rivers
and springs through public resources would significantly improve air quality and
the environment, conservation of land outside APPs decreases by 12%. Recall that
this motivation was perfectly correlated with attitudes towards government’s role
in protecting natural resources from Factor Analysis 3: (see table B.7) those who
acknowledge benefits of restoration yet believe it’s the government’s responsibility to
protect and pay to protect natural resources on public property are not incentivised
to conserve in absence of financial support.
B.6.2 Take Up of PES Program (Model 3)
Opportunity costs
Opportunity costs are strong predictors of PES enrollment. When participation
is regressed only on observable opportunity costs, we see that as household size
increases by one member, landholders are 2 percent less likely to participate (Table
B.10). Landholders who suffered an income shock and earned less income than usual
in the previous year are 10 percent less likely to participate. As the proportion of
very steep property increases, the landholder is 15 percent more likely to enroll in the
program. Furthermore, landholders who have all required legal documents for their
property are 35 percent more likely to enroll in the program. The proxy variables for
opportunity cost remain significant and at similar, if not slightly smaller, magnitudes
in the fully specified model.
We asked if additional incentives, such as access to technical assistance, would
change their participation decision. Free mapping of the property, fencing, seeds/
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seedlings and specialised technical assistance were provided as options. An over-
whelming 92 percent of landholders replied that access to assistance in any form
would not change their participation decision.
Motivations
Those with prosocial motivations are less likely to enroll in the PES program. A
one-unit standard deviation increase in prosocial motivation leads to a 5 percent
decrease in probability of participating in the program in the fully interacted model.
The finding that prosocial motivated landholders are more likely to be conserving
land both within and outside APPs before the program is introduced, yet are less
likely to then enroll in the program, demonstrates a potential crowding out effect
of a government incentives program on prosocial motivated landholders. However,
we can only evaluate if crowding out of conservation behaviour occurred once the
program has finished.
Those concerned about social norms also are less likely to enroll in the PES pro-
gram. A one-unit increase in standard deviation in Social norms also has a negative
effect on participation; the landholder is 7.8 percent less likely to participate. And if
the social norm motivated landholder received a high offer, they are 22 percent less
likely to enroll. Recall the social norms indicator is comprised of responses to two
questions: if the landholder plans to discuss the project with their neighbor after
the survey, and if the landholder would change their decision based on the decision
of their neighbor. Our original hypothesis holds that the landholder’s participation
decision is dependent on their valuation of how conservation behaviour, and how ac-
cepting a monetary reward in return for positive conservation outcomes, is judged by
their community. The social connection moderator is triggered as approaching each
landholder individually undermines the social connections within the community.
Proenvironment motivated landholders - on the other hand - are 3 percent more
likely to enroll in the program. The incentives program may be activating all psy-
chological moderators under SDT theory: the incentive may be supporting their
self-determination and competence if landholders are acting in accordance with their
free will to conserve (as shown in the baseline conservation regressions) and value
the compensation as positive feedback on their existing conservation behaviour. It
also may support their environmental connection if it further supports their desire
to feel connected to nature.
Most importantly, access to information is the strongest predictor of take up.
Landholders who had heard of PES in general and/or of the specific MdA program,
and who fully understand the Forest Code are 13.2 percent more likely to participate
in the program.
B.6.3 Qualitative Follow-up Survey
A qualitative survey was administered to those eligible for the program to under-
stand why they accepted or rejected the incentive to enroll in the conservation pro-
gram. Please note that we do not include these questions in our quantitative analysis
as they were administered to the relative subsamples (enrolled versus non enrolled)
and thus the quantitative analysis would suffer from selection bias. Furthermore due
to the small sample, we would not have enough power to quantitatively estimate the
patterns in responses. Instead we highlight the results from the qualitative survey
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below, which serve as further support of our hypothesised channels through which
an incentive supports or undermines motivation and motivations for enrollment.
When asked specifically why the household chose to participate in the program
the most common response was “the payment is little but it is an incentive to comply
with the law” (Figure B.5). This confirms our quantitative finding that those with
access to information are 15 percent more likely to enroll in the program. In line with
SDT, the payments may enhance self-determination for those well informed through
the channel of self-development by learning the legal requirements and context.
Figure B.5: Motives for enrolling in the PES restoration program
According to our qualitative findings, just over one-quarter of those who accepted
the offer were planning to restore regardless of the program. As mentioned earlier,
many hypothesise that low rates of reduced deforestation in PES schemes are due
to low additionality whereby those already conserving self select into the program.
Here we qualitatively observe a possible additionality issue.
Among the 27 percent of households who indicated that they would restore
anyway, the most common reason for doing so was to conserve water they consume
(Figure B.6). Here we observe validation from our quantitative findings that those
who are proenvironment are more likely to conserve land before the introduction of
the program, and are more likely to also enroll in the PES program.
Figure B.6: Motives for intending to restore anyway
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Questions were also asked to those who chose not to enroll. The most common
response was “the incentive was low” for the conservation program and “recovering
a hectare compromises a very productive area” (Figure B.7).
Figure B.7: Motives for not enrolling in the PES program
Thus for both the conservation and restoration program, opportunity costs are
a crucial hurdle to increase enrollment. Respondents also mentioned that they did
not want someone to control their behaviour on their own property. This response
suggests an undermining of self determination by the principal. According to SDT
theory, the incentive may feel imposed on the individual and result in a crowding
out of their motivation.
B.7 Conclusion
Standard take up analyses of PES programs study the impact of observable op-
portunity costs on enrollment. We extend this work by further incorporating be-
havioural determinants (intrinsic motivations) in the enrollment decision. We first
disentangle and measure intrinsic motivations, specifically proenvironment, proso-
cial, progovernment, and social norms. Controlling for proxies for opportunity costs,
we then analyse behavioural determinants of take up for the PES program. We dis-
cuss the findings in light of SDT, which hypothesises mechanisms through which
payments may alter the landholder’s self-satisfaction need to feel competent, self-
determined, and connected to others and their environment (“social relatedness” and
“environmental relatedness”). The specific design of payments affects these need sat-
isfaction moderators in different ways. The psychological moderators, individually
or in combination, drive the crowding in or crowding out effect of a PES incentive
on take up.
To first measure latent motivations, we use factor analysis on responses to an
exhaustive and multi dimensional questionnaire in the baseline survey for a PES
program in the state of Sa˜o Paulo, Brazil. We then determine if stated conservation
preferences predict revealed conservation preferences, as determined by existing level
of forest cover on their property before the program is introduced.
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The program conditions require conservation only of land already under legal
protection by the Brazil Forest Code. We find that prosocial landholders are more
likely to be conserving land both within and outside areas of legal protection (APPs)
before the program is introduced. These findings are in line with the hypothesis that
prosocial motivations drive conservation both within and outside APPs. Proenvir-
onment motivations drive conservation on land outside APPs. The results also
confirm the hypothesis that stated preferences of conservation are strong predictors
of revealed preferences in our survey. This result provides a robustness check for
using the factored indices to proxy latent motivations as independent variables in
the take up analysis.
We use the indices to then study determinants of take up to analyse which types
of individuals are more likely to enroll in the PES program when controlling for
proxies for opportunity costs. Landholders with a low opportunity cost of conser-
vation are already conserving and, in turn, are more likely to enroll in a program
which compensates them for their existing behaviour. Thus we would then expect
that those with high opportunity costs would not enroll in the program. This finding
is supported by the qualitative follow-up survey: the main reason provided to not
enroll in the restoration program was because it compromises a productive area of
land.
When analyzing behavioural determinants of take up, we observe proenviron-
ment landholders are more likely to enroll in the PES program. The payments
may support the landholder’s need to feel connected to their environment, and the
incentive works to crowd in their motivation. This finding is reinforced by the qual-
itative follow up survey: the main reason landholders enrolled was to protect water
resources. The crux of SDT theory is that self-determination support is necessary to
maintain intrinsic motivation. Payments may be seen as a type of positive feedback
on a person’s performance (competence), which can increase intrinsic motivation
(Deci, 1971). It is worth noting these landholders are closest to the margin of ad-
opting - as they were already conserving land outside of legal protection but not
yet conserving land under legal protection - and a small incentive crowds in their
intrinsic motivation.
While we found that prosocial landholders, like proenvironment landholders, are
more likely to be conserving land regardless of the legal requirements before the
program is introduced, these landholders are less likely to enroll in the program.
Drawing upon SDT theory, the incentive may undermine their free will and de-
sire to feel connected to their community through their prosocial behaviour. Under
this model, such landholders may even reduce their conservation. Further research
should explore the dynamic effects of whether the introduction of a monetary in-
centive program for conservation results in a crowding out of observed conservation
behaviour in the long run.
Landholders with social norms motivations are also less likely to enroll in the
program. As the program was introduced to each landholder individually, this may
have undermined the social connection moderator of the landholder’s needs satis-
faction.
Importantly, one of the largest drivers of enrollment is having information on
the Forest Code, the concept of PES, and information on this specific PES program
before the survey was administered. This is a key finding for program administrators.
Education campaigns that provide this information are likely to increase enrollment.
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While individual motivations must be taken into account to assure that PES is
cost- effective and results in high additionality, we find the opportunity cost of land
is still the most critical hurdle to change land use. If program administrators are
concerned that those already engaging in conservation practices self-select into the
program, then it is advisable to direct the monetary incentive offer to landholders
not conserving because of high opportunity costs to motivate a change in existing
behaviour and ensure additional conservation. The survey responses suggest that
other incentives such as technical assistance of any kind would not change their
participation decision, nor would additional financing. Further research is needed
to understand the most effective combination of incentives to promote conservation
for those with high opportunity costs of land use.
Our paper sheds light on the importance of using preference questions in a
baseline survey to analyse pre existing motivations before the introduction of a
payments program for conservation. These questions can be utilised to gain a more
comprehensive understanding of the reasons landholders chose whether to enroll in
the program. Understanding how pre existing motivations interact with the de-
cision to participate in a PES program can bring important insight to contract
design under asymmetric information. If program administrators want to achieve
high additional conservation, they could use this information to more efficiently tar-
get programs to those who are not yet conserving their land according to program
conditions. Further, by repeating studies to have a firmer understanding of the ef-
fect of a monetary offer on various intrinsic motivations, program administrators can
use the analysis to direct payments to those close to the margin of conserving but
need a incentive to comply with the program conditions (like the proenvironment
landholders in our sample). They should not offer a monetary incentive to those
whose pre existing intrinsic motivations are undermined by the extrinsic incentive
(like the prosocial landholders in our sample). To the extent that people do have
pre-exiting motivations to conserve, implementation of a PES program might crowd
out their conservation behaviour in the long run, whereas if no such motivations
existed previously, or the motivations have no effect on participation, then crowding
out is unlikely to be an issue. However, further research is needed to understand the
long run effect of the introduction and implementation of PES in the community on
conservation behaviour for both those who did and did not enroll in the program.
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B.8 Graphics and Tables
A Images
Photos: Stefano Pagiola
Figure B.8: Examples of well-conserved springs in Guapiara municipality, with ex-
tensive vegetation cover around the spring (the legal requirement is for vegetation
in a 50m radius around the spring to be conserved).
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Photo: Stefano Pagiola
Figure B.9: Example of poorly conserved spring in Guapiara municipality, with min-
imal vegetation cover around the spring and steep cultivated slopes in the recharge
area above.
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Photos: Stefano Pagiola
Figure B.10: Examples of farming landscapes in Guapiara municipality, with cul-
tivated areas and pastures, often on steep slopes, as well as forest remnants and
eucalyptus plantations.
B Descriptives and Regressions
Descriptives
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Table B.5: Mean characteristics of landholders in the study areas
Total Enrolled Non-enrolled Ibiu´na Guapiara
Household size 3.92 3.48 3.73 4.05 3.76
(2.68) (1.7) (2.35) (2.22) (3.13)
Gender of household head
(1=male) 0.85 0.86 0.81 0.88 0.83
(0.35) (0.35) (0.4) (0.33) (0.38)
Age of household head 55.37 55.45 54.34 54.05* 56.9
(13.89) (13.8) (13.27) (14.63) (12.85)
Education level of household head 2.47 2.6 2.41 2.81*** 2.07
(1.16) (1.19) (1.15) (1.25) (0.9)
Household income from
agriculture 1.35 1.19 1.54 1.28 1.44
(1.64) (1.44) (1.82) (1.71) (1.56)
If household uses credit 0.15 0.12 0.17 0.11** 0.19
(0.35) (0.33) (0.38) (0.31) (0.39)
Profit (in logs) 12.13 12.13 12.13 12.12 12.14
(0.14) (0.1) (0.13) (0.18) (0.08)
Last year’s income lower than
usual 0.29 0.21** 0.34 0.16*** 0.44
(0.45) (0.41) (0.47) (0.37) (0.5)
Area of property (in ha) 12.24 13.01 11.04 12.31 12.15
(13.07) (14.3) (13.07) (13.06) (13.13)
Number of ag workers 1.97 1.68 1.91 1.52*** 2.49
(2.17) (1.45) (1.82) (1.94) (2.31)
Possess legal documents 0.88 0.95*** 0.83 0.85 0.91
(0.33) (0.21) (0.38) (0.36) (0.29)
Land type: Clay 0.26 0.17 0.17 0.32*** 0.19
(0.44) (0.38) (0.37) (0.47) (0.39)
Land type: Sand 0.26 0.32 0.27 0.34*** 0.17
(0.44) (0.47) (0.45) (0.47) (0.37)
Land type: Clay-Sand 0.23 0.25 0.2 0.26 0.19
(0.42) (0.44) (0.4) (0.44) (0.39)
Land type: Terra Roxa 0.44 0.37** 0.54 0.26*** 0.64
(0.5) (0.49) (0.5) (0.44) (0.48)
Proportion of property with steep
land 0.76 0.77 0.72 0.77 0.74
(0.28) (0.28) (0.29) (0.26) (0.3)
Number of ha eroded 0.15 0.11 0.15 0.06*** 0.25
(0.49) (0.37) (0.44) (0.27) (0.65)
Uses land for agriculture 0.8 0.79 0.84 0.7*** 0.93
(0.4) (0.41) (0.37) (0.46) (0.26)
Plans to deforest spring 0.04 0.08* 0.02 0.03 0.06
(0.2) (0.27) (0.14) (0.18) (0.23)
Conserve land in APPs 0.75 0.77 0.71 0.76 0.74
(0.33) (0.33) (0.37) (0.33) (0.33)
Conserve land in Non APPs 0.37 0.38 0.33 0.42*** 0.31
(0.33) (0.32) (0.33) (0.32) (0.32)
Interested to Participate 1.68 1.59 1.67 1.58** 1.8
(0.86) (0.81) (0.88) (0.81) (0.91)
Notes: Standard errors shown in parentheses; * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01
T-tests of means: EOI vs. Non-EOI; Guapiara vs. Ibiuna
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Table B.6: Factor Analysis II: Community and landholders’ responsibility to protect
and pay (rotated factors)
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 Factor 6 Factor 7
Responsible for protecting public resources:
Community or All -0.08 0.11 -0.01 0.66 -0.03 -0.02 0.17
Community only -0.04 -0.06 -0.03 0.66 0.11 0.03 -0.05
End users 0.1 -0.03 -0.02 -0.06 -0.01 0 0.04
Responsible for paying to protect public resources:
Community or All -0.07 0.13 0.01 0.13 0.22 0.13 0.57
Community only 0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.17 0.53 -0.04 0.28
End users 0.04 0.1 -0.02 0.02 -0.02 -0.04 -0.1
Responsible for protecting private resources:
Landowners -0.02 -0.71 0.02 0.01 -0.17 -0.06 -0.03
Community or All 0.03 0.78 -0.01 0.04 -0.09 0.04 0.04
End users -0.01 0.1 0 -0.06 0.46 -0.02 0.05
Community only -0.02 0.36 0 -0.03 -0.03 -0.08 -0.07
Responsible for paying to protect private resources:
Landowners 0.12 -0.1 0.06 -0.05 -0.01 -0.14 0.1
Community or All -0.06 0.24 -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 0.55 0.14
End users -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.05 -0.08 -0.04 0.23
Community only -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 0.08 -0.01 0.48 0
Responsible for protecting the environment for future generations:
Community, All or
Landowners 0.08 0.05 0.03 0 0.06 -0.05 0.01
Landowners only 0.99 0.01 -0.13 -0.02 0 -0.01 -0.01
Community only 0.1 -0.01 0.99 -0.01 0 0 0
Community or
Landowners 0.95 0.01 0.32 -0.02 0 -0.01 -0.01
Eigenvalue 1.94 1.37 1.12 0.94 0.61 0.59 0.54
Proportion of
Variance 0.31 0.22 0.18 0.15 0.1 0.09 0.09
Notes: Within each factor, those with high factor loadings in the same direction are included in an index
together.
Table B.7: Factor Analysis III: Government’s responsibility to protect and pay
(rotated factors)
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3
Progovernment: Responses to survey questions Progovt - -
Responsible for protecting water resources on public
land: Government only: Government only 0.039 0.364 -0.008
Responsible for paying to protect water resources on
public land: Government only 0.376 0.662 0
Responsible for protecting water resources on private
land: Government only 0.019 -0.017 0.039
Responsible for paying to protect water resources on
private land: Government only 0.882 -0.016 -0.003
Responsible for protecting water resources on private and
public land: Government only 0.883 0.335 0.003
Eigenvalue 1.701 0.684 0.002
Proportion of Variance 0.776 0.312 0.001
Notes: Shaded cells show within each factor, those with high factor loadings in the same direction, and thus
included in an index together.
Regressions
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Table B.8: Stated versus revealed conservation in APPs (Model 1)
I II III
Means Conventional Indices
Household size 3.928 -0.022 -0.03
(0.145) (0.173) (0.174)
Education level of household head 2.474 -0.064* -0.067**
(0.063) (0.033) (0.034)
If household uses credit 0.145 -0.404 -0.483
(0.019) (0.324) (0.377)
Last yr income not typical (earned less) 0.295 0.039 0.092
(0.025) (0.439) (0.503)
Area of property (in ha) 12.296 0.022*** 0.021***
(0.706) (0.002) (0.002)
Number of ag workers 1.977 -0.007 0.012
(0.117) (0.159) (0.161)
Possess legal documents 0.879 -0.163 -0.16
(0.018) (0.137) (0.215)
Land type: Sand 0.266 0.331* 0.289*
(0.024) (0.197) (0.161)
Land type: Clay 0.257 0.068 0.085
(0.024) (0.195) (0.216)
Land type: Sand-clay 0.228 0.36 0.345
(0.023) (0.233) (0.256)
Land type: Terra Roxa 0.434 0.051 0.032
(0.027) (0.033) (0.137)
Proportion of total steepness over total property 0.756 0.576 0.535
(0.015) (0.422) (0.483)
Number of properties eroded 0.145 0.274*** 0.260***
(0.026) (0.054) (0.058)
Land used for agriculture 0.806 -0.306 -0.266
(0.021) (0.646) (0.791)
Area of non-APP conserved with trees 0.373 0.529 0.635
(0.018) (0.6) (0.647)
Concerned about future supply of water 0.234 -0.248
(0.023) (0.154)
Concerned about protecting environment for future
generations 0.004 0.074***
(0.054) (0.013)
Concerned about behavioral impacts on environment 0.005 0.065
(0.054) (0.055)
Pro public-financed restoration 0.002 0.129
(0.054) (0.136)
Constant 0.703 0.759
(0.668) (0.558)
Observations 346 341 337
Squared correlation between observed and predicted 0.07 0.08
Notes: Standard errors shown in parentheses; *p <0.10, **p <0.05, ***p <0.01
Table B.9: Stated versus revealed conservation in non APPs (Model 2)
I II III
Means Conventional Indices
Household size 3.928 0.080*** 0.079***
(0.145) (0.015) (0.012)
Education level of household head 2.474 -0.073 -0.083
(0.063) (0.065) (0.075)
If household uses credit 0.145 -0.163 -0.028
(0.019) (0.368) (0.273)
Last yr income not typical (earned less) 0.295 -0.254*** -0.309***
(0.025) (0.064) (0.018)
Area of property (in ha) 12.296 0 0.003
(0.706) (0.009) (0.009)
Number of ag workers 1.977 -0.092** -0.101***
(0.117) (0.046) (0.033)
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Possess legal documents 0.879 -0.025 -0.027
(0.018) (0.066) (0.031)
Land type: Sand 0.266 -0.197** -0.162***
(0.024) (0.083) (0.05)
Land type: Clay 0.257 -0.057 -0.118***
(0.024) (0.073) (0.025)
Land type: Sand-clay 0.228 -0.032 -0.025
(0.023) (0.134) (0.113)
Land type: Terra Roxa 0.434 -0.22 -0.163
(0.027) (0.194) (0.186)
Proportion of total steepness over total property 0.756 0.213 0.367
(0.015) (0.219) (0.26)
Number of properties eroded 0.145 -0.444* -0.573***
(0.026) (0.269) (0.213)
Land used for agriculture 0.806 -0.680** -0.788***
(0.021) (0.266) (0.221)
Area of APPs conserved with trees 0.75 0.409 0.451
(0.331) (0.505) (0.522)
Concerned about future supply of water 0.234 0.729***
(0.023) (0.088)
Concerned about protecting env for future generations 0.004 0.096**
(0.054) (0.041)
Concerned about behavioral impacts on env 0.005 0.067***
(0.054) (0.018)
Pro Public financed restoration 0.002 -0.122***
(0.054) (0.033)
Constant -0.055 -0.303
(0.325 (0.343)
Observations 346 341 337
Squared correlation between observed and predicted 0.14 0.20
Notes: Standard errors shown in parentheses; *p <0.10, **p <0.05, ***p <0.01
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Table B.10: Program take up (Model 3)
I II III IV
Enrolled in MdA Means Conventional Indices Interaction
effects
Ibiu´na 0.538 0.02 0.078*** 0.059***
(0.027) (0.031) (0.015) (0.01)
Household size 3.928 -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.016***
(0.145) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005)
Education level of household head 2.474 0.006 -0.001 0.041***
(0.063) (0.032) (0.006) (0.007)
If household uses credit 0.145 -0.067 -0.093** -0.094
(0.019) (0.047) (0.047) (0.061)
Last yr income not typical (earned less) 0.295 -0.099*** -0.048 -0.023
(0.025) (0.019) (0.033) (0.044)
Area of property (in ha) 12.296 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.706) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Number of ag workers 1.977 0.006 -0.002 -0.005
(0.117) (0.019) (0.012) (0.007)
Possess legal documents 0.879 0.345** 0.317*** 0.270***
(0.018) (0.146) (0.056) (0.025)
Land type: Sand 0.266 -0.162*** -0.096*** -0.071*
(0.024) (0.04) (0.037) (0.037)
Land type: Clay 0.257 -0.116 -0.084 -0.084
(0.024) (0.216) (0.2) (0.187)
Land type: Sand-clay 0.228 -0.067*** -0.022 -0.040*
(0.023) (0.019) (0.053) (0.022)
Land type: Terra Roxa 0.434 -0.25 -0.189 -0.196*
(0.027) (0.154) (0.13) (0.112)
Proportion of total steepness over total property 0.756 0.152** 0.127*** 0.133***
(0.015) (0.063) (0.013) (0.013)
Number of properties eroded 0.145 -0.047 -0.041 -0.012
(0.026) (0.12) (0.044) (0.059)
Land used for agriculture 0.806 0.032 -0.001 0.044
(0.021) (0.046) (0.119) (0.122)
Area of APPs conserved with trees 0.374 0.082 0.044 0.046
(0.328) (0.148) (0.167) (0.151)
Concerned about future supply of water -0.033 -0.039
(0.123) (0.144)
Concerned about protecting env for future generations -0.021 -0.048**
(0.013) (0.022)
Concerned about behavioral impacts on env 0.044*** 0.042*
(0.009) (0.025)
Pro public financed restoration -0.022 0.008
(0.052) (0.043)
Social norms -0.059** -0.033***
(0.029) (0.001)
Access to info 0.129*** 0.145***
(0.003) (0.004)
High offer 0.483 0.074 0.084
(0.027) (0.094) (0.087)
Concerned about future supply of water * high offer 0.103
(0.088)
Concerned about protecting env for future generations *
high offer 0.187
(0.116)
Concerned about behavioral impacts on env * high offer 0.021
(0.214)
Pro public financed restoration * high offer -0.157
(0.12)
Social norms * high offer -0.224***
(0.002)
Access to info * high offer -0.086
(0.112)
Observations 346 204 201 201
Squared correlation between observed and predicted 0.11 0.19 0.23
Notes: Standard errors shown in parentheses; *p <0.10, **p <0.05, ***p <0.01
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Appendix C
Appendix to Chapter 3
C.1 Empirical Appendix
A To the baseline findings
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Figure C.1: Areas covered by conservation zones and deforestation rates
Notes: Conservation zones (left panels), deforestation rates (right panel). The four upper panels
are for zones established 2004-2010, the two lower panels are for zones established 1959-2012.
Figure 3.1 in the main text presents the two upper panels for zones established 2004-2010. Note
that the outside area differs, as we we use outside cells based on the shortest distance to a zone.
For the 1959-2012 zones, all cells are included. Source: authors own calculations based on data
from INPE.
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Figure C.2: SP vs. SU zones
Left panel SP-zones, right panel SU-zones, otherwise as figure 3.2.
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Figure C.3: Zone locations 2005 (upper) and 2008 (lower)
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Figure C.4: Priority and non-priority municipalities
Left panel SP-zones, right panel SU-zones, priority municipalities in red; otherwise as figure 3.2.
Table C.2: Soil quality
(1) (2) (3)
All SP SU
D=1 ever in CZ -0.0009∗ -0.0024∗∗∗ -0.0005
(0.0005) (0.0008) (0.0006)
D=1 ever in CZ x Post 0.0007 0.0009 0.0006
(0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0007)
D=1 ever in CZ x Post x msoil -0.0000 -0.0004∗∗ 0.0002
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002)
D=1 ever in CZ x msoil 0.0001 0.0005∗∗∗ -0.0002
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001)
Post x msoil -0.0002 0.0030 -0.0015
(0.0007) (0.0019) (0.0012)
Observations 1 033 058 282 701 747 769
R-sq 0.037 0.014 0.043
Clusters 877 207 680
Meters from CZ incl. 10 000 10 000 10 000
Notes: As table 3.1, except soil quality. The soil quality is the mean across all cells per municipality
and is measured as an deviation from the average of all cells, i.e. the coefficient on the non-interacted
variables shown the effect at the general mean of soil quality. The soil quality variable drops out
because of municipality-year fixed effects.
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Table C.1: Difference-in-Difference estimates of the effect of zoning presenting con-
trols
(1) (2) (3)
All SP SU
D=1 ever in CZ -0.0010∗ -0.0025∗∗∗ -0.0004
(0.0005) (0.0009) (0.0006)
D=1 ever in CZ x Post 0.0007 0.0010 0.0005
(0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0007)
Post -0.0014 0.0002 -0.0011
(0.0009) (0.0012) (0.0012)
ln Dist city -0.0007∗∗∗ -0.0002 -0.0008∗∗∗
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003)
Non-forest -0.0022∗∗∗ -0.0022∗∗∗ -0.0027∗∗∗
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0008)
RF (-1) 0.0003 -0.0020∗∗∗ 0.0014
(0.0009) (0.0005) (0.0012)
Constant 0.0100∗∗∗ 0.0061∗∗ 0.0103∗∗∗
(0.0023) (0.0027) (0.0030)
Observations 1 033 058 282 701 747769
Obs. t<0 389 827 104 929 283497
Obs. t=0 . . .
Obs. t>0 643 231 177 772 464 272
Obs. Evertreated t<0 263 007 69 424 189 413
Obs. Evertreated t>0 432 465 11 9734 307 507
R-sq 0.037 0.013 0.043
Clusters 877 207 680
Meters from CZ incl. 10 000 10 000 10 000
Notes: Identical to table 3.1, but presenting controls.
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B Robustness checks
Table C.3: Different controls: All zones
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
All All All All All All All All
D=1 ever in CZ -0.0015∗∗∗ -0.0015∗∗∗ -0.0015∗∗∗ -0.0015∗∗∗ -0.0010∗ -0.0010∗ 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (.) (.)
D=1 ever in CZ x Post 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008 0.0007 0.0008 0.0007 0.0008 -0.0009∗∗
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0004)
Post -0.0014 -0.0014 -0.0014 -0.0014 -0.0014 -0.0014 -0.1844 -0.0564
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (8.9801) (11.9990)
ln Dist city -0.0006∗∗∗ -0.0007∗∗∗
(0.0002) (0.0002)
Non-forest -0.0023∗∗∗ -0.0022∗∗∗
(0.0006) (0.0006)
RF (-1) 0.0013∗ 0.0003 0.2232∗∗∗
(0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0340)
Dist CZ -0.0000∗∗ -0.0000∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0000)
Dist CZ sq -0.0000∗ -0.0000∗
(0.0000) (0.0000)
D=1 ever in CZ x Dist CZ 0.0000∗ 0.0000∗
(0.0000) (0.0000)
D=1 ever in CZ x Dist CZ sq 0.0000∗ 0.0000∗
(0.0000) (0.0000)
Constant 0.0028∗∗∗ 0.0100∗∗∗ 0.0030∗∗∗ 0.0018∗∗ 0.0023∗∗∗ 0.0100∗∗∗
(0.0007) (0.0024) (0.0007) (0.0009) (0.0007) (0.0023)
Observations 1 033 058 1 033 058 1 033 058 1 033 058 1 033 058 1 033 058 1 033 058 1 033 058
R-sq 0.037 0.037 0.037 0.037 0.037 0.037 0.147 0.280
Notes: As table 3.1, different columns vary by the included controls. Column 7 and 8 include cell fixed effect, in addition to the municipality year fixed effects included in
all columns.
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Table C.4: Different controls: SP zones
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
SP SP SP SP SP SP SP SP
D=1 ever in CZ -0.0019∗∗∗ -0.0019∗∗∗ -0.0019∗∗∗ -0.0019∗∗∗ -0.0025∗∗∗ -0.0025∗∗∗ 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0009) (0.0009) (.) (.)
D=1 ever in CZ x Post 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0011∗∗ -0.0005∗
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0004) (0.0003)
Post 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 -0.0012∗∗ 0.0000
(0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0006) (0.0007)
ln Dist city -0.0003 -0.0002
(0.0002) (0.0002)
Non-forest -0.0003∗∗ -0.0022∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0006)
RF (-1) -0.0007∗∗∗ -0.0020∗∗∗ 0.1423∗∗∗
(0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0238)
Dist CZ 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000)
Dist CZ sq 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000)
D=1 ever in CZ x Dist CZ -0.0000 -0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000)
D=1 ever in CZ x Dist CZ sq -0.0000 -0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000)
Constant 0.0012 0.0045∗ 0.0012 0.0019∗∗ 0.0018∗ 0.0061∗∗
(0.0008) (0.0026) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0027)
Observations 282 701 282 701 282 701 282 701 282 701 282 701 282 701 282 701
R-sq 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.144 0.227
Notes: As table 3.1, different columns vary by the included controls. Column 7 and 8 include cell fixed effect, in addition to the municipality year fixed effects included in
all columns.
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Table C.5: Different controls: SU zones
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
SU SU SU SU SU SU SU SU
D=1 ever in CZ -0.0014∗∗ -0.0013∗ -0.0014∗∗ -0.0014∗∗ -0.0005 -0.0004 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0006) (.) (.)
D=1 ever in CZ x Post 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 0.0005 0.0007 -0.0008∗
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0005)
Post -0.0011 -0.0011 -0.0011 -0.0011 -0.0011 -0.0011 -0.0003 0.0001
(0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0002) (0.0002)
ln Dist city -0.0007∗∗ -0.0008∗∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0003)
Non-forest -0.0035∗∗∗ -0.0027∗∗∗
(0.0010) (0.0008)
RF (-1) 0.0023∗∗ 0.0014 0.2375∗∗∗
(0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0395)
Dist CZ -0.0000∗∗∗ -0.0000∗∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0000)
Dist CZ sq -0.0000∗∗ -0.0000∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0000)
D=1 ever in CZ x Dist CZ 0.0000∗∗ 0.0000∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0000)
D=1 ever in CZ x Dist CZ sq 0.0000∗∗ 0.0000∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0000)
Constant 0.0029∗∗∗ 0.0103∗∗∗ 0.0031∗∗∗ 0.0010 0.0020∗∗ 0.0103∗∗∗
(0.0009) (0.0031) (0.0009) (0.0012) (0.0009) (0.0030)
Observations 747 769 747 769 747 769 747 769 747 769 747 769 747 769 747 769
R-sq 0.042 0.042 0.043 0.043 0.042 0.043 0.148 0.290
Notes: As table 3.1, different columns vary by the included controls. Column 7 and 8 include cell fixed effect, in addition to the municipality year fixed effects included in
all columns.
237
Table C.6: Different sample: 5km
(1) (2) (3)
All SP SU
D=1 ever in CZ -0.0007 -0.0018∗ -0.0004
(0.0005) (0.0009) (0.0006)
D=1 ever in CZ x Post 0.0009 0.0015 0.0006
(0.0006) (0.0010) (0.0008)
Post -0.0012 -0.0002 -0.0005
(0.0008) (0.0014) (0.0007)
Observations 630 293 164 320 463 374
Obs. t<0 238 120 61 189 175 681
Obs. t=0 . . .
Obs. t>0 392 173 103 131 287 693
Obs. Evertreated t<0 164 246 41 488 120 646
Obs. Evertreated t>0 270 064 71 021 196 393
R-sq 0.029 0.017 0.035
Clusters 877 207 680
Meters from CZ incl. 5000 5000 5000
Notes: As table 3.1, but includes only cells up to 5 km from the zone boundaries.
Table C.7: Different sample: 30km
(1) (2) (3)
All SP SU
D=1 ever in CZ -0.0012∗∗ -0.0021∗∗∗ -0.0008
(0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0007)
D=1 ever in CZ x Post 0.0007 0.0008∗ 0.0005
(0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0007)
Post -0.0012 -0.0001 -0.0012
(0.0009) (0.0007) (0.0013)
Observations 1690795 548355 1202429
Obs. t<0 633674 201184 453539
Obs. t=0 . . .
Obs. t>0 1057121 347171 748890
Obs. Evertreated t<0 384439 114738 260603
Obs. Evertreated t>0 642155 202803 429689
R-sq 0.059 0.012 0.064
Clusters 877 207 680
Meters from CZ incl. 30000 30000 30000
Notes: As table 3.1, but includes only cells up to 30 km from the zone boundaries.
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Table C.8: Different sample: All borders
(1) (2) (3)
All SP SU
D=1 ever in CZ -0.0011∗∗∗ -0.0021∗∗∗ -0.0007
(0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0005)
D=1 ever in CZ x Post 0.0008∗ 0.0016∗∗ 0.0003
(0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0006)
Post -0.0012∗∗ 0.0011∗ -0.0005
(0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0006)
Observations 5 271 706 1 594 140 3 675 396
Obs. t<0 2 042 111 610 056 1 430 196
Obs. t=0 . . .
Obs. t>0 3 229 595 984 084 2 245 200
Obs. Evertreated t<0 1 249 983 385 283 843 024
Obs. Evertreated t>0 1 996 427 62 7736 1 337 757
R-sq 0.024 0.017 0.029
Clusters 940 229 711
Meters from CZ incl. 10 000 10 000 10 000
Notes: As table 3.1, but includes all borders.
Table C.9: The priority list, including non-listed municipalities
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All SP SU All SP SU
D=1 ever in CZ -0.0031 -0.0085∗∗ -0.0025 -0.0011∗ -0.0026∗∗∗ -0.0007
(0.0021) (0.0040) (0.0027) (0.0006) (0.0010) (0.0008)
D=1 ever in CZ x Post 0.0038 -0.0003 0.0060∗ 0.0011∗ 0.0016∗∗ 0.0009
(0.0026) (0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0009)
D=1 ever in CZ x Post
x pr post -0.0010 0.0028 -0.0026
∗∗ -0.0011∗∗ -0.0033∗∗∗ -0.0005
(0.0012) (0.0022) (0.0011) (0.0005) (0.0012) (0.0006)
D=1 ever in CZ x
pr post 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
pr post 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Post -0.0058 0.0010 -0.0099∗ -0.0035∗∗ -0.0002 -0.0036
(0.0039) (0.0034) (0.0054) (0.0015) (0.0013) (0.0028)
Observations 229 444 69 354 159 157 955 793 270 887 682 044
Controls 64 518 14 258 52 204 316 713 91 691 230 552
Treated 164 926 55 096 106 953 639 080 179 196 451 492
Obs. t<0 88 886 24 340 63 330 340 652 97 559 241 674
Obs. t=0 . . . . . .
Obs. t>0 140 558 45 014 95 827 615 141 173 328 440 370
Obs. Evertreated t<0 64 428 18 681 43 732 227 118 63 087 160 503
Obs. Evertreated t>0 100 498 36 415 63 221 411 962 116 109 290 989
R-sq 0.038 0.017 0.044 0.037 0.014 0.043
Clusters 280 84 186 759 176 593
Meters from CZ incl. 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000
Not on pri-list 0 0 0 2 2 2
Notes: Three first columns identical with table 3.3, three last columns include also municipalities never
on the list.
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Table C.10: Different sample: 5 km, the priority list
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All SP SU All SP SU
D=1 ever in CZ -0.0013 -0.0024 -0.0010 -0.0010∗∗∗ -0.0016∗∗∗ -0.0007
(0.0009) (0.0015) (0.0011) (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0004)
D=1 ever in CZ x Post 0.0022 0.0038∗∗ 0.0021 0.0007 0.0019∗∗∗ 0.0001
(0.0019) (0.0017) (0.0032) (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0006)
D=1 ever in CZ x Post
x pr post -0.0008 -0.0008 -0.0014 -0.0002 -0.0014
∗∗ 0.0006
(0.0016) (0.0009) (0.0029) (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0006)
D=1 ever in CZ x
pr post 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
pr post 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Post -0.0029∗∗ -0.0025 -0.0036 -0.0023∗∗∗ 0.0002 -0.0010
(0.0014) (0.0017) (0.0023) (0.0007) (0.0010) (0.0007)
Observations 760 034 254 264 507 284 2 872 876 882 386 1976896
Controls 271 002 82 677 192 440 1 038 177 305 791 744 624
Treated 489 032 171 587 314 844 1 834 699 576 595 1 232 272
Obs. t<0 320 745 97 553 222 554 1 063 094 330 886 726 333
Obs. t=0 . . . . . .
Obs. t>0 439 289 15 6711 284 730 1 809 782 551 500 1 250 563
Obs. Evertreated t<0 204 424 65 252 137 054 676 789 214 247 452 226
Obs. Evertreated t>0 284 608 106 335 177 790 1 157 910 362 348 780 046
R-sq 0.019 0.017 0.023 0.021 0.018 0.025
Clusters 313 95 208 822 198 624
Meters from CZ incl. 5 000 5 000 5 000 5 000 5 000 5 000
Not on pri-list 0 0 0 2 2 2
Notes: As table 3.3, but includes only cells up to 5 km from the zone boundaries.
D = 1 ever in CZ x pr post and pr post drop out.
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Table C.11: Different sample: 30 km, the priority list
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All SP SU All SP SU
D=1 ever in CZ -0.0022∗ -0.0039∗∗∗ -0.0011 -0.0018∗∗∗ -0.0027∗∗∗ -0.0011∗
(0.0012) (0.0014) (0.0016) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0007)
D=1 ever in CZ x Post 0.0034 0.0013 0.0048 0.0012∗∗ 0.0017∗∗ 0.0006
(0.0028) (0.0015) (0.0051) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0009)
D=1 ever in CZ x Post
x pr post -0.0012 0.0003 -0.0030 0.0003 -0.0006
∗ 0.0011
(0.0023) (0.0006) (0.0046) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0008)
D=1 ever in CZ x
pr post 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
pr post 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Post -0.0033 0.0016 -0.0043 -0.0021∗∗ 0.0017∗∗ -0.0004
(0.0020) (0.0010) (0.0037) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0011)
Observations 2 527 679 1 017 781 1 688 056 9 581 957 3 294 216 6 611 464
Controls 1 141 388 481 437 848 252 4 533 913 1 560 498 3 410 036
Treated 1 386 291 536 344 839 804 5 048 044 1 733 718 3 201 428
Obs. t<0 1 029 713 370 449 714 984 3 512 898 1 212 563 2 410 406
Obs. t=0 . . . . . .
Obs. t>0 1 497 966 647 332 973 072 6 069 059 2 081 653 4 201 058
Obs. Evertreated t<0 558 925 192 838 354 788 1 855 820 639 970 1 168 289
Obs. Evertreated t>0 827 366 343 506 485 016 3 192 224 1 093 748 2 033 139
R-sq 0.029 0.017 0.032 0.034 0.021 0.040
Clusters 324 95 229 822 198 624
Meters from CZ incl. 30 000 30 000 30 000 30 000 30 000 30 000
Not on pri-list 0 0 0 2 2 2
Notes: As table 3.3, but includes cells up to 30 km from the zone boundaries.
D = 1 ever in CZ x pr post and pr post drop out.
Table C.12: Different sample: All borders, the priority list
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All SP SU All SP SU
D=1 ever in CZ -0.0015 -0.0035∗∗ -0.0006 -0.0012∗∗∗ -0.0021∗∗∗ -0.0008
(0.0010) (0.0015) (0.0013) (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0005)
D=1 ever in CZ x Post 0.0026 0.0029∗ 0.0032 0.0009∗ 0.0020∗∗∗ 0.0003
(0.0023) (0.0016) (0.0040) (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0007)
D=1 ever in CZ x Post
x pr post -0.0009 -0.0002 -0.0020 0.0000 -0.0013
∗∗∗ 0.0009
(0.0020) (0.0008) (0.0037) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0006)
D=1 ever in CZ x
pr post 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
pr post 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Post -0.0032∗ -0.0012 -0.0042 -0.0024∗∗∗ 0.0006 -0.0011
(0.0017) (0.0015) (0.0030) (0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0013)
Observations 1 304 259 448 009 866 825 4 916 480 1 542 436 3366648
Controls 486 075 156 488 344 959 1 870 756 564 892 1 349 618
Treated 818 184 291 521 521 866 3 045 724 977 544 2 017 030
Obs. t<0 545 247 169 482 377 041 1 815 318 577 122 1 233 483
Obs. t=0 . . . . . .
Obs. t>0 759 012 278 527 489 784 3 101 162 965 314 2 133 165
Obs. Evertreated t<0 338 587 108 966 225 394 1 122 219 362 831 738 808
Obs. Evertreated t>0 479 597 182 555 296 472 1 923 505 614 713 1 278 222
R-sq 0.022 0.016 0.027 0.024 0.017 0.028
Clusters 324 95 219 822 198 624
Meters from CZ incl. 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000
Not on pri-list 0 0 0 2 2 2
Notes: As table 3.3, but includes all borders.
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Appendix D
Appendix to Chapter 4
D.1 OPOWER Home Report example
Figure D.1: Example of OPOWER Home Report
242
Figure D.2: Example of OPOWER Home Report
D.2 City of Cape Town Utility Bill page 1
example
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Figure D.3: City of Cape Town Municipal Bill
Civic Centre
12 Hertzog Boulevard 8001
PO Box 655 Cape Town 8000
VAT Registration number
4500193497
                                     
022003920213072015
BRUCE CHARLES BC PROCTER
PO BOX 6020
AURORA
7501
Tax invoice number
Customer VAT registration
number
Account number
Distribution code
Business partner number
140005715306
220039202
1000588078
Tax invoice
Tel: 086 010 3089 - Fax: 086 010 3090
Tel: overseas clients +27 21 401 4701
E-mail: accounts@capetown.gov.za
Correspondence : Director Revenue
PO Box 655 Cape Town 8000
Web address: www.capetown.gov.za
Account summary as at 13/07/2015 Due date 07/08/2015
At BELLVILLE,31 ARISTEA STREET WELGEDACHT / Erf 31466
Previous account balance 2759.06
Less payments (07/07/2015) Thank You 2759.06-
(a) 0.00
Current amount due (b) Payable by 07/08/2015 3024.03
Total (a) + (b) 3024.03
Total (a) + (b) above 3024.03
Total liability 3024.03
Current charges totalling R 3024.03 will be debited from your bank account.
Every Capetonian should save water, it is everyone's responsibility to report and fix any leaks.
Please note:
1.
2.
3.
4.
Payment options
(a)Cheques: (i) Made payable to the City of Cape Town. (ii) Limit of R500 000,00. (iii) Post-dated cheques are not acceptable.
(b)Debit orders: Call 0860 103 089 or visit a Customer Service Centre. (c)Internet payments: Visit Easypay.co.za or payCity.co.za.
(d)Electronic payments (EFT): Select the City of Cape Town as a bank-listed beneficiary on your bank's website. Use only your nine-digit
municipal account number as reference.(e)Direct deposit at ABSA Bank: Please insert your account no. 220039202 on deposit slip.
(f)Debit/credit card: Only at City vendors reflected below. Bank charges will be levied on your account in respect of single as well as
multiple payments in excess of R5 000,00.
Interest will be charged on all amounts still outstanding after the due date.
You may not withhold payment, even if you have submitted a query to the City concerning this account.
Failure to pay could result in your water and/or electricity supply being disconnected/restricted. Immediate reconnection of the
supply after payment cannot be guaranteed. A disconnection fee will be charged and your deposit amount might be increased.
Pay points:  City of Cape Town cash offices or the vendors below;
BRUCE CHARLES BC PROCTER
                                   
>>>>> 915552200392028
Account number
Amount due if not paid in cash
Amount due if paid in cash
Rounded down amount carried forward to next invoice
220039202
3024.03
3024.00
0.03
Page 1 of 4
0
0
6
5
2
8
Latest account - see overleaf 3024.03
isuinv_20150714_012716.muln 003238 / 006612
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Figure D.4: City of Cape Town Municipal Bill page 2 example
                                
>>>>> 915552200392028
Page 2 of 4
Account details as at 13/07/2015 Account number 220039202
PROPERTY RATES ( Period 12/06/2015 to 13/07/2015 ) 32 Days
At BELLVILLE,31 ARISTEA STREET WELGEDACHT / Erf 31466
# Total value
From 12/06/2015 : R 4523000.00 @ 0.0062540 ÷ 365 x 19 1472.47
# Statutory rebate credit
From 12/06/2015 : R 15000.00 @ 0.0062540 ÷ 365 x 19 4.88-
# Additional rebate credit
From 12/06/2015 : R 185000.00 @ 0.0062540 ÷ 365 x 19 60.23-
# Total value
From 01/07/2015 : R 4523000.00 @ 0.0068790 ÷ 366 x 13 1105.13
# Statutory rebate credit
From 01/07/2015 : R 15000.00 @ 0.0068790 ÷ 366 x 13 3.67-
# Additional rebate credit
From 01/07/2015 : R 185000.00 @ 0.0068790 ÷ 366 x 13 45.20-
2463.62
WATER ( Period 11/06/2015 to 07/07/2015 -  27 Days ) (Actual reading)
At BELLVILLE,31 ARISTEA STREET WELGEDACHT / Erf 31466
Meter no: CNHH717 / Consumption 22.000 kl / Daily average 0.815 kl
* Consumption charge (domestic)
From 11/06/2015 : (1) 3.9450 kl free (2) 2.9590 kl @ R 8.7500
(3) 6.2470 kl @ R 12.5400 (4) 3.1453 kl @ R 18.5800
From 01/07/2015 : (1) 1.3770 kl free (2) 1.0330 kl @ R 9.7100
(3) 2.1800 kl @ R 13.9200 (4) 1.1137 kl @ R 20.6200 226.01
226.01
REFUSE ( Period 12/06/2015 to 13/07/2015 ) 32 Days
At BELLVILLE,31 ARISTEA STREET WELGEDACHT / Erf 31466
* Refuse charge ( 1 X 140L RECYL X 1 Removals ) 0.00
* Refuse charge ( 1 X 240lBIN X 1 Removals ) 103.95
103.95
SEWERAGE ( Period 11/06/2015 to 07/07/2015 -  27 Days ) (Actual reading)
At BELLVILLE,31 ARISTEA STREET WELGEDACHT / Erf 31466
* Disposal charge
From 11/06/2015 : (1) 2.7620 kl free (2) 2.0710 kl @ R 8.2500
(3) 4.3720 kl @ R 14.6400 (4) 2.2024 kl @ R 16.0100
From 01/07/2015 : (1) 0.9640 kl free (2) 0.7230 kl @ R 9.1600
(3) 1.5260 kl @ R 16.2500 (4) 0.7796 kl @ R 17.7700 161.63
161.63
Add 14% VAT on amounts marked with * above 68.82
0% VAT on amounts marked with # above
Current account: Total due 3,024.03
Meter details Previous reading New reading Units used
WATER 6825.000kl(Actual) 6847.000kl(Actual) 22.000klCNHH717/001
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D.3 Treatments
246
Figure D.5: Tips
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Figure D.6: Tips: Afrikaans language
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Figure D.7: Tariff Graph
  
Did you 
know?
Water is priced in six tariff blocks. 
Check out which block your consumption falls into. 
As the blocks are stepped, consumption in the first block is free and 
consumption in the last block is the most expensive.
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Figure D.8: Tariff Graph: Afrikaans language
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Figure D.9: Financial Gains Message
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Figure D.10: Financial Gains Message: Afrikaans language
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Figure D.11: Social Norm Message
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Figure D.12: Social Norm Message: Afrikaans language
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Figure D.13: Intrinsic Motivation Message
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Figure D.14: Intrinsic Motivation Message: Afrikaans language
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Figure D.15: Public Recognition Message
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Figure D.16: Public Recognition Message: Afrikaans language
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Figure D.17: Public Good Message
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Figure D.18: Public Good Message: Afrikaans language
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D.4 Robustness Checks
Table D.1: Short Run Analysis (Dec 2015): Difference in difference model using
fixed effects with trend
I II
Monthly consumption (kl) Monthly consumption (kl)
Tips 0.118 0.140*
0.106 0.084
Graph 0.001 0.049
0.102 0.077
Gain -0.042 -0.056
0.114 0.083
Social norm 0.049 -0.025
0.114 0.088
intrinsic motivation 0.114 0.069
0.126 0.092
Social recog comp 0.187 0.093
0.16 0.145
public good 0.108 0.136
0.143 0.136
Post -2.629*** -2.717***
0.24 0.275
Tips x Post -0.064 -0.089
0.114 0.109
Graph x Post
Financial gains x Post -0.001 0.035
0.105 0.099
Social norm x Post -0.005 -0.008
0.126 0.106
Intrinsic motivation x
Post 0.001 -0.066
0.13 0.111
Social recognition x
Post -0.513*** -0.553***
0.17 0.174
Public Good x Post -0.408*** -0.673***
0.158 0.173
QPV1 -3.638*** -1.768***
0.526 0.29
QPV2 -4.049*** -1.932***
0.456 0.277
QPV3 -3.972*** -1.810***
0.356 0.216
QPV4 -2.758*** -1.144***
0.234 0.139
Indigent Status -1.656*** -1.152***
0.272 0.243
Late receiver 1.391** 0.782
0.693 0.733
Frequency (-1) 0.029***
0
Tariff rate (-1) -0.099 -0.244**
0.173 0.119
Graph x indigent - -
- -
Financial gains x
indigent - -
- -
Social norm x indigent -0.236 -0.015
0.168 0.131
Intrinsic motivation x
indigent 0.081 -0.024
0.176 0.125
Social recognition x
indigent -0.425 -0.239
0.307 0.32
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Public Good x
indigent -0.539** -0.406
0.261 0.262
Tips x indigent x Post 0.019 0.143
0.178 0.154
Graph x indigent x
Post - -
- -
Financial gains x
indigent x Post - -
- -
Social norm x indigent
x Post 0.265 0.034
0.205 0.169
Intrinsic motivation x
indigent x Post -0.142 0.008
0.18 0.159
Social recognition x
indigent x Post 0.521* 0.434
0.297 0.33
Public Good x
indigent x Post 0.655** 0.709**
0.268 0.284
Post x indigent 1.750*** 1.437***
0.336 0.33
Constant 16.814*** 12.899***
0.32 0.253
Observations 420352 406203
Treated 357040 345127
Control 63312 61076
Clusters 672 672
Fpvalue 0.081 0.003
R-squared 0.485 0.683
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the suburb level and are presented below the coefficient.
Pre-intervention period: December 2014 - January 2015. Post-intervention period: December 2015 -
January 2016. Treated category include all treatments with at most five months of observations.
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Table D.2: Longer run analysis (Dec 2015 - April 2016) without CoCT Indigents (Indigent A): Difference in difference model using fixed
effects with trend
I II III IV V VI VII VIII
Monthly
consumption
(kl)
Monthly
consumption
(kl)
Monthly
consumption
(kl)
Monthly
consumption
(kl)
Monthly
consumption
(kl)
Monthly
consumption
(kl)
Monthly
consumption
(kl)
Monthly
consumption
(kl)
Tips x Post -0.158* -0.147* -0.154* -0.152** -0.145* -0.210*** -0.200*** -0.208**
0.081 0.081 0.081 0.089 0.082 0.08 0.072 0.081
Graph x Post -0.178** -0.179** -0.175** -0.190*** -0.178** -0.188** -0.199*** -0.198**
0.082 0.081 0.08 0.072 0.084 0.089 0.072 0.083
Financial gains x Post -0.215*** -0.214*** -0.218*** -0.205*** -0.185** -0.272*** -0.251*** -0.244***
0.077 0.089 0.078 0.069 0.089 0.078 0.069 0.075
Social norm x Post -0.329*** -0.303*** -0.290*** -0.300*** -0.299*** -0.324*** -0.325*** -0.338***
0.093 0.093 0.093 0.082 0.094 0.091 0.081 0.092
Intrinsic motivation x Post -0.327*** -0.291*** -0.257*** -0.284*** -0.273*** -0.295*** -0.315*** -0.312***
0.086 0.086 0.088 0.089 0.088 0.089 0.08 0.088
Social recognition x Post -0.465*** -0.347*** -0.325*** -0.364*** -0.380*** -0.395*** -0.425*** -0.452***
0.096 0.091 0.093 0.089 0.095 0.092 0.089 0.095
Public Good x Post -0.282*** -0.303*** -0.322*** -0.326*** -0.318*** -0.332*** -0.332*** -0.324***
0.084 0.082 0.083 0.089 0.084 0.089 0.075 0.086
Trend -0.298*** -0.293*** -0.110*** -0.310*** -0.304*** -0.126*** -0.326*** -0.320***
0.028 0.014 0.011 0.014 0.015 0.012 0.014 0.015
Indigent B Status -0.510*** -0.269 -0.473** -0.644*** -0.446 -0.883* -0.758
0.187 0.18 0.197 0.184 0.54 0.528 0.508
Frequency (-1) -0.594*** -0.592***
0.038 0.038
Billed amount (-1) 0.005*** 0.005***
0 0
Tariff rate (-1) -0.039*** -0.039***
0.002 0.002
Tips x Indigent B -0.634 -0.434 -0.647
0.578 0.533 0.563
Graph x Indigent B -0.869 -0.607 -1.114
0.729 0.656 0.758
Financial gains x Indigent B -0.948 -0.669 -0.768
0.597 0.553 0.595
Social norm x Indigent B -2.447*** -2.103*** -2.437***
0.871 0.792 0.873
Intrinsic motivation x Indigent B -0.846 -0.648 -0.982
0.821 0.736 0.849
263
Social recognition x Indigent B -1.538*** -1.190** -1.569**
0.565 0.524 0.628
Public Good x Indigent B -0.934 -0.619 -1.201**
0.595 0.551 0.61
Tips x Indigent B x Post 0.654* 0.544* 0.716**
0.369 0.319 0.357
Graph x Indigent B x Post 0.174 0.119 0.251
0.372 0.326 0.369
Financial gains x Indigent B x Post 0.620* 0.512* 0.653**
0.334 0.287 0.314
Social norm x Indigent B x Post 0.434 0.324 0.463
0.456 0.399 0.457
Intrinsic motivation x Indigent B x
Post 0.43 0.35 0.444
0.34 0.299 0.349
Social recognition x Indigent B x Post 0.844*** 0.729** 0.850***
0.327 0.289 0.321
Public Good x Indigent B x Post 0.14 0.075 0.074
0.34 0.304 0.32
Post x Indigent B 1.685*** 1.786*** 1.687***
0.319 0.291 0.308
Constant 26.637*** 7.872*** 6.437*** 5.753*** 8.927*** 6.559*** 5.874*** 9.058***
0.182 0.307 0.337 0.31 0.298 0.338 0.31 0.299
Observations 1779015 1779015 1755075 1755075 1565336 1755075 1755075 1565336
Treated 1561484 1561484 1540696 1540696 1374157 1540696 1540696 1374157
Control 217531 217531 214379 214379 191179 214379 214379 191179
Clusters 674 674 674 674 674 674 674 674
R-squared 0.022 0.221 0.227 0.243 0.222 0.228 0.244 0.224
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the suburb level and are presented below the coefficient. Pre-intervention period: December 2014 - January 2015.
Post-intervention period: December 2015 - January 2016. Treated category include all treatments with at most five months of observations.
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Table D.3: Pooled regressions: Monthly consumption
I II III V VII IX X XI XII XIII XIV XV
Monthly
con-
sumption
(kl)
Monthly
con-
sumption
(kl)
Monthly
con-
sumption
(kl)
Monthly
con-
sumption
(kl)
Monthly
con-
sumption
(kl)
Monthly
con-
sumption
(kl)
Monthly
con-
sumption
(kl)
Monthly
con-
sumption
(kl)
Monthly
con-
sumption
(kl)
Monthly
con-
sumption
(kl)
Monthly
con-
sumption
(kl)
Monthly
con-
sumption
(kl)
Tips -0.053 -0.067 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.061 -0.08 -0.108 -0.108 -0.082* -0.114*
0.059 0.054 0.055 0.054 0.054 0.054 0.038 0.052 0.067 0.067 0.047 0.063
Graph 0.084 -0.037 -0.041 -0.04 -0.04 -0.042 -0.043 -0.062 -0.077 -0.078 -0.078* -0.094
0.062 0.06 0.059 0.059 0.06 0.06 0.043 0.058 0.063 0.063 0.045 0.061
Gain 0.002 -0.114** -0.113** -0.113** -0.113** -0.115** -0.070* -0.118** -0.169*** -0.171*** -0.120*** -0.173***
0.068 0.057 0.057 0.057 0.057 0.057 0.04 0.056 0.063 0.063 0.044 0.061
Social norm -0.083 -0.067 -0.068 -0.068 -0.068 -0.079 -0.063* -0.097* -0.209*** -0.218*** -0.155*** -0.220***
0.056 0.055 0.054 0.054 0.054 0.054 0.038 0.052 0.065 0.065 0.045 0.062
Intrinsic Motivation -0.103* -0.165*** -0.164*** -0.164*** -0.164*** -0.175*** -0.140*** -0.173*** -0.216*** -0.225*** -0.179*** -0.228***
0.063 0.053 0.053 0.053 0.053 0.052 0.04 0.052 0.067 0.067 0.05 0.065
Social recognition -0.184*** -0.177*** -0.181*** -0.181*** -0.093* -0.100* -0.101** -0.046 -0.232*** -0.239*** -0.226*** -0.177***
0.054 0.055 0.055 0.055 0.054 0.054 0.041 0.053 0.06 0.06 0.045 0.056
Public Good -0.188*** -0.182*** -0.184*** -0.184*** -0.109* -0.108* -0.107*** -0.073 -0.168** -0.168** -0.166*** -0.134*
0.06 0.058 0.058 0.058 0.057 0.056 0.039 0.057 0.073 0.073 0.05 0.072
Mean pre consumption 0.395*** 0.392*** 0.392*** 0.392*** 0.392*** 0.261*** 0.350*** 0.392*** 0.392*** 0.261*** 0.350***
0.015 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.013 0.015 0.014 0.014 0.013 0.015
QPV1 -0.792*** -0.797*** -0.799*** -0.803*** -0.587*** -0.715*** -0.799*** -0.803*** -0.587*** -0.715***
0.237 0.231 0.231 0.23 0.176 0.215 0.23 0.229 0.175 0.214
QPV2 -1.211*** -1.214*** -1.211*** -1.214*** -0.859*** -1.129*** -1.212*** -1.215*** -0.859*** -1.130***
0.204 0.196 0.197 0.196 0.145 0.172 0.196 0.196 0.145 0.172
QPV3 -1.354*** -1.354*** -1.352*** -1.355*** -0.944*** -1.296*** -1.353*** -1.355*** -0.945*** -1.296***
0.158 0.158 0.158 0.158 0.114 0.146 0.158 0.158 0.114 0.145
QPV4 -0.982*** -0.982*** -0.982*** -0.984*** -0.644*** -0.943*** -0.983*** -0.985*** -0.645*** -0.943***
0.104 0.104 0.104 0.104 0.075 0.097 0.104 0.104 0.075 0.097
Indigent Status 0.007 0.007 0.008 -0.007 -0.011 -0.170* -0.168* -0.152* -0.180*
0.085 0.085 0.085 0.069 0.074 0.102 0.102 0.078 0.094
Late receiver -0.471*** -0.312*** -0.415*** -0.950*** -0.468*** -0.310*** -0.412*** -0.946***
0.093 0.113 0.076 0.103 0.091 0.112 0.074 0.102
Frequency (-1) 0.170*** 0.170***
0.055 0.055
Billed amount (-1) 0.011*** 0.011***
0 0
Tariff rate (-1) 0.178*** 0.178***
0.005 0.005
Tips x indigent 0.113 0.112 0.062 0.098
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0.111 0.111 0.081 0.11
Graph x indigent -0.097 -0.1 -0.015 -0.121
0.18 0.18 0.134 0.19
Financial gains x indigent 0.125 0.122 0.156 0.141
0.157 0.157 0.112 0.153
Social norm x indigent 0.376*** 0.370*** 0.250*** 0.335***
0.108 0.108 0.075 0.108
Intrinsic motivation x indigent 0.156 0.151 0.119 0.164
0.102 0.102 0.079 0.103
Social recognition x indigent 0.388*** 0.385*** 0.344*** 0.369***
0.114 0.114 0.088 0.115
Public Good x indigent 0.172 0.173 0.166** 0.178
0.113 0.113 0.083 0.115
Constant 13.128*** 4.646*** 5.538*** 5.537*** 5.520*** 5.377*** 6.666*** 4.005*** 5.580*** 5.437*** 6.715*** 4.061***
0.072 0.22 0.25 0.253 0.253 0.232 0.184 0.238 0.257 0.235 0.187 0.241
Observations 1 118 128 1027476 1 027 476 1 027 476 1 027 476 1 027 476 1 027 476 913 507 1 027 476 1 027 476 1 027 476 913 507
Treated 955 122 878 191 878 191 878 191 878 191 878 191 878 191 780 981 878 191 878 191 878 191 780 981
Control 163 006 149 285 149 285 149 285 149 285 149 285 149 285 132 526 149 285 149 285 149 285 132 526
Clusters 672 669 669 669 669 669 669 669 669 669 669 669
Fpvalue 0.001 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.1 0.059 0.025 0.07 0.001 0 0 0.002
R-squared 0.426 0.533 0.534 0.534 0.534 0.534 0.591 0.547 0.534 0.534 0.591 0.547
266
Table D.4: Pooled regressions: Daily averge consumption
I II III V VII IX X XI XII XIII XIV XV
Daily
average
(kl)
Daily
average
(kl)
Daily
average
(kl)
Daily
average
(kl)
Daily
average
(kl)
Daily
average
(kl)
Daily
average
(kl)
Daily
average
(kl)
Daily
average
(kl)
Daily
average
(kl)
Daily
average
(kl)
Daily
average
(kl)
Tips 0 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003
0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
Graph 0.005 0 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
Gain -0.002 -0.006** -0.006** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.005** -0.005** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.007*** -0.008***
0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.003
Social norm -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.005 -0.005 -0.003 -0.005*
0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
Intrinsic Motivation -0.001 -0.004* -0.004* -0.004 -0.004* -0.004 -0.003 -0.004* -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 -0.005
0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
Social recognition -0.007*** -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.005** -0.005** -0.006*** -0.005** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011***
0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
Public Good -0.006** -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003* -0.003 -0.006* -0.006* -0.006** -0.005
0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
Mean pre consumption 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.008*** 0.012*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.008*** 0.012***
0 0 0 0 0 0 0.001 0 0 0 0.001
QPV1 -0.029*** -0.021*** -0.021*** -0.021*** -0.013** -0.017** -0.021*** -0.021*** -0.012** -0.017**
0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.006 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.006 0.007
QPV2 -0.040*** -0.035*** -0.035*** -0.035*** -0.021*** -0.030*** -0.035*** -0.035*** -0.021*** -0.030***
0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.005 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.005 0.006
QPV3 -0.038*** -0.038*** -0.038*** -0.038*** -0.022*** -0.034*** -0.038*** -0.038*** -0.022*** -0.034***
0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.004 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.004 0.005
QPV4 -0.027*** -0.028*** -0.028*** -0.028*** -0.014*** -0.025*** -0.028*** -0.028*** -0.014*** -0.025***
0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.004
Indigent Status -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.014*** -0.013*** -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.019***
0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.004
Late receiver 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.014*** 0.013***
0.004 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.003
Frequency (-1) 0 0
0.002 0.002
Billed amount (-1) 0.000*** 0.000***
0 0
Tariff rate (-1) 0.006*** 0.006***
0 0
Tips x indigent 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.003
0.005 0.005 0.004 0.005
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Graph x indigent 0.004 0.004 0.007 0.002
0.008 0.008 0.006 0.008
Financial gains x indigent 0.009 0.009 0.010** 0.007
0.006 0.006 0.004 0.006
Social norm x indigent 0.011** 0.011** 0.006 0.009**
0.004 0.004 0.003 0.004
Intrinsic motivation x indigent 0.002 0.002 0 0.003
0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
Social recognition x indigent 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.015*** 0.016***
0.004 0.004 0.003 0.004
Public Good x indigent 0.007 0.007 0.006* 0.007
0.005 0.005 0.004 0.005
Constant 0.433*** 0.256*** 0.284*** 0.286*** 0.286*** 0.287*** 0.331*** 0.239*** 0.288*** 0.289*** 0.333*** 0.241***
0.003 0.007 0.008 0.009 0.009 0.008 0.006 0.008 0.009 0.008 0.006 0.008
Observations 1 118 128 1 027 476 1 027 476 1 027 476 1 027 476 1 027 476 1 027 476 913 507 1 027 476 1 027 476 1 027 476 913 507
Treated 955 122 878 191 878 191 878 191 878 191 878 191 878 191 780 981 878 191 878 191 878 191 780 981
Control 163 006 149 285 149 285 149 285 149 285 149 285 149 285 132 526 149 285 149 285 149 285 132 526
Clusters 672 669 669 669 669 669 669 669 669 669 669 669
Fpvalue 0.002 0.209 0.203 0.157 0.057 0.055 0.026 0.197 0.001 0.001 0 0.006
R-squared 0.254 0.313 0.313 0.313 0.313 0.313 0.359 0.323 0.313 0.313 0.359 0.323
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Table D.5: Pooled regressions: Relative consumption
I II III V VII IX X XI XII XIII XIV XV
Relative
con-
sumption
Relative
con-
sumption
Relative
con-
sumption
Relative
con-
sumption
Relative
con-
sumption
Relative
con-
sumption
Relative
con-
sumption
Relative
con-
sumption
Relative
con-
sumption
Relative
con-
sumption
Relative
con-
sumption
Relative
con-
sumption
Tips -0.009** -0.009** -0.009** -0.009** -0.009** -0.009** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009** -0.009** -0.008** -0.009**
0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.003
Graph -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.012*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.011*** -0.010** -0.009** -0.009** -0.009** -0.009**
0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
Gain -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.012*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.009** -0.009** -0.009** -0.008** -0.008**
0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
Social norm -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.004 -0.008* -0.008* -0.008* -0.010**
0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
Intrinsic Motivation -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.011*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.011*** -0.010** -0.009** -0.009** -0.010**
0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
Social recognition -0.017*** -0.009** -0.009** -0.009** -0.008** -0.008* -0.008** -0.006 -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.010**
0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
Public Good -0.013*** -0.006 -0.006* -0.007* -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.005 -0.009** -0.009** -0.009** -0.009**
0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
QPV1 0.142*** 0.117*** 0.117*** 0.117*** 0.134*** 0.105*** 0.116*** 0.116*** 0.134*** 0.105***
0.016 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.015 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.015 0.014
QPV2 0.086*** 0.070*** 0.070*** 0.070*** 0.091*** 0.058*** 0.069*** 0.069*** 0.090*** 0.057***
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.011 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.011 0.01
QPV3 0.052*** 0.051*** 0.051*** 0.051*** 0.073*** 0.043*** 0.051*** 0.051*** 0.072*** 0.043***
0.008 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.008
QPV4 0.028*** 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.044*** 0.024*** 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.044*** 0.024***
0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006
Indigent Status 0.040*** 0.040*** 0.040*** 0.042*** 0.039*** 0.038*** 0.038*** 0.041*** 0.036***
0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009
Late receiver -0.007 -0.009 -0.008 -0.017** -0.007 -0.008 -0.007 -0.016**
0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008
Frequency (-1) -0.002 -0.002
0.003 0.003
Billed amount (-1) 0.000*** 0.000***
0 0
Tariff rate (-1) -0.004*** -0.004***
0 0
Tips x indigent 0 0 -0.001 -0.001
0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008
Graph x indigent -0.029* -0.029* -0.029* -0.025
0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016
269
Financial gains x indigent -0.024* -0.024* -0.026** -0.022*
0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013
Social norm x indigent 0.015* 0.015* 0.013 0.016*
0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009
Intrinsic motivation x indigent -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.003
0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008
Social recognition x indigent 0.01 0.01 0.009 0.011
0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009
Public Good x indigent 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.01
0.008 0.008 0.008 0.009
Constant 0.01 -0.01 -0.071*** -0.076*** -0.076*** -0.074*** -0.102*** -0.028** -0.075*** -0.074*** -0.102*** -0.027**
0.007 0.01 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.013 0.012 0.012 0.013 0.014 0.012
Observations 857676 857 676 857 676 857 676 857 676 857 676 857 676 779 426 857 676 857 676 857 676 779 426
Treated 733 762 733 762 733 762 733 762 733 762 733 762 733 762 666 825 733 762 733 762 733 762 666825
Control 123 914 123 914 123 914 123 914 123 914 123 914 123 914 112 601 123 914 123 914 123 914 112 601
Clusters 669 669 669 669 669 669 669 669 669 669 669 669
Fpvalue 0 0.001 0.016 0.034 0.029 0.031 0.022 0.068 0.227 0.236 0.258 0.252
R-squared 0.027 0.031 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.045 0.041 0.033 0.033 0.045 0.041
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Table D.6: Difference in Difference: no FE, no trend
Monthly
con-
sumption
(kl)
Monthly
con-
sumption
(kl)
Monthly
con-
sumption
(kl)
Monthly
con-
sumption
(kl)
Monthly
con-
sumption
(kl)
Monthly
con-
sumption
(kl)
Monthly
con-
sumption
(kl)
Monthly
con-
sumption
(kl)
Monthly
con-
sumption
(kl)
Monthly
con-
sumption
(kl)
Monthly
con-
sumption
(kl)
Monthly
con-
sumption
(kl)
Tips 0.047 0.04 0.037 0.038 0.038 0.034 0.032 0.028 0.098 0.105 0.082 0.096
0.081 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.081 0.05 0.076 0.102 0.104 0.064 0.098
Graph 0.599*** 0.520*** 0.516*** 0.500*** 0.500*** 0.495*** 0.449*** 0.461*** 0.175* 0.176* 0.162*** 0.134
0.103 0.101 0.1 0.101 0.101 0.102 0.064 0.096 0.095 0.097 0.059 0.091
Gain 0.535*** 0.474*** 0.470*** 0.455*** 0.455*** 0.448*** 0.399*** 0.429*** 0.156 0.158 0.128** 0.128
0.1 0.097 0.097 0.096 0.096 0.098 0.063 0.09 0.098 0.099 0.061 0.09
Social norm -0.085 -0.068 -0.071 -0.067 -0.067 -0.059 -0.043 -0.106 0.101 0.107 0.068 0.074
0.082 0.081 0.08 0.081 0.081 0.083 0.051 0.078 0.107 0.109 0.068 0.1
intrinsic motivation 0.035 0.056 0.054 0.059 0.059 0.037 0.009 0.015 0.174 0.165 0.106 0.123
0.085 0.084 0.084 0.084 0.084 0.085 0.051 0.078 0.111 0.113 0.068 0.102
Social recog comp 0.068 0.058 0.001 0.004 0.03 0.025 0.064 0.038 0.156 0.159 0.144** 0.175
0.086 0.085 0.086 0.086 0.088 0.091 0.055 0.084 0.114 0.117 0.072 0.109
public good 0 0.004 -0.044 -0.039 -0.018 -0.017 0.064 -0.015 0.132 0.133 0.157** 0.134
0.077 0.076 0.077 0.076 0.077 0.078 0.048 0.074 0.099 0.1 0.062 0.094
Post -1.626*** -1.628*** -1.680*** -1.676*** -1.677*** -1.787*** -2.271*** -1.495*** -2.336*** -2.463*** -2.873*** -2.183***
0.13 0.13 0.129 0.129 0.129 0.122 0.114 0.141 0.135 0.119 0.132 0.141
tips x Post -0.109 -0.109 -0.103 -0.104 -0.103 -0.1 -0.108** -0.101 -0.185** -0.192** -0.162*** -0.190**
0.074 0.074 0.074 0.074 0.074 0.075 0.047 0.077 0.085 0.087 0.057 0.092
graph x Post -0.780*** -0.783*** -0.776*** -0.779*** -0.779*** -0.766*** -0.764*** -0.769*** -0.252*** -0.252*** -0.294*** -0.222**
0.112 0.113 0.112 0.112 0.112 0.112 0.082 0.119 0.085 0.086 0.06 0.09
gain x Post -0.795*** -0.801*** -0.795*** -0.798*** -0.798*** -0.783*** -0.685*** -0.793*** -0.315*** -0.317*** -0.244*** -0.290***
0.102 0.104 0.102 0.102 0.102 0.104 0.073 0.108 0.082 0.084 0.054 0.087
socialnorm x Post 0.061 0.061 0.081 0.082 0.082 0.07 0.032 0.098 -0.242*** -0.251*** -0.181*** -0.229**
0.079 0.079 0.079 0.079 0.079 0.08 0.05 0.083 0.093 0.094 0.058 0.096
intrinsic x Post -0.078 -0.077 -0.058 -0.057 -0.057 -0.038 -0.054 -0.021 -0.312*** -0.306*** -0.258*** -0.266***
0.071 0.072 0.072 0.072 0.072 0.073 0.048 0.076 0.091 0.093 0.063 0.095
sro x Post -0.226*** -0.220*** -0.221*** -0.220*** -0.218*** -0.214** -0.303*** -0.178** -0.487*** -0.491*** -0.522*** -0.462***
0.083 0.082 0.082 0.082 0.082 0.085 0.059 0.086 0.094 0.097 0.072 0.099
pg x Post -0.017 -0.017 -0.072 -0.071 -0.068 -0.068 -0.206*** -0.012 -0.259*** -0.257*** -0.357*** -0.213**
0.074 0.074 0.075 0.075 0.075 0.074 0.048 0.079 0.087 0.088 0.058 0.09
Indigent Status -0.406** -0.406*** -0.396** -0.087 -0.370*** -1.527*** -1.511*** -1.150*** -1.536***
0.157 0.157 0.156 0.114 0.142 0.234 0.237 0.179 0.233
Late receiver -0.152 -0.142 -0.226*** -0.690*** -0.161 -0.145 -0.230*** -0.688***
0.109 0.114 0.077 0.093 0.107 0.112 0.076 0.093
Frequency (-1) 0.034 0.047
0.042 0.042
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Billed amount (-1) 0.019*** 0.019***
0 0
Tariff rate (-1) 0.326*** 0.326***
0.006 0.006
Tips x indigent -0.189 -0.227 -0.160* -0.216
0.158 0.158 0.092 0.147
Graph x indigent 0.741** 0.756** 0.496** 0.661**
0.348 0.353 0.205 0.316
Financial gains x indigent 0.443* 0.401* 0.316** 0.372*
0.237 0.243 0.158 0.22
Social norm x indigent -0.273* -0.276* -0.135 -0.300**
0.155 0.159 0.099 0.151
Intrinsic motivation x indigent -0.127 -0.168 -0.091 -0.105
0.165 0.164 0.099 0.156
Social recognition x indigent -0.265 -0.293* -0.14 -0.301*
0.161 0.169 0.108 0.155
Public Good x indigent -0.292** -0.298** -0.147 -0.288**
0.144 0.148 0.09 0.141
Post x indigent 1.969*** 1.931*** 1.817*** 2.056***
0.215 0.219 0.179 0.249
Tips x indigent x Post 0.259 0.296* 0.179* 0.281*
0.165 0.166 0.097 0.166
Graph x indigent x Post -0.555 -0.574 -0.365* -0.555
0.351 0.358 0.215 0.342
Financial gains x indigent x Post -0.088 -0.047 -0.063 -0.076
0.221 0.23 0.153 0.23
Social norm x indigent x Post 0.525*** 0.527*** 0.270*** 0.524***
0.149 0.154 0.094 0.162
Intrinsic motivation x indigent x Post 0.340** 0.380*** 0.237** 0.303*
0.146 0.145 0.098 0.158
Social recognition x indigent x Post 0.573*** 0.599*** 0.443*** 0.609***
0.158 0.164 0.112 0.165
Public Good x indigent x Post 0.311** 0.316** 0.214** 0.326**
0.153 0.155 0.093 0.158
Constant 14.971*** 18.111*** 21.736*** 21.787*** 21.789*** 21.844*** 19.434*** 17.628*** 22.132*** 22.185*** 19.755*** 17.983***
0.081 0.31 0.418 0.42 0.42 0.412 0.361 0.361 0.424 0.413 0.367 0.364
Observations 2 074 219 2 074 219 2 074 219 2 074 219 2 074 219 2 042 709 2 042 709 1 821 003 2 074 219 2 042 709 2 042 709 1 821 003
Treated 1 769 214 1 769 214 1 769 214 1 769 214 1 769 214 1 742 722 1 742 722 1 553 673 1 769 214 1 742 722 1 742 722 1 553 673
Treat1 313 199 313 199 313 199 313 199 313 199 308 128 308 128 274 927 313 199 308 128 308 128 274 927
Treat2 225 771 225 771 225 771 225 771 225 771 222 735 222 735 198 680 225 771 222 735 222 735 198 680
Treat3 223 460 223 460 223 460 223 460 223 460 220 433 220 433 196 652 223 460 220 433 220 433 196 652
Treat4 236 743 236 743 236 743 236 743 236 743 233 000 233 000 207 937 236 743 233 000 233 000 207 937
Control 305 005 305 005 305 005 305 005 305 005 299 987 299 987 267 330 305 005 299 987 299 987 267 330
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Clusters 672 672 672 672 672 672 672 672 672 672 672 672
Fpvalue 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.001
R-squared 0.416 0.421 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.441 0.588 0.476 0.441 0.442 0.588 0.477
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Table D.7: Fixed Effects no trend
I II III V VII VIII IX X XI XII XIII XIV
Monthly
con-
sumption
(kl)
Monthly
con-
sumption
(kl)
Monthly
con-
sumption
(kl)
Monthly
con-
sumption
(kl)
Monthly
con-
sumption
(kl)
Monthly
con-
sumption
(kl)
Monthly
con-
sumption
(kl)
Monthly
con-
sumption
(kl)
Monthly
con-
sumption
(kl)
Monthly
con-
sumption
(kl)
Monthly
con-
sumption
(kl)
Monthly
con-
sumption
(kl)
Post -1.662*** -1.662*** -1.722*** -1.738*** -1.738*** -1.647*** -1.894*** -1.797*** -2.421*** -2.352*** -2.546*** -2.514***
0.134 0.134 0.133 0.132 0.132 0.134 0.121 0.146 0.134 0.127 0.129 0.144
Tips x Post -0.137* -0.137* -0.129* -0.127* -0.127* -0.128* -0.127* -0.101 -0.202** -0.210*** -0.201*** -0.191**
0.073 0.073 0.072 0.072 0.072 0.073 0.065 0.072 0.08 0.08 0.072 0.083
Graph x Post -0.815*** -0.815*** -0.809*** -0.795*** -0.795*** -0.779*** -0.774*** -0.808*** -0.239*** -0.234*** -0.242*** -0.231***
0.113 0.113 0.112 0.112 0.112 0.112 0.103 0.118 0.081 0.081 0.073 0.085
Financial gains x Post -0.852*** -0.852*** -0.845*** -0.832*** -0.832*** -0.826*** -0.792*** -0.820*** -0.316*** -0.323*** -0.299*** -0.283***
0.108 0.108 0.106 0.106 0.106 0.106 0.097 0.11 0.076 0.078 0.07 0.077
Social norm x Post 0.018 0.018 0.04 0.038 0.038 0.02 0.015 0.064 -0.305*** -0.314*** -0.288*** -0.286***
0.079 0.079 0.079 0.079 0.079 0.08 0.07 0.081 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.09
Intrinsic motivation x Post -0.121* -0.121* -0.098 -0.1 -0.1 -0.088 -0.091 -0.062 -0.319*** -0.317*** -0.308*** -0.294***
0.068 0.068 0.067 0.067 0.067 0.069 0.062 0.07 0.086 0.088 0.08 0.087
Social recognition x Post -0.242*** -0.242*** -0.239*** -0.240*** -0.240*** -0.247*** -0.270*** -0.217** -0.503*** -0.516*** -0.521*** -0.498***
0.085 0.085 0.085 0.084 0.084 0.086 0.078 0.087 0.096 0.097 0.09 0.099
Public Good x Post -0.052 -0.052 -0.106 -0.109 -0.109 -0.124 -0.153** -0.071 -0.286*** -0.294*** -0.315*** -0.270***
0.075 0.075 0.075 0.075 0.075 0.075 0.067 0.077 0.085 0.086 0.077 0.088
Indigent status 2.139*** 2.139*** 2.197*** 2.215*** 1.792*** 1.412*** 1.434*** 1.425*** 0.941**
0.323 0.323 0.327 0.333 0.326 0.389 0.389 0.388 0.369
Frequency (-1) -0.036 -0.022
0.038 0.037
Billed amount (-1) 0.005*** 0.005***
0 0
Tariff rate (-1) -0.053*** -0.053***
0.003 0.003
Post x indigent 2.079*** 2.059*** 2.020*** 2.187***
0.235 0.238 0.224 0.268
Tips x indigent 0.142 0.14 0.197 0.077
0.249 0.237 0.228 0.269
Graph x indigent -1.033* -0.806 -0.723 -1.063
0.599 0.575 0.531 0.665
Financial gains x indigent -1.006** -1.016*** -0.922** -0.781*
0.403 0.392 0.377 0.434
Social norm x indigent -0.506 -0.406 -0.367 -0.365
0.323 0.324 0.307 0.336
Intrinsic motivation x indigent -0.481 -0.507* -0.413 -0.341
274
0.295 0.298 0.279 0.323
Social recognition x indigent -0.534* -0.541* -0.435 -0.607*
0.301 0.3 0.279 0.32
Public Good x indigent -0.585** -0.574** -0.508** -0.555**
0.268 0.276 0.256 0.267
Tips x indigent x Post 0.235 0.259 0.23 0.280*
0.158 0.162 0.143 0.156
Graph x indigent x Post -0.542* -0.553* -0.502* -0.495
0.324 0.334 0.293 0.321
Financial gains x indigent x Post -0.114 -0.068 -0.073 -0.075
0.241 0.252 0.224 0.235
Social norm x indigent x Post 0.566*** 0.551*** 0.479*** 0.563***
0.155 0.159 0.139 0.158
Intrinsic motivation x indigent x Post 0.243* 0.276* 0.253* 0.258*
0.142 0.146 0.132 0.15
Social recognition x indigent x Post 0.567*** 0.585*** 0.540*** 0.608***
0.159 0.165 0.15 0.163
Public Good x indigent x Post 0.261* 0.251 0.231* 0.307**
0.155 0.157 0.138 0.156
Constant 23.264*** 23.264*** 26.914*** 26.259*** 26.259*** 26.275*** 25.220*** 27.275*** 26.566*** 26.586*** 25.520*** 27.613***
0.066 0.066 0.252 0.28 0.28 0.275 0.315 0.257 0.284 0.279 0.315 0.261
Observations 2 074 219 2074219 2 074 219 2 074 219 2 074 219 2042709 2042709 1821003 2 074 219 2 042 709 2 042 709 1 821 003
Treated 1 769 214 1 769 214 1 769 214 1 769 214 1 769 214 1742722 1742722 1553673 1 769 214 1742722 1742722 1553673
Control 305 005 305 005 305 005 305 005 305 005 299987 299987 267330 305 005 299987 299987 267330
Clusters 672 672 672 672 672 672 672 672 672 672 672 672
Fpvalue 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
R-squared 0.012 0.012 0.074 0.074 0.074 0.076 0.093 0.088 0.078 0.079 0.097 0.092
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Appendix E
Appendix to Chapter 5
E.1 Be´nabou and Tirole’s (2006) Model on
Incentives and Prosocial Behaviour
Note: The explanation of this model as it relates to our study is taken from the
work by Exley (2014) as well as Rosa Dias (2013).
According to Be´nabou and Tirole (2006), the benefit of conserving water a is equal
to the household’s intrinsic motivation for conserving water va and for the reward
vy.
The level of a is incentivised at a rate y according to their intrinsic, extrinsic and
image motivations and cost of conserving water (Exley, 2014). Preferences for how
much the household values the public signal vy leads to a utility of (va + yvy)a.
The cost to the household of conserving water is donated by C(a) (Exley, 2014):
U(a, y) = (va + yvy)a− C(a) (E.1)
The reputational payoff from a, given y, is (Exley, 2014):
x[γaE(va|a, y)− γyE(vy|a, y)] (E.2)
with γa and γy ≥ 0. x>0 is the measure of visibility of the household’s water
savings. We exogenously vary the visibility of x by allowing an opt-out in one
treatment. γa and γy are the levels at which the household would like to appear
prosocial and not image concerned, respectively (Exley, 2014). Image motivation is
the combination of how prosocial or image concerned others believe the agent is
based on the incentive given for conserving water a, which is weighted by the
household’s preference to appear prosocial - ua and not image concerned - uy given
visibility of the household’s water savings efforts. This is captured by I(a, y):
I(a, y) = uaE(va|a, y)− uyE(vy|a, y) (E.3)
and entered in the utility maximization function with respect to a (Exley, 2014):
U(a, y) = (va + yvy)a+ I(a, y)− C(a) (E.4)
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This model helps to structure our hypotheses and questions at hand as we
randomise the visibility of social recognition.
E.2 Treatments
Figure E.1: Tips
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Figure E.2: Tips: Afrikaans language
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Figure E.3: Intrinsic Motivation Message
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Figure E.4: Intrinsic Motivation Message: Afrikaans language
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Figure E.5: Public Recognition Message
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Figure E.6: Public Recognition Message: Afrikaans language
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Figure E.7: Social Recognition: Opt Out
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Figure E.8: Social Recognition: Opt Out: Afrikaans language
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Figure E.9: May Insert for Winners in both Social Recognition treatments
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Figure E.10: May Insert for Winners in both Social Recognition treatments:
Afrikaans language
  
•  
•  
•  
 
 
 
•  
 
•  
 
 
•  
286
E.3 Hypotheses
Figure E.11: Intrinsic Motivation Hypothesis I
Figure E.12: Social Recognition Hypothesis II
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Figure E.13: Social Recognition Hypothesis III
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E.4 Robustness checks
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Table E.1: DiD Once off results (Dec 2015 - Jan 2016)
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X XI
Monthly
consumption
(kl)
Monthly
consumption
(kl)
Monthly
consumption
(kl)
Monthly
consumption
(kl)
Monthly
consumption
(kl)
Monthly
consumption
(kl)
Monthly
consumption
(kl)
Monthly
consumption
(kl)
Monthly
consumption
(kl)
Monthly
consumption
(kl)
Monthly
consumption
(kl)
Tips 0.088 0.085 0.088 0.092 0.088 0.093 0.076 0.112 0.145 0.162* 0.152*
0.085 0.083 0.083 0.075 0.083 0.075 0.066 0.074 0.091 0.083 0.089
Intrinsic 0.062 0.085 0.097 0.027 0.097 0.026 -0.008 0.035 0.033 0.058 0.051
0.098 0.096 0.096 0.087 0.096 0.087 0.068 0.086 0.11 0.091 0.107
Image
Motivation 0.324* 0.316* 0.318* 0.289* -0.008 -0.051 -0.033 -0.04 0.14 0.1 0.154
0.17 0.169 0.17 0.165 0.109 0.099 0.083 0.097 0.149 0.143 0.146
SR Opt Out 0.077 0.093 0.102 -0.007 0.101 -0.007 0.055 0.008 0.04 0.149 0.057
0.088 0.086 0.086 0.083 0.086 0.083 0.072 0.081 0.102 0.09 0.099
Post -2.022*** -2.028*** -2.031*** -1.956*** -2.031*** -1.957*** -2.199*** -1.954*** -2.585*** -2.706*** -2.592***
0.193 0.193 0.193 0.198 0.193 0.198 0.206 0.2 0.243 0.273 0.244
Tips x Post -0.059 -0.061 -0.062 -0.074 -0.063 -0.074 -0.065 -0.093 -0.081 -0.106 -0.084
0.09 0.09 0.09 0.088 0.09 0.088 0.083 0.089 0.11 0.107 0.11
Intrinsic x
Post 0.055 0.055 0.055 0.064 0.055 0.064 0.046 0.043 0.03 -0.042 0.011
0.1 0.1 0.1 0.098 0.1 0.098 0.087 0.101 0.122 0.11 0.123
Image
Motivation x
Post
-0.575*** -0.561*** -0.554*** -0.590*** -0.245** -0.268** -0.327*** -0.271** -0.536*** -0.555*** -0.537***
0.185 0.185 0.186 0.184 0.123 0.123 0.119 0.123 0.169 0.173 0.169
SR Opt Out x
Post -0.046 -0.05 -0.051 -0.008 -0.051 -0.008 -0.101 -0.026 -0.056 -0.200* -0.061
0.091 0.09 0.09 0.087 0.09 0.087 0.084 0.087 0.104 0.106 0.105
QPV1 -4.157*** -3.587*** -2.200*** -3.591*** -2.204*** -1.602*** -2.108*** -2.213*** -1.613*** -2.116***
0.572 0.565 0.364 0.567 0.365 0.285 0.353 0.367 0.286 0.355
QPV2 -4.366*** -3.966*** -2.358*** -3.972*** -2.366*** -1.721*** -2.252*** -2.355*** -1.711*** -2.241***
0.544 0.521 0.357 0.522 0.358 0.292 0.345 0.36 0.293 0.347
QPV3 -3.813*** -3.807*** -2.221*** -3.807*** -2.222*** -1.524*** -2.110*** -2.223*** -1.529*** -2.111***
0.42 0.41 0.282 0.41 0.282 0.228 0.272 0.282 0.228 0.272
QPV4 -2.743*** -2.766*** -1.626*** -2.763*** -1.622*** -1.026*** -1.537*** -1.624*** -1.030*** -1.539***
0.272 0.268 0.18 0.268 0.18 0.145 0.173 0.18 0.145 0.173
Indigent status -0.875*** -0.604*** -0.865*** -0.593*** -0.439*** -0.560*** -1.544*** -1.222*** -1.518***
0.194 0.158 0.195 0.159 0.133 0.154 0.268 0.247 0.266
Less November 0.621*** 0.621*** 0.134*** 0.579*** 0.622*** 0.135*** 0.579***
0.009 0.009 0.011 0.009 0.009 0.011 0.009
Frequency (-1) 1.535** 1.636** 0.973 1.583** 1.593** 0.944 1.542**
0.712 0.711 0.752 0.707 0.709 0.753 0.704
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Billed amount
(-1) 0.026*** 0.026***
0.001 0.001
Tariff rate (-1) 0.159*** 0.160***
0.004 0.004
Post x indigent 1.876*** 1.531*** 1.908***
0.344 0.335 0.348
Tips x indigent -0.153 -0.269** -0.118
0.161 0.129 0.159
Intrinsic x
indigent 0.154 -0.033 0.132
0.169 0.128 0.165
Image
Motivation x
indigent
-0.451 -0.313 -0.462
0.3 0.31 0.301
SR Opt out x
indigent -0.028 -0.188 -0.032
0.179 0.147 0.176
Tips x
indigent x Post 0.025 0.141 -0.021
0.178 0.158 0.18
Intrinsic x
indigent x Post -0.238 -0.035 -0.248
0.181 0.161 0.184
Image
Motivation x
indigent x Post
0.560* 0.483 0.557*
0.301 0.324 0.306
SR Opt Out x
indigent x Post -0.06 0.129 -0.095
0.196 0.175 0.193
Constant 13.325*** 16.376*** 16.495*** 8.904*** 16.496*** 8.903*** 11.324*** 7.407*** 9.200*** 11.557*** 7.704***
0.135 0.377 0.373 0.289 0.373 0.288 0.259 0.277 0.304 0.281 0.295
Observations 281 373 281 373 281 373 272 452 281 373 272 452 263 265 271 049 272 452 263 265 271 049
Treated 218 061 218 061 218 061 212 552 218 061 212 552 205 343 211 486 212 552 205 343 211 486
Treat1 65 014 65 014 65 014 62 171 65 014 62 171 60 044 61 862 62 171 60 044 61 862
Treat2 49 605 49 605 49 605 48 871 49 605 48 871 47 224 48 630 48 871 47 224 48 630
Treat3 48 553 48 553 48 553 47 385 48 553 47 385 45 824 47 150 47 385 45 824 47 150
Treat4 54 889 54 889 54 889 54 125 54 889 54 125 52 251 53 844 54 125 52 251 53 844
Control 63 312 63 312 63 312 59 900 63 312 59 900 57 922 59 563 59 900 57 922 59 563
Clusters 652 652 652 652 652 652 652 652 652 652 652
Fpvalue 0.036 0.042 0.047 0.025 0.259 0.16 0.041 0.185 0.023 0.013 0.026
R-squared 0.475 0.479 0.479 0.582 0.48 0.583 0.689 0.591 0.584 0.69 0.593
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Notes: Regressions include tariff block, month and suburb fixed effects
Standard errors are clustered at the suburb level and are presented in parenthesis
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Table E.2: Pooled regressions (monthly consumption) Dec 2014 - April 2015
I II III V VI VIII IX X XI XII XIII IXV XV XVI
Monthly
con-
sumption
(kl)
Monthly
con-
sumption
(kl)
Monthly
con-
sumption
(kl)
Monthly
con-
sumption
(kl)
Monthly
con-
sumption
(kl)
Monthly
con-
sumption
(kl)
Monthly
con-
sumption
(kl)
Monthly
con-
sumption
(kl)
Monthly
con-
sumption
(kl)
Monthly
con-
sumption
(kl)
Monthly
con-
sumption
(kl)
Monthly
con-
sumption
(kl)
Monthly
con-
sumption
(kl)
Monthly
con-
sumption
(kl)
Tips -0.054 -0.062 -0.067 -0.067 -0.063 -0.067 -0.063 -0.063 -0.058 -0.074 -0.074 -0.075 -0.059 -0.088
0.059 0.063 0.063 0.063 0.054 0.063 0.054 0.054 0.042 0.053 0.065 0.065 0.049 0.063
Intrinsic
Motivation -0.099 -0.119* -0.112* -0.109* -0.196*** -0.109* -0.195*** -0.195*** -0.170*** -0.207*** -0.225*** -0.224*** -0.192*** -0.245***
0.063 0.062 0.062 0.062 0.056 0.062 0.056 0.056 0.044 0.054 0.067 0.067 0.054 0.064
Image
Motivation -0.184*** -0.124** -0.130** -0.128** -0.182*** -0.053 -0.132** -0.132** -0.116** -0.114** -0.224*** -0.226*** -0.205*** -0.205***
0.055 0.055 0.055 0.055 0.053 0.057 0.056 0.056 0.046 0.054 0.064 0.064 0.051 0.06
SR Opt Out -0.091 -0.1 -0.095 -0.093 -0.173*** -0.093 -0.173*** -0.175*** -0.145*** -0.176*** -0.224*** -0.226*** -0.177*** -0.219***
0.058 0.063 0.063 0.063 0.052 0.063 0.052 0.052 0.041 0.054 0.065 0.065 0.051 0.062
Pre
intervention
monthly
consumption
0.220*** 0.218*** 0.218*** 0.146*** 0.218*** 0.146*** 0.146*** 0.122*** 0.139*** 0.146*** 0.146*** 0.122*** 0.139***
0.015 0.015 0.015 0.011 0.015 0.011 0.011 0.01 0.012 0.011 0.011 0.01 0.012
Property
Value Q1 -1.860*** -1.719*** -0.843*** -1.721*** -0.845*** -0.846*** -0.643*** -0.729*** -0.843*** -0.844*** -0.641*** -0.727***
0.331 0.338 0.225 0.337 0.225 0.225 0.178 0.199 0.225 0.224 0.178 0.199
Property
Value Q2 -2.187*** -2.090*** -1.041*** -2.090*** -1.042*** -1.044*** -0.790*** -0.933*** -1.041*** -1.044*** -0.790*** -0.933***
0.306 0.302 0.222 0.302 0.222 0.222 0.171 0.186 0.222 0.222 0.171 0.186
Property
Value Q3 -2.045*** -2.046*** -1.017*** -2.046*** -1.017*** -1.019*** -0.750*** -0.938*** -1.018*** -1.019*** -0.750*** -0.938***
0.229 0.226 0.17 0.226 0.171 0.171 0.127 0.152 0.171 0.17 0.127 0.152
Property
Value Q4 -1.535*** -1.542*** -0.818*** -1.543*** -0.819*** -0.820*** -0.593*** -0.771*** -0.819*** -0.821*** -0.593*** -0.772***
0.15 0.149 0.111 0.149 0.111 0.111 0.086 0.103 0.111 0.111 0.086 0.103
Indigent status -0.219* -0.032 -0.220* -0.032 -0.033 -0.032 0.025 -0.141 -0.143 -0.116 -0.085
0.121 0.091 0.121 0.091 0.091 0.076 0.084 0.106 0.106 0.086 0.102
10% target* 0.549*** 0.549*** 0.549*** 0.357*** 0.521*** 0.549*** 0.549*** 0.357*** 0.521***
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.006 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.006 0.01
Late Receiver -0.451*** -0.309** -0.009 -0.391*** -0.590*** -0.306** -0.006 -0.388*** -0.588***
0.138 0.149 0.164 0.13 0.137 0.149 0.164 0.13 0.136
Frequency (-1) 0.299*** 0.299***
0.066 0.066
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Billed amount
(-1) 0.009*** 0.009***
0 0
Tariff rate (-1) 0.146*** 0.146***
0.005 0.005
Tips x
Indigent 0.037 0.038 0.004 0.044
0.12 0.119 0.096 0.12
Intrinsic
Motivation x
Indigent
0.094 0.094 0.072 0.118
0.114 0.114 0.094 0.114
Image
Motivation x
Indigent
0.272** 0.274** 0.257*** 0.267**
0.115 0.114 0.094 0.116
SR Opt Out x
Indigent 0.155 0.155 0.1 0.133
0.11 0.11 0.086 0.117
Constant 13.003*** 7.782*** 9.334*** 9.364*** 3.865*** 9.353*** 3.858*** 3.574*** 5.472*** 2.390*** 3.893*** 3.608*** 5.498*** 2.425***
0.071 0.216 0.281 0.283 0.191 0.283 0.191 0.197 0.175 0.177 0.193 0.198 0.177 0.179
TB baseline YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Month fixed
effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 742 968 567 810 567 810 567 810 550 768 567 810 550 768 550 768 550 768 500 511 550 768 550 768 550 768 500 511
Treated 579 962 443 893 443 893 443 893 432 596 443 893 432 596 432 596 432 596 393 081 432 596 432 596 432 596 393 081
Tips 168 577 128 864 128 864 128 864 122 906 128 864 122 906 122 906 122 906 111 546 122 906 122 906 122 906 111 546
Intrinsic
Motivation 127 391 97 045 97 045 97 045 95 712 97 045 95 712 95 712 95 712 86 957 95 712 95 712 95 712 86 957
Image
Motivation 143 083 109 929 109 929 109 929 107 325 109 929 107 325 107 325 107 325 97 586 107 325 107 325 107 325 97 586
SR Opt Out 140 911 108 055 108 055 108 055 106653 108 055 106 653 106 653 106 653 96 992 106 653 106 653 106 653 96 992
Control 163 006 123 917 123 917 123 917 118 172 123 917 118 172 118 172 118 172 107 430 118 172 118 172 118 172 107 430
Clusters 652 649 649 649 649 649 649 649 649 649 649 649 649 649
Fpvalue 0.015 0.145 0.15 0.163 0 0.437 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
R-squared 0.426 0.509 0.51 0.51 0.575 0.51 0.575 0.575 0.609 0.585 0.575 0.575 0.609 0.585
294
Table E.3: Pooled regressions: Relative consumption (Dec 2014 - April 2015)
I II III IV V VIII IX X XI XII XIII XIV
Relative
consump-
tion
(kl)
Relative
consump-
tion
(kl)
Relative
consump-
tion
(kl)
Relative
consump-
tion
(kl)
Relative
consump-
tion
(kl)
Relative
consump-
tion
(kl)
Relative
consump-
tion
(kl)
Relative
consump-
tion
(kl)
Relative
consump-
tion
(kl)
Relative
consump-
tion
(kl)
Relative
consump-
tion
(kl)
Relative
consump-
tion
(kl)
Tips -0.009** -0.009** -0.009** -0.009** -0.009** -0.009** -0.009** -0.009*** -0.009** -0.009** -0.008** -0.009**
0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
Intrinsic
Motivation -0.010*** -0.011*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.011*** -0.012*** -0.009** -0.009** -0.008** -0.010**
0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
Image
Motivation -0.017*** -0.009** -0.009** -0.010** -0.009** -0.009** -0.009** -0.009** -0.012*** -0.013*** -0.012*** -0.013***
0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
SR Opt Out -0.010*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.010** -0.011*** -0.012*** -0.010*** -0.011***
0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
Property
Value Q1 0.139*** 0.107*** 0.119*** 0.107*** 0.119*** 0.126*** 0.111*** 0.119*** 0.119*** 0.126*** 0.111***
0.015 0.014 0.015 0.014 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015
Property
Value Q2 0.086*** 0.064*** 0.077*** 0.064*** 0.077*** 0.086*** 0.068*** 0.077*** 0.077*** 0.086*** 0.068***
0.011 0.009 0.011 0.009 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011
Property
Value Q3 0.053*** 0.053*** 0.065*** 0.053*** 0.065*** 0.074*** 0.059*** 0.065*** 0.065*** 0.074*** 0.059***
0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.008
Property
Value Q4 0.025*** 0.026*** 0.034*** 0.026*** 0.034*** 0.041*** 0.031*** 0.034*** 0.034*** 0.041*** 0.031***
0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006
Indigent status 0.050*** 0.050*** 0.050*** 0.050*** 0.051*** 0.050*** 0.049*** 0.049*** 0.051*** 0.049***
0.007 0.008 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
10% target* 0.005*** 0.005*** 0 0.007*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0 0.007***
0.001 0.001 0 0.001 0.001 0.001 0 0.001
Late Receiver -0.002 0 -0.004 -0.007 -0.002 0 -0.004 -0.007
0.01 0.011 0.01 0.009 0.01 0.011 0.009 0.009
Frequency (-1) 0.003 0.003
0.004 0.004
Billed amount
(-1) 0.000*** 0.000***
0 0
Tariff rate (-1) -0.006*** -0.006***
0 0
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Tips x
Indigent 0 0 -0.001 -0.002
0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008
Intrinsic
Motivation x
Indigent
-0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.006
0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008
Image
Motivation x
Indigent
0.009 0.009 0.009 0.01
0.009 0.009 0.009 0.01
SR Opt Out x
Indigent 0.002 0.002 0 0.002
0.009 0.009 0.009 0.01
Constant 0.011 -0.073*** -0.080*** -0.144*** -0.080*** -0.146*** -0.110*** -0.094*** -0.143*** -0.146*** -0.110*** -0.093***
0.007 0.012 0.012 0.018 0.012 0.019 0.016 0.016 0.018 0.02 0.016 0.017
TB baseline YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Month fixed
effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 567 801 567 801 567 801 550 759 567 801 550 759 550 759 500 504 550 759 550 759 550 759 500 504
Treated 443 887 443 887 443 887 432 590 443 887 432 590 432 590 393 077 432 590 432 590 432 590 393 077
Tips 128 864 128 864 128 864 122 906 128 864 122 906 122 906 111 546 122 906 122 906 122 906 111 546
Intrinsic
Motivation 97 041 97 041 97 041 95 708 97 041 95 708 95 708 86 955 95 708 95 708 95 708 86 955
Image
Motivation 109 927 109 927 109 927 107 323 109 927 107 323 107 323 97 584 107 323 107 323 107 323 97 584
SR Opt Out 108 055 108 055 108 055 106 653 108 055 106 653 106 653 96 992 106 653 106 653 106 653 96 992
Control 123 914 123 914 123 914 118 169 123 914 118 169 118 169 107 427 118 169 118 169 118 169 107 427
Clusters 649 649 649 649 649 649 649 649 649 649 649 649
Fpvalue 0.001 0.018 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.014 0.016 0.022 0.022 0.042 0.029
R-squared 0.029 0.034 0.035 0.039 0.035 0.039 0.049 0.048 0.039 0.039 0.049 0.048
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Table E.4: Pooled regressions using Daily Average (April 2014 - May 2015)
I II III IV V VI VIII IX X XI XII XIII XIV XV
Daily
average
(kl)
Daily
average
(kl)
Daily
average
(kl)
Daily
average
(kl)
Daily
average
(kl)
Daily
average
(kl)
Daily
average
(kl)
Daily
average
(kl)
Daily
average
(kl)
Daily
average
(kl)
Daily
average
(kl)
Daily
average
(kl)
Daily
average
(kl)
Daily
average
(kl)
Tips 0 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0 -0.002
0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
Intrinsic
Motivation -0.001 -0.004* -0.004 -0.004 -0.004* -0.004 -0.004* -0.004* -0.003 -0.005** -0.004 -0.004 -0.002 -0.005
0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
Image
Motivation -0.007*** -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 -0.005** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.012*** -0.012*** -0.011*** -0.011***
0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
SR Opt Out -0.003 -0.004* -0.004* -0.004* -0.005** -0.004* -0.005** -0.005** -0.004* -0.006*** -0.006** -0.006** -0.004 -0.007**
0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
Pre
intervention
mean
consumption
0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.008*** 0.013*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.006*** 0.007***
0.001 0.001 0.001 0 0.001 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Property
Value Q1 0.034*** 0.028*** -0.012* 0.028*** -0.012* -0.012* -0.009 -0.01 -0.012* -0.012* -0.009 -0.01
0.009 0.009 0.007 0.009 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.007
Property
Value Q2 0.043*** 0.039*** -0.018** 0.039*** -0.018** 0.018*** -0.013** -0.015** -0.018** -0.018** -0.013** -0.015**
0.009 0.008 0.007 0.008 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.007
Property
Value Q3 0.037*** 0.037*** -0.016** 0.037*** -0.016** -0.016** -0.010* -0.014** -0.016** -0.016** -0.010* -0.014**
0.007 0.007 0.006 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.006
Property
Value Q4 0.027*** 0.028*** 0.014*** -0.028*** 0.014*** 0.014*** -0.008** -0.013*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.008** -0.013***
0.005 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
Indigent status 0.011*** -0.008** -0.011*** -0.008** -0.008** -0.010*** -0.007** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.011***
0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
10% target* 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.010*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.010*** 0.017***
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Late Receiver 0.010** 0.015*** 0.020*** 0.014*** 0.015*** 0.016*** 0.020*** 0.014*** 0.016***
0.004 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.003 0.004
Frequency (-1) 0.005** 0.005**
0.002 0.002
Billed amount
(-1) 0.000*** 0.000***
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0 0
Tariff rate (-1) 0.004*** 0.004***
0 0
Tips x
Indigent 0.002 0.002 0 0.001
0.005 0.005 0.004 0.005
Intrinsic
Motivation x
Indigent
0 0 -0.002 0.001
0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
Image
Motivation x
Indigent
0.015*** 0.015*** 0.013*** 0.014***
0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
SR Opt Out x
Indigent 0.005 0.005 0.002 0.004
0.004 0.004 0.003 0.004
Constant 0.428*** 0.256*** 0.286*** 0.288*** 0.168*** 0.288*** 0.168*** 0.164*** 0.249*** 0.140*** 0.170*** 0.165*** 0.250*** 0.141***
0.003 0.008 0.01 0.01 0.008 0.01 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.007
TB baseline YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Month fixed
effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 742 968 681 603 681 603 681 603 658 839 681 603 658 839 658 839 658 839 585 855 658 839 658 839 658 839 585 855
Treated 579 962 532 318 532 318 532 318 517 420 532 318 517 420 517 420 517 420 460 076 517 420 517 420 517 420 460 076
Tips 168 577 154 477 154 477 154 477 146 454 154 477 146 454 146 454 146 454 130 220 146 454 146 454 146 454 130 220
Intrinsic
Motivation 127 391 116 587 116 587 116 587 114 925 116 587 114 925 114 925 114 925 102 145 114 925 114 925 114 925 102 145
Image
Motivation 143 083 131 871 131 871 131 871 128 425 131 871 128 425 128 425 128 425 114 124 128 425 128 425 128 425 114 124
SR Opt Out 140 911 129 383 129 383 129 383 127 616 129 383 127 616 127 616 127 616 113 587 127 616 127 616 127 616 113 587
Control 163 006 149 285 149 285 149 285 141 419 149 285 141 419 141 419 141 419 125 779 141 419 141 419 141 419 125 779
Clusters 652 649 649 649 649 649 649 649 649 649 649 649 649 649
Fpvalue 0.016 0.26 0.291 0.321 0.049 0.142 0.006 0.006 0.008 0.004 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
R-squared 0.259 0.317 0.318 0.318 0.351 0.318 0.351 0.351 0.379 0.359 0.351 0.351 0.379 0.359
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Table E.5: DiD (no fixed effects, no trend)
I II III IV V VI VIII IX X XI XII XIII XIV
Monthly
consump-
tion
(kl)
Monthly
consump-
tion
(kl)
Monthly
consump-
tion
(kl)
Monthly
consump-
tion
(kl)
Monthly
consump-
tion
(kl)
Monthly
consump-
tion
(kl)
Monthly
consump-
tion
(kl)
Monthly
consump-
tion
(kl)
Monthly
consump-
tion
(kl)
Monthly
consump-
tion
(kl)
Monthly
consump-
tion
(kl)
Monthly
consump-
tion
(kl)
Monthly
consump-
tion
(kl)
Tips 0.047 0.037 0.038 0.05 0.038 0.05 0.051 0.049 0.048 0.132* 0.144* 0.116** 0.134*
0.081 0.08 0.08 0.064 0.08 0.064 0.066 0.046 0.064 0.079 0.081 0.058 0.079
Intrinsic
Motivation 0.042 0.062 0.067 -0.046 0.067 -0.046 -0.064 -0.048 -0.051 0.052 0.048 0.046 0.04
0.085 0.084 0.084 0.074 0.084 0.074 0.074 0.051 0.072 0.094 0.096 0.067 0.091
Image
Motivation 0.068 0.032 0.035 -0.006 0.072 0.005 0.003 0.064 0.049 0.133 0.142 0.156** 0.189**
0.086 0.086 0.086 0.076 0.09 0.081 0.083 0.056 0.08 0.097 0.098 0.068 0.096
SR Opt Out 0.057 0.069 0.072 -0.044 0.072 -0.044 -0.045 -0.011 -0.036 0.006 0.013 0.038 0.014
0.077 0.075 0.075 0.072 0.075 0.072 0.073 0.049 0.07 0.086 0.087 0.062 0.084
Post -1.623*** -1.678*** -1.674*** -1.659*** -1.675*** -1.659*** -1.764*** -2.159*** -1.518*** -2.340*** -2.460*** -2.780*** -2.230***
0.13 0.129 0.129 0.134 0.129 0.134 0.135 0.117 0.146 0.134 0.128 0.13 0.14
Tips x Post -0.109 -0.103 -0.103 -0.102 -0.103 -0.102 -0.103 -0.108** -0.112 -0.214*** -0.227*** -0.186*** -0.228***
0.074 0.074 0.074 0.07 0.074 0.07 0.071 0.049 0.073 0.079 0.08 0.057 0.085
Intrinsic x
Post -0.08 -0.06 -0.059 -0.042 -0.059 -0.042 -0.027 -0.042 -0.037 -0.291*** -0.287*** -0.253*** -0.272***
0.071 0.072 0.072 0.069 0.072 0.069 0.071 0.051 0.072 0.088 0.09 0.067 0.09
Image
Motivation x
Post
-0.226*** -0.224*** -0.223*** -0.224*** -0.219*** -0.222*** -0.223*** -0.297*** -0.222** -0.509*** -0.518*** -0.533*** -0.517***
0.083 0.082 0.082 0.082 0.082 0.082 0.084 0.062 0.086 0.091 0.092 0.073 0.095
SR Opt Out x
Post -0.121 -0.107 -0.106 -0.08 -0.106 -0.08 -0.08 -0.087* -0.08 -0.247*** -0.254*** -0.214*** -0.240***
0.074 0.073 0.073 0.074 0.073 0.074 0.074 0.052 0.078 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.084
Property
Value Q1 -4.316*** -4.058*** -2.689*** -4.059*** -2.689*** -2.669*** -1.885*** -2.434*** -2.670*** -2.652*** -1.871*** -2.402***
0.589 0.563 0.342 0.563 0.342 0.336 0.228 0.321 0.345 0.339 0.231 0.325
Property
Value Q2 -4.594*** -4.415*** -2.837*** -4.415*** -2.837*** -2.824*** -1.940*** -2.627*** -2.816*** -2.802*** -1.921*** -2.594***
0.553 0.525 0.351 0.525 0.351 0.347 0.233 0.325 0.352 0.349 0.234 0.326
Property
Value Q3 -4.099*** -4.099*** -2.548*** -4.099*** -2.548*** -2.526*** -1.642*** -2.398*** -2.538*** -2.518*** -1.635*** -2.380***
0.418 0.413 0.275 0.413 0.275 0.272 0.18 0.255 0.275 0.272 0.18 0.255
Property
Value Q4 -2.937*** -2.949*** -1.829*** -2.950*** -1.830*** -1.812*** -1.126*** -1.726*** -1.827*** -1.810*** -1.126*** -1.720***
0.277 0.276 0.181 0.276 0.181 0.178 0.12 0.164 0.181 0.178 0.12 0.164
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Indigent status -0.409** -0.155 -0.410** -0.155 -0.149 0.02 -0.17 -1.351*** -1.336*** -1.089*** -1.424***
0.193 0.154 0.193 0.154 0.154 0.129 0.141 0.221 0.224 0.185 0.224
10% target* 0.621*** 0.621*** 0.622*** 0.337*** 0.566*** 0.621*** 0.622*** 0.338*** 0.566***
0.011 0.011 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Late Receiver -0.221* -0.062 -0.04 -0.185** -0.552*** -0.071 -0.041 -0.189** -0.555***
0.128 0.123 0.129 0.091 0.117 0.121 0.127 0.089 0.116
Frequency (-1) 0.033 0.045
0.039 0.039
Billed amount
(-1) 0.016*** 0.016***
0 0
Tariff rate (-1) 0.204*** 0.203***
0.004 0.004
Post x indigent 2.076*** 2.038*** 1.911*** 2.170***
0.224 0.229 0.189 0.255
Tips x indigent -0.252* -0.293** -0.213** -0.269**
0.131 0.131 0.085 0.125
Intrinsic x
indigent -0.054 -0.092 -0.059 -0.03
0.149 0.148 0.101 0.147
Image
Motivation x
indigent
-0.257* -0.290* -0.162 -0.290*
0.155 0.162 0.113 0.156
SR Opt out x
indigent -0.021 -0.048 -0.032 -0.019
0.15 0.154 0.105 0.148
Tips x
indigent x Post 0.344** 0.386** 0.245** 0.358**
0.152 0.154 0.101 0.158
Intrinsic x
indigent x Post 0.273* 0.311** 0.208** 0.225
0.143 0.143 0.105 0.155
Image
Motivation x
indigent x Post
0.596*** 0.630*** 0.470*** 0.620***
0.161 0.168 0.124 0.174
SR Opt Out x
indigent x Post 0.238 0.267 0.154 0.218
0.171 0.173 0.119 0.18
Constant 14.846*** 21.597*** 21.654*** 14.175*** 21.656*** 14.176*** 14.197*** 15.622*** 12.218*** 14.531*** 14.548*** 15.942*** 12.589***
0.082 0.456 0.46 0.366 0.459 0.366 0.363 0.348 0.33 0.376 0.371 0.358 0.336
TB baseline YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
300
Month fixed
effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 1 380 281 1 380 281 1 380 281 1 327 866 1 380 281 1 327 866 1 307 866 1 307 866 1 167 551 1 327 866 1 307 866 1 307 866 1 167 551
Treated 1 075 276 1 075 276 1 075 276 1 043 132 1 075 276 1 043 132 1 027 405 1 027 405 917 123 1 043 132 1 027 405 1 027 405 917 123
Tips 313 199 313 199 313 199 295 668 313 199 295 668 291 135 291 135 260 033 295 668 291 135 291 135 260 033
Intrinsic
Motivation 235 372 235 372 235 372 231 838 235 372 231 838 228 258 228 258 203 723 231 838 228 258 228 258 203 723
Image
Motivation 265 693 265 693 265 693 258 300 265 693 258 300 254 714 254 714 227 136 258 300 254 714 254 714 227 136
SR Opt Out 261 012 261 012 261 012 257 326 261 012 257 326 253 298 253 298 226 231 257 326 253 298 253 298 226 231
Control 305 005 305 005 305 005 284 734 305 005 284 734 280 461 280 461 250 428 284 734 280 461 280 461 250 428
Clusters 653 653 653 653 653 653 653 653 653 653 653 653 653
Fpvalue 0.1 0.098 0.099 0.099 0.11 0.101 0.093 0 0.107 0 0 0 0
R-squared 0.412 0.435 0.436 0.517 0.436 0.517 0.519 0.604 0.534 0.518 0.52 0.606 0.536
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Table E.6: DiD with FE (no trend)
I II III IV V VI VIII IX X XI
Monthly
consumption
(kl)
Monthly
consumption
(kl)
Monthly
consumption
(kl)
Monthly
consumption
(kl)
Monthly
consumption
(kl)
Monthly
consumption
(kl)
Monthly
consumption
(kl)
Monthly
consumption
(kl)
Monthly
consumption
(kl)
Monthly
consumption
(kl)
Post -1.720*** -1.738*** -1.738*** -1.658*** -1.894*** -1.773*** -2.428*** -2.377*** -2.561*** -2.509***
0.133 0.132 0.132 0.141 0.122 0.146 0.134 0.132 0.129 0.143
Tips x Post -0.129* -0.127* -0.127* -0.124* -0.123* -0.099 -0.203** -0.215*** -0.203*** -0.196**
0.072 0.072 0.072 0.073 0.064 0.073 0.081 0.082 0.073 0.084
Intrinsic x
Post -0.098 -0.101 -0.101 -0.079 -0.079 -0.063 -0.292*** -0.292*** -0.282*** -0.278***
0.067 0.067 0.067 0.069 0.062 0.07 0.087 0.089 0.081 0.088
Image
Motivation x
Post
-0.246*** -0.247*** -0.247*** -0.257*** -0.278*** -0.240*** -0.502*** -0.518*** -0.522*** -0.510***
0.085 0.084 0.084 0.088 0.079 0.089 0.096 0.097 0.089 0.099
SR Opt Out x
Post -0.116 -0.115 -0.115 -0.109 -0.108 -0.077 -0.242*** -0.250*** -0.234*** -0.234***
0.075 0.075 0.075 0.077 0.068 0.078 0.085 0.085 0.077 0.086
Indigent status 2.369*** 2.369*** 2.398*** 2.415*** 2.022*** 1.443*** 1.446*** 1.447*** 0.994***
0.319 0.319 0.33 0.338 0.327 0.39 0.388 0.388 0.365
Frequency (-1) -0.027 -0.014
0.038 0.038
Billed amount
(-1) 0.005*** 0.005***
0 0
Tariff rate (-1) -0.053*** -0.053***
0.004 0.004
Post x indigent 2.173*** 2.157*** 2.107*** 2.289***
0.234 0.238 0.223 0.266
Tips x indigent -0.054 -0.004 0.064 -0.118
0.255 0.25 0.239 0.273
Intrinsic x
indigent -0.445 -0.46 -0.368 -0.341
0.321 0.324 0.304 0.354
Image
Motivation x
indigent
-0.438 -0.426 -0.331 -0.509
0.307 0.307 0.287 0.331
SR Opt out x
indigent -0.115 -0.134 -0.099 -0.036
0.3 0.286 0.278 0.322
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Tips x
indigent x Post 0.258 0.283* 0.248* 0.300*
0.158 0.161 0.14 0.157
Intrinsic x
indigent x Post 0.162 0.192 0.174 0.166
0.141 0.145 0.131 0.149
Image
Motivation x
indigent x Post
0.527*** 0.541*** 0.495*** 0.556***
0.166 0.172 0.156 0.171
SR Opt Out x
indigent x Post 0.181 0.178 0.143 0.203
0.174 0.176 0.156 0.178
Constant 26.335*** 25.485*** 25.485*** 25.615*** 24.512*** 26.600*** 25.962*** 25.991*** 24.876*** 27.010***
0.255 0.293 0.293 0.291 0.329 0.271 0.297 0.292 0.327 0.274
TB baseline YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Month fixed
effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 1 380 281 1 380 281 1 380 281 1 307 866 1 307 866 1 167 551 1 327 866 1 307 866 1 307 866 1 167 551
Treated 1 075 276 1 075 276 1 075 276 1 027 405 1 027 405 917 123 1 043 132 1 027 405 1 027 405 917 123
Tips 313 199 313 199 313 199 291 135 291 135 260 033 295 668 291 135 291 135 260 033
Intrinsic
Motivation 235 372 235 372 235 372 228 258 228 258 203 723 231 838 228 258 228 258 203 723
Image
Motivation 265 693 265 693 265 693 254 714 254 714 227 136 258 300 254 714 254 714 227 136
SR Opt Out 261 012 261 012 261 012 253 298 253 298 226 231 257 326 253 298 253 298 226 231
Control 305 005 305 005 305 005 280 461 280 461 250 428 284 734 280 461 280 461 250 428
Clusters 653 653 653 653 653 653 653 653 653 653
Fpvalue 0.07 0.067 0.067 0.065 0.012 0.105 0 0 0 0
R-squared 0.071 0.072 0.072 0.074 0.094 0.086 0.077 0.079 0.098 0.091
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Table E.7: Robustness checks: DiD with trend, no fixed effects. Creating an alternative control group which is follows the late receivers.
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X XI
Monthly
consumption
(kl)
Monthly
consumption
(kl)
Monthly
consumption
(kl)
Monthly
consumption
(kl)
Monthly
consumption
(kl)
Monthly
consumption
(kl)
Monthly
consumption
(kl)
Monthly
consumption
(kl)
Monthly
consumption
(kl)
Monthly
consumption
(kl)
Monthly
consumption
(kl)
Tips x Post -0.132* -0.132* -0.125* -0.122* -0.124* -0.122* -0.098 -0.195** -0.203** -0.192*** -0.184**
0.073 0.073 0.072 0.072 0.073 0.065 0.072 0.08 0.081 0.072 0.083
Intrinsic x
Post -0.118* -0.118* -0.094 -0.097 -0.085 -0.086 -0.06 -0.312*** -0.311*** -0.300*** -0.288***
0.068 0.068 0.067 0.067 0.07 0.062 0.07 0.086 0.088 0.08 0.087
Image
Motivation x
Post
-0.247*** -0.247*** -0.242*** -0.243*** -0.251*** -0.273*** -0.228*** -0.502*** -0.516*** -0.520*** -0.504***
0.085 0.085 0.085 0.084 0.086 0.078 0.087 0.096 0.097 0.09 0.1
SR Opt Out x
Post -0.134* -0.134* -0.112 -0.111 -0.12 -0.119* -0.078 -0.276*** -0.284*** -0.267*** -0.256***
0.076 0.076 0.075 0.075 0.075 0.066 0.077 0.082 0.082 0.074 0.083
Trend -0.191*** -0.191*** -0.192*** -0.194*** -0.189*** -0.212*** -0.200*** -0.270*** -0.269*** -0.284*** -0.280***
0.028 0.028 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.013 0.016 0.015 0.015 0.014 0.016
Indigent status 2.370*** 2.389*** 2.411*** 2.019*** 1.434*** 1.444*** 1.447*** 0.967***
0.318 0.325 0.332 0.325 0.382 0.382 0.381 0.362
Frequency (-1) -0.017 0
0.037 0.037
Billed amount
(-1) 0.005*** 0.005***
0 0
Tariff rate (-1) -0.053*** -0.054***
0.004 0.004
Post x indigent 2.089*** 2.071*** 2.027*** 2.199***
0.235 0.238 0.223 0.269
Tips x indigent 0.14 0.138 0.199 0.072
0.251 0.24 0.231 0.271
Intrinsic x
indigent -0.486 -0.510* -0.411 -0.348
0.295 0.299 0.279 0.324
Image
Motivation x
indigent
-0.45 -0.45 -0.345 -0.503
0.298 0.297 0.275 0.32
SR Opt out x
indigent -0.087 -0.133 -0.099 0.023
0.296 0.283 0.275 0.313
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Tips x
indigent x Post 0.225 0.248 0.218 0.267*
0.158 0.162 0.141 0.156
Intrinsic x
indigent x Post 0.233 0.265* 0.241* 0.245
0.143 0.146 0.131 0.151
Image
Motivation x
indigent x Post
0.553*** 0.569*** 0.524*** 0.592***
0.159 0.165 0.149 0.164
SR Opt Out x
indigent x Post 0.272 0.277 0.237 0.296*
0.176 0.176 0.156 0.179
Constant 23.727*** 23.727*** 27.102*** 26.260*** 26.280*** 25.284*** 27.312*** 26.931*** 26.972*** 25.933*** 28.036***
0.195 0.195 0.291 0.323 0.309 0.362 0.305 0.326 0.309 0.36 0.307
Observations 1 379 393 1 379 393 1 379 393 1 379 393 1 357 734 1 357 734 1 210 934 1 379 393 1 357 734 1 357 734 1 210 934
Treated 1 075 276 1 075 276 1 075 276 1 075 276 1 058 615 1 058 615 944 484 1 075 276 1 058 615 1 058 615 944 484
Treat1 313 199 313 199 313 199 313 199 308 128 308 128 274 927 313 199 308 128 308 128 274 927
Treat2 235 372 235 372 235 372 235 372 231 713 231 713 206 759 235 372 231 713 231 713 206 759
Treat3 265 693 265 693 265 693 265 693 261 901 261 901 233 417 265 693 261 901 261 901 233 417
Treat4 261 012 261 012 261 012 261 012 256 873 256 873 229 381 261 012 256 873 256 873 229 381
Control 304 117 304 117 304 117 304 117 299 119 299 119 266 450 304 117 299 119 299 119 266 450
Clusters 653 653 653 653 653 653 653 653 653 653 653
Fpvalue 0.068 0.068 0.078 0.076 0.064 0.012 0.121 0 0 0 0
R-squared 0.012 0.012 0.071 0.072 0.073 0.093 0.085 0.076 0.077 0.097 0.09
